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Introduction
Taxes are among the oldest instruments of governments to generate income. There
is documented evidence dated to the first dynasty of the Old Kingdom in the 3rd
millennium B.C. that the pharaoh collected taxes which ancient Egyptians had to pay
(e.g. Malik, 2000). With respect to taxation modern Europeans do not seem to be
very different from ancient Egyptians: some kind of tax has to be paid everywhere.
An important difference to ancient times is that nowadays not the pharaoh, but
elected governments collect these taxes. What is taxed and how differs a lot across
European countries. One of the most striking features of modern countries is that
in many cases taxation is not exclusive to one government, since local, regional, and
central governments exist in parallel and their territories overlap. All those levels
of government need revenues to fulfill their responsibilities. In the European Union,
the degree of importance of the local and regional level varies across countries, as
does the autonomy over tax instruments, which sub-national entities can use on the
revenue side of their budget.
Starting with the Union level itself, a part of its budget is financed by a share of
each member state’s harmonized revenues from the value added tax. The relevance
of taxation at the supranational level is rather low, though. Traditional own source
revenues at this level of government, raised on behalf of the entire Union, are mainly
import duties on services and goods. In addition the EU level is financed with
transfers from the member states. Although there is a still ongoing debate over
European taxes, until now the European Union does not have the power to decide
upon an own tax-base, reliefs, or a tax-rate. However, the European debt crisis
revived the debate over more fiscal centralization at the European level, including the
harmonization of some tax bases, the set-up of a stronger European fiscal authority,
or even the creation of European tax instruments.
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So far, most tax related issues are still dealt with exclusively by the member
states, and in many cases additionally by their sub-national entities. Central gov-
ernment tax bases, tax rates, and other elements of the tax code vary substantially
between countries in Europe. Below the central level, the federal set-up of European
countries, the fiscal policy instruments at their disposal, and their fiscal position
in terms of debts and deficits vary remarkably. While the debate at the European
level is mostly about centralizing taxation at the supranational level, in most of the
member states a trend towards decentralization to the sub-national sector has been
observable over the past two decades. This is related to an increasing importance of
sub-national governments’ decision making. The central aim of this work is a bet-
ter positive understanding of issues arising in public finances at the sub-national level.
The literature on fiscal federalism deals with questions of public finance in multi-
tiered governmental systems. Ever since the 1950’s, academic scholars were concerned
about taxation and the provision of public goods in a world where countries divide
some of those responsibilities between the central and sub-national levels. The pro-
vision of public goods and taxation at those lower levels of government can, under
certain circumstances, be more efficient than at the higher level (e.g. Tiebout, 1956;
Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). One assumption of the earlier literature, sometimes
classified as first generation fiscal federalism, was that benevolent governments max-
imize public social welfare and do not distort public policies because of rent-seeking
or vote-maximizing behavior (Oates, 2005).
Most European countries have established a principle of local autonomy and self-
government.1 When discussing the revenue side of local or state budgets, two impor-
tant features have to be taken into account. First, the distinction between revenues
from taxation and other revenues, such as user fees, grants, and other allocation
of funds. Second, tax revenues have to be split up into own and shared revenues.
Own revenues are those where the respective government has an impact on tax rates
or reliefs, and other tax revenues arise through redistribution mechanisms. Figure
I.1 shows the composition for the EU15 countries. Three stylized facts can be de-
rived from this graph, which serve as one of the motivations for the three empirical
contributions in this dissertation:
1See Dexia (2008) for a comprehensive descriptive analysis.
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Figure I.1: Breakdown of sub-national government revenue
1. The degree of tax-autonomy varies widely across sub-national sectors in the
EU15.
2. German local governments have substantial autonomy over taxation.
3. The local sector in the neighboring country France shares this characteristic of
relatively high ratios of own-source taxes.
Each of the three contributions in this dissertation is concerned with one of the
stylized facts presented above and relates to the recent conclusions of the second gen-
eration fiscal federalism literature as surveyed by Weingast (2009). Main conclusions
of this new strand of literature are challenged with the data in one of the following
chapters respectively.
3
The first chapter deals with the question of whether fiscal rules and the het-
erogeneity in the structure of revenues, as shown in Figure I.1, have an impact on
sub-national fiscal outcomes. This topic has been a particular focus of the younger
literature on fiscal federalism. While the traditional literature emphasized the poten-
tial pros of higher efficiency of decentralization, recently also potential cons were more
intensively discussed in the literature (see e.g. Prud’homme, 1995). Weingast (1995)
defines five conditions, and for an ideal, market-preserving type of federalism, all of
which should be fulfilled simultaneously. One of them says that “all governments,
especially subnational ones, [should] face hard budget constraints” (Weingast, 1995, p.
4). This condition implies that local and regional governments are fully responsible
for their own financial decisions. One main channel behind soft-budget constraints in-
stead is the expected likelihood to receive bailouts and additional grants from higher
level governments. If those sub-national governments have incentives to overspend,
their budget constraints become soft, resulting in higher sub-national deficits and
debts. To meet the criteria of hard budget constraints, “[...] each level of govern-
ment in the federal system must be fiscally independent. That is, each must have
its own tax base that more or less matches its expenditure obligations without sig-
nificant intergovernmental transfers” (McKinnon, 1997, p. 73). An excellent survey
and a collection of case studies for different countries around the globe is provided
by Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003). According to this, the abovementioned
structure of revenues across European sub-national sectors is a particularly strong
driving force of a bias towards higher deficits. The revenue structure is important
for the functioning of a federal organized country and is at the core of the analysis
in this chapter.
This part of my research investigates the differences of deficits across EU15 sub-
national governments. Specifically, I establish a link between the fiscal profligacy and
the autonomy that these governments have in raising their revenues. This autonomy
might constraint sub-national sectors as a form of an implicit rule, since more au-
tonomy over taxation goes along with greater responsibility for the results of their
own fiscal policies. In line with the soft-budget hypothesis, higher autonomy should
reduce the bias towards deficits. On the other hand, a well established framework
of fiscal rules can help prevent a deficit bias and centralize the budget process (see
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Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen, 2009, for an extensive treatment of this relation-
ship). My research pays special attention to the increasing implementation of fiscal
rules across sub-national government sectors of the European Union by investigating
their impact on deficits together with their tax autonomy. Results from my original
dataset, which covers full information for 14 years for the EU15, show that the effec-
tiveness of means depends critically on the federal background. Explicit fiscal rules,
as formulated in law or constitutions, work for unitary countries. Implicit rules in
the form of higher tax autonomy improve the market-preserving aspect of the federal
structure in countries which are organized as federations according to their constitu-
tion.
The second chapter deals with the perception that economic policies are not al-
ways carried out by benevolent governments acting as social planners, but rather
by “government officials, usually with at least one eye to their reelection prospects”
(Hatfield, 2006, p. 1). This prediction is a result of the work in political economy
and public choice, which assumes that politicians and bureaucrats act in their own
interest instead of focusing on the welfare of their constituents. This chapter is mo-
tivated by the second stylized fact presented above. In Germany, local councils can
manipulate local tax rates on business and revenues from these taxes are a substantial
part of local level budgets. According to the theory of political budget cycles, policy
makers are supposed to use the tools at their disposal to signal their competence to
the electorate in order to increase their reelection prospects at the ballot boxes (Ro-
goff, 1990). Voters, even those who are rational and forward-looking, might reward
lower taxes or higher spending if information asymmetry does not allow them to fully
evaluate the long-term consequences of such policies. Politicians, in turn, can make
use of this and try to signal their “competence” by keeping taxes low, even though
financial pressure might heavily call for a tax increase.
The autonomy that German local governments enjoy in setting their taxes, to-
gether with the fact that these tax rates are often quite persistent over time, calls for
an investigation of political budget cycles in tax rate choices. The purpose of that
chapter is to assess whether politicians manipulate the timing of tax rate changes in a
strategic way to maximize reelection prospects. To do so, we exploit the German local
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business tax as a testing ground which is set autonomously by German municipali-
ties. As election dates vary across local councils, the data allow us to disentangle the
effects related to the timing of elections from common trends. The results strongly
suggest the notion of a political budget cycle. The decision to alter business tax rates
as well as the annual percentage change of the tax rates are determined by electoral
events. Specifically, we find that in election years the probability of a tax hike declines
while this is exactly the opposite once the election took place. In post-election years
the probability of a tax increases or positive changes of the tax rates is significantly
larger than zero. This pattern is in line with considerations of the political budget
cycles literature, as politicians do not implement unpopular policies at times when
voters are likely to remember that at the ballot boxes.
The third chapter2 of my dissertation contributes to the empirical research in the
area of fiscal interactions and tax competition. European businesses in cross-border
situations encounter important tax issues. This chapter draws on the second and
third stylized fact that both German and French local jurisdictions can autonomously
charge taxes on business activities. According to Figure I.1 more than 20% of German
and 40% of French sub-national revenues are generated by taxes where the respective
authorities can decide upon the tax rate. Both countries’ taxation tools have an
impact on the after tax profits of firms. The research presented in this chapter focuses
on the question of whether officials in local jurisdictions use this tax instrument
in a strategic way in order to be attractive for capital investment or to maximize
reelection prospects. These hypotheses are predictions from the tax competition (see
Wilson (1999) for a survey) and the yardstick competition (Besley and Case, 1995)
literatures. We are in particular interested if local communities interact only with
respect to other domestic communities or also with respect to those on the other side
of the Franco-German border.
A newly constructed panel data set of the municipalities in France and in Ger-
many along the Rhine Valley allows us to estimate an empirical model of strategic
interactions between French and German local jurisdictions over the period 2000-
2007. We compute effective average tax rates to obtain comparable measures of the
2The research presented in this chapter is based on Cassette, Di Porto, and Foremny (2012).
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tax burden for each municipality in each country. With this data we estimate panel
models in which we distinguish between the influence of competing municipalities
that belong to the same country and the effect of competing municipalities that be-
long to different countries, sharing a border. A specific feature of our sample is that
the Franco-German border coincides with the River Rhine. Crossing the Rhine is
only possible where infrastructure in the form of bridges or ferries is available. This
allows us to distinguish between the pure effect of neighborhood and the role of in-
frastructure. Our results show that a strong border effect exists in local tax rate
setting, even though capital is free to cross the border. Spatial correlation between
the taxes set by local governments is driven exclusively by domestic effects, even after
controlling for bridges and ferries.
This thesis investigates how different tax systems, tax tools, and institutional
settings affect economic agents and outcomes. The research presented in this disser-
tation provides empirical evidence for an interplay between politics and fiscal policy
in an European sub-national context. Over the last decades decentralization in Euro-
pean countries and at the Union level itself has always been in motion. The strategic
element in fiscal policy observed in the data, be it the timing of tax rate changes,
the structure of competition for capital among local governments, or how to restrain
deficits, suggests that it is important to take the role of the politicians themselves
into account when competencies are transferred and restructured across governmental
levels.
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Chapter 1
Vertical aspects of sub-national
deficits
The impact of implicit and explicit constraints in Europe
1.1 Introduction
This chapter tackles the questions of why the aggregated fiscal performance of sub-
national governments in European countries differs, and how this can be explained by
different institutional settings, such as fiscal rules and autonomy over tax instruments.
Much research has been done since the early 1990’s which dealt with the ques-
tion of why certain countries have experienced long periods of budget deficits that
accumulated in high levels of public debt while others did not. Attention has focused
on political and institutional factors, since even countries with similar underlying
economic conditions showed a widespread variation in debt levels. It has been ar-
gued that to a large extent the design of the institutions which govern the budgetary
process is the underlying reason for the cross-country heterogeneity in fiscal posi-
tions (among others, see von Hagen and Harden, 1994, 1995; von Hagen, 2002, 2005;
Alesina and Perotti, 1996, for this line of argument).
While much attention, both theoretical and empirical, has been spent on the cen-
tral or general budget and national fiscal policy, the links between sub-national debts
and deficits, their institutions, and in particular the restrictions imposed on them by
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fiscal rules, have not yet been explored in depth. The institutional background in
this context is different from that of the central level because vertical relationships
between the levels of government play a crucial role. This chapter aims at a closer
empirical investigation of the underlying forces.
The differences in fiscal positions below the national level can be caused by a deficit
bias due to a common pool externality. Budgetary inflows in almost all countries come
to a certain extent from a common source in the form of transfers or grants, while
budgetary outflows are targeted to specific regions or municipalities. To be precise, a
substantial share of revenues is generated with instruments that sub-national entities
have no direct discretion over. The concept that the tax base is responsible for
bailouts and connected through this channel to the deficit bias was introduced by
von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996). They argue that, in a dynamic context, the
budget constraints of governments which are highly dependent on revenues that are
not generated by their own instruments might become soft. The respective decision
makers at the sub-national level might expect ex-ante that, if they cause a large and
unsustainable deficit, the resulting outstanding debt would have to be bailed out ex-
post by a higher-level government. In other words, the central government cannot
credibly commit itself to a no-bailout policy, if the respective lower level government
has no power to solve fiscal problems on its own because the instruments to do so
are not available once fiscal trouble has emerged. If instead a large proportion of
sub-national revenues comes from own tax resources, this might work as an implicit
way of the central government to communicate that sub-national entities should act
on their own behalf. In this case, they can be asked to implement adjustments by
increasing tax rates under their control. Low fiscal autonomy instead is connected
with higher deficits, since budget constraints are soft (von Hagen and Eichengreen,
1996).
A recent attempt to mitigate this time inconsistency problem of soft budget con-
straints was to impose fiscal rules on sub-national governments. The idea of fiscal
rules is to force local or regional governments to act in the way the central level de-
sires. The number of fiscal frameworks which impose balanced budget or debt rules
on lower governmental sectors has increased over the last two decades. The introduc-
tion of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact could be seen as
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the cornerstone in the interest of such rules. In recent years a strong increase in the
number of fiscal rules at the national level can be observed. The goal of these rules,
often called “national stability pact”, could easily be jeopardized if the budgetary
policies of sub-national governments do not act in concert. Therefore, almost all of
these national pacts impose restrictions on lower level governments as well.
The driving forces behind sub-national deficits I explore in this paper are twofold.
On the one hand, I focus on the autonomy that these governments have in raising
revenues. This autonomy might constrain sub-national sectors as a form of an implicit
rule, since greater autonomy goes along with greater responsibility for results of their
fiscal policy. On the other hand, I also focus on explicit fiscal rules, as formulated
in laws or constitutions, covering restrictions imposed on the sub-national sector to
harden the budget constraint.
I also analyze what drives countries to adopt, keep, or to strengthen their frame-
work of rules. This is an important task that helps overcome a potential problem of
endogeneity, which is well known in this strand of literature. Stricter rules may be
adopted by governments with stronger preferences for fiscal discipline or a severe need
for consolidation. I show that good instrumental variables for sub-national rules exist
which can help to solve this potential endogeneity problem. The main reasoning of
the paper in this dimension is that political characteristics of the rule imposing level
might be good instruments for the rules themselves at the lower governmental level.
They fulfill the exclusion restriction since these political variables might have an im-
pact on the fiscal outcome of the central level, but not on the deficits of sub-national
governments.
I derive my results from a panel-data set of the sub-national sectors of the EU15
countries, covering data for fiscal rules, tax autonomy, and political and fiscal vari-
ables over the period 1995-2008. Regressions of the deficits of sub-national sectors
on measurements of the strictness of rules and the discretion to tax show that the
effectiveness of fiscal rules and the impact of tax autonomy depend critically on the
federal structure of the respective country. As a main result, fiscal rules work in uni-
tary countries and not in federations, but implicit restrictions in the form of higher
tax autonomy are an effective way to constrain excessive spending for the federal
countries in my sample.
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This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents stylized facts for sub-
national public finances of the EU15 countries. Section 1.3 summarizes the underlying
theory and the related literature. The empirical analysis starts in Section 1.4 with
an explanation of my identification strategy. Section 1.5 presents my dataset, and
my results are shown and discussed in Section 1.6. This chapter comes to a close in
the Section 1.7.
1.2 Stylized facts
The structure of European countries differs in many respects. One of the most im-
portant distinctions is the role and status of the sub-national sector due to the con-
stitutional structure.
federal Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain
countries (local and regional levels included seperately)
unitary Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
countries Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom
(consolidated sub-national values included)
Table 1.1: Unitary and federal classification
Three countries out of the EU15 are original federations as written down in the
respective constitution (Austria, Belgium, Germany), and another country (Spain)
has a very regionalized structure. All these countries have had handed over important
responsibilities to the regional and local level, and these sub-national governments
have significant own legislative powers. I treat this group of countries as federations
in my analysis. The other group of states consists of unitary countries, but those may
have a different number of sub-national levels. While Finland has only a local level
sector, the remaining unitary countries (Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) have at
least one regional level, but with limited legal autonomy, compared to their federal
counterparts. As indicated in Table 1.1, I group all these countries as unitary ones.
European countries differ substantially in the level of sub-national debt which they
have accumulated in the past. Figure 1.1 shows the level of debt outstanding in 2008
11
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Figure 1.1: Sub-national outstanding debt
as a share of GDP in the top panel. This indicates that a substantial part of the total
debt in European countries is due to sub-national borrowing. Most federal countries,
and in particular Germany, show relatively large ratios of debt to GDP. However,
this measure can be misleading, since it does not take into account the actual size of
the sub-national sector. Therefore, the bottom panel depicts the outstanding debt as
a share of revenues for the same year at the sub-national sector. Measures in terms
of revenues capture two important dimensions. First, they indicate the relevance of
debt in terms of the capacity to generate budgetary inflows. Second, this measures
the size of the sub-national sector as mentioned before.1 While the ranking for federal
countries remains largely the same, this further illustrates the differences in unitary
countries. Even though the Nordic countries have much larger sub-national sectors
relative to the general government sector, their debt is lower compared to countries
1The actual size might be also depicted in terms of expenditures, but note that the ordering of
countries does not change if I do so.
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such as Portugal or France, which are less decentralized.
Since debts are (at least formally)2 the accumulation of deficits over time, the pa-
per aims at answering the following questions. First, why did some federal countries,
such as Germany, have on average larger deficits than other federal countries? And
second, what drives the pattern of deficits over time in the unitary countries, even
though the differences in decentralization have been taken into account? To sum it
up, I will explore why sub-national sectors in some countries are exposed to a larger
bias toward deficits than others.
1.3 Theoretical motivation and related empirical
literature
A well-established reasoning for differences in debts and deficits at any level of gov-
ernment is that the respective decision makers do not fully internalize the costs of
the public goods they acquire. This is known as the common pool problem of pub-
lic budgeting. Since costs are shared by the whole population, theoretical models,
as those of von Hagen and Harden (1995), Velasco (2000), Hallerberg, Strauch, and
von Hagen (2009), and Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2010), emphasize that these costs
are not fully internalized by the spending claims of individual spending ministers,
in the sub-national context by members of local or regional councils. This results
in overspending, since only a small part of the additional social costs of raising the
tax burden are taken into account, eventually creating a problem of 1/n. The more
interest groups are involved in deciding the budget, the more fragmented the budget
process becomes, and the larger the deficit bias due to individual spending claims.
This is a result of a horizontal externality since it occurs within one government.
This point, which applies to every level of government, is supplemented by one
that especially lets sub-national governments be inclined to overspend and borrow
extensively. This might occur because several sub-national entities are grabbing for
resources out of a national common pool (von Hagen, 2005). In this case the existence
of soft budget constraints creates a vertical externality. Bordignon (2006) provides
2See von Hagen and Wolff (2006) for a treatment of creative accounting and stock-flow adjust-
ments.
13
a survey of this literature. When a budget constraint is considered to be soft, a
sub-national government can increase expenditures without facing the full additional
social costs. A hard budget constraint instead makes the entity internalize the full
additional social costs, since it expects to be responsible for the consequences of its
spending plans (Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack, 2003).
The underlying problem is of a dynamic nature: sub-national governments can
accumulate unsustainable debt levels if they expect ex-ante that the central govern-
ment might wish to bail them out once fiscal obligations can no longer be fulfilled
ex-post. In other words, sub-national governments might expect that under certain
circumstances the central government will assume responsibility for the liabilities they
accumulate. Thus, there is a link between expectations of the future behavior of a
higher-level government and the fiscal policy chosen at present. One main channel
of these expectations is intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The probability that a
sub-national entity is not responsible for its fiscal decisions taken today is higher, the
lower the share of own-source revenues is. In other words, the higher the dependency
on central governmental grants and transfers, the higher the expectation of a bailout.
This is because the central level has less room to ask for adjustments in sub-national
taxes in the case of fiscal trouble, resulting in a dynamic game between the two actors
(von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996).
This “default-bailout game” between the central and sub-national level is formal-
ized by Inman (2001) and Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003). The center commits
itself at the first stage to a no-bailout policy. The sub-national level instead chooses
to spend at a level where the local marginal benefit is higher than the marginal social
costs if it has a strong belief that the commitment of the center at the first stage is
not credible. Finally, the central government has to decide whether or not to provide
additional transfers to the lower level in order to reduce the deficit there. If the
center has strong incentives to do so, its actions will be anticipated by the lower level
government. The budget constraint is the softer, the lower the costs of the center
to provide additional funds compared to leaving the sub-national government alone
with its deficits.
Starting with Wildasin (1997), several papers formalized the problem in partial
equilibrium models in order to analyze the effects of different issues on the preva-
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lence of soft budget constraints (see Vigneault (2006) for an extensive overview over
theoretical considerations). Wildasin (1997) focuses on the size and structure of
jurisdictions. In his model the incentives of the central government to intervene in
lower-level public finances is due to positive externalities of local public expenditures.
Since these interventions can be anticipated at the first stage, local budget constraints
are soft. The model of Goodspeed (2002) shows that a bailout forced by incentives of
a lower level government to accumulate high debt has to be paid partially by other
regions through increased taxation. Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2007) investigates the impact of
fiscal equalization schemes, and Breuille´, Madie`s, and Taugourdeau (2006) focus on
the impact of horizontal and vertical tax competition. For federal systems, Breuille´
and Vigneault (2010) have recently shown that the soft budget problem can be worse
in a multi-tier system if regional level governments have discretion over transfer poli-
cies. In that case a soft budget constraint on the regional level yields even softer
budget constraints on the local level.
The theoretical interest in soft budget constraints in the context of fiscal federalism
has also triggered empirical contributions in this area. These studies focus either
on cross-country evidence over aggregated fiscal policy on the sub-national level,
or country specific case studies. Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003) provide a
collection of mostly descriptive case studies. Additional country specific evidence for
sub-national bailouts is provided by von Hagen et al. (2000) for German states, Italian
regions, Australian and Swedish local jurisdictions.3 Evidence for Sweden is found by
Dahlberg and von Hagen (2004). They show that the ability of the central Swedish
government to commit to a no-bailout policy is rather weak, while the high degree of
tax autonomy at the local level helps to harden budget constraints. A recent study by
Pettersson-Lidbom (2010) identifies the expectations of local Swedish governments
over a future discretionary grant by an instrumental variable approach. He uses the
grants received by neighboring municipalities as an instrument for the anticipation
of own additional future discretionary grants. A significant soft budget effect is
found, and on average debt is increased by 20 percent when the budget constraint
3Among others, further contributions deal with bailouts across the German states (Seitz, 2000;
Fink and Stratmann, 2011; Baskaran, 2012), Spanish regions (Sorribas-Navarro, 2011), and various
Latin American countries (e.g. Echavarria, Renteria, and Steiner, 2002; Bevilaqua, 2002; Nicolini
et al., 2002).
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becomes soft. Apart from these studies, there is not much more empirical evidence
at the country level. The lack of empirical work can be explained by the fact that
expectations over the additional allocation of funds are not easy to measure, and as
shown in the various case studies, numerous aspects of intergovernmental relations
can create this effect.
In order to solve the soft budget problem of time inconsistent behavior, countries
characterized by little revenue raising power at sub-national levels might impose more
restrictions through fiscal rules on lower level governments in order to commit the
local or regional level to fiscal discipline. Indeed, von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996)
show that borrowing limits are more prevalent in countries where the share of sub-
central government’s own-source resources is small. This is because if own taxes could
be adjusted, the central government could deny a bailout. It has been also pointed
out that these incentives might be different according to the federal organization of
countries.
Recent empirical work on fiscal rules at the general level of government across
European countries4 has established that their effectiveness depends on the institu-
tional and political background of the respective country. Evidence in von Hagen
(2006) underpins the importance of the design of the budget process that enables the
government to commit to the rule. Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2007) show
that the stringency of fiscal targets has an impact in European countries which are
characterized by ideological dispersion in the government. An intensive discussion of
these results is provided in Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2009). Similar re-
sults are obtained by the study of Debrun et al. (2008), who apply another indicator
to capture the strictness of rules across European Union countries.
Empirical contributions that are closely related to this paper perform cross-
country comparisons at the sub-national level, rather than investigating individual
local or regional governments. At the sub-national level fiscal rules and tax autonomy
may have simultaneously an influence on fiscal positions. This literature focuses on
4For studies exploiting variation across US states see, among others, von Hagen (1991); Poterba
(1994); Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995); Poterba (1996); Fata´s and Mihov (2006). Bohn and
Inman (1996) find that only constitutional rules prevent deficits in US states, while statutory ones
do not. Feld and Kirchgassner (2006) find that across Swiss cantons those with fiscal constraints have
significantly lower deficits. In addition, Alesina et al. (1999) show for a sample of Latin American
countries that well designed budget institutions reduce deficits.
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the differences across countries in order to investigate which institutional elements
have an impact on sub-national fiscal policy. Rodden (2002, 2006) uses a panel-data
set of forty-three OECD, developing, and developed countries over ten years (1986 to
1996). A first set of results is based on ten-year average regressions, capturing long-
run effects. He finds that vertical fiscal imbalance (i.e. the share of grants and shared
taxes in revenues) is positively related to deficits. For a second set of results all coun-
tries are grouped in two categories, countries with high and low borrowing autonomy.
For the former he finds that vertical fiscal imbalance is still a driving force of deficits,
while there is no effect for the latter. As already mentioned in the conclusion of that
paper, more work should be done to investigate the effects of tax autonomy, and in
particular the changes over time and the different degrees of borrowing autonomy.
Plekhanov and Singh (2006) analyze with a panel-data set over 1982-2000 which spe-
cific institutional design of borrowing constraints prevents large sub-national deficits.
Their classification of fiscal rules is based on dummies according to the way the rules
are imposed. This paper finds, while averaging over all years for each country, that
rules imposed by the central government and cooperative agreements might reduce
deficits when the vertical imbalance is large.
These days, however, almost all European sub-national governments are con-
strained by some restrictions, and the pure classification into categories as in Plekhanov
and Singh (2006) is not without ambiguity. Another probable shortcoming of the ex-
isting empirical literature is that none of the papers provide a panel analysis which
takes the changes in fiscal rules and tax autonomy over time into account. On the
one hand, this is because time invariant indicators are used, and hence institutional
changes are neglected. On the other hand, some results are based on between es-
timations, which were carried out on the average of the variables per country over
time. Fiscal rules differ over time and how stringent and transparent they are ap-
plied. In particular European countries introduced numerous rules for sub-national
sectors over the last two decades. I use a continuous index, rather than a categorical
approach, to investigate whether the strictness of rules has an impact.
Similar arguments apply to the characterization of own-source revenues. The
concept of vertical fiscal imbalance should be carefully reconsidered, since it has
not accounted for shared taxes. But shared taxes, collected by the central and then
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redistributed to the lower level sectors, might not be any different from grants in terms
of incentives as tax rates cannot be decided at the sub-national level. I rather focus
on the development of own-source taxes, which takes into account the distortionary
nature of taxes, when central governments ask for adjustments by increasing tax rates
rather than providing additional funds through bailouts or by increasing grants. This
is even more important since the underlying problem of soft budget constraints is a
dynamic one.
Solving these issues is one of the main contributions of this paper. I estimate panel
models where I carefully construct measures of the tax autonomy of sub-national
sectors, the different strength of borrowing restrictions in the form of fiscal rules,
and explicitly take into account the variation over time. This can be interpreted as
comparing the outcome for times before major reforms of rules and tax autonomy
were implemented with the time after implementation.
A further well known problem in the literature on fiscal rules is that their correla-
tion with deficits does not necessarily have to be causal. Studies on the national level
have highlighted the lack of good quality instruments in order to address a problem
of endogeneity. This explicit sub-national context, however, allows finding variables
that are correlated with the fiscal rules index, but are orthogonal to the error term.
I exploit the fact that fiscal rules are in almost all cases imposed by a higher level
of government. Earlier contributions have shown that political economy variables
are able to explain the stringency of fiscal rules (see Debrun et al. (2008), for in-
stance). However, on the national level these variables might not be simultaneously
uncorrelated with budgetary outcomes. Although this is true on the national level,
in the case of sub-national sectors the decision makers over rules (the central govern-
ment) and the decision makers over budgetary policy (the sub-national entities) are
not the same. I will make use of the fact that the characteristics of central govern-
ments, which impose rules on the sub-national one, are unlikely to be correlated with
their budgetary outcomes, but describe well the prevalence of rules. The attempt to
solve this endogeneity problem is another contribution of this paper compared to the
existing literature.
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1.4 Identification
The main objective of this paper is to analyze whether a measure of the budgetary
position can be explained by autonomy over taxation and fiscal rules, as tools which
might restrict governments from profligacy. I estimate a reduced form model of a
fiscal reaction function according to equation (1.1):
Di,t = γtaxi,t−1 + δrulesi,t + βXi,t + µi + ηt + εi,t (1.1)
The dependent variable is a measure of the budget deficit, Di,t, at the sub-national
level. The impact of the tax-structure in terms of sub-national autonomy is captured
by the parameter γ. I estimate the reaction to a lagged variable of the share of taxes
which are under discretion of the respective government. I argue that using the one
period lag is important since policy makers will use their knowledge from the past to
build their expectations about the future. A high dependency on own-source taxes
in the past indicates that it is likely that current deficits must be paid back by own
resources instead of expecting to receive transfers from the central government.
The parameter δ captures the impact of fiscal rules, as an explicit way to restrict
public finances. The data section spends special attention to the question how the
variables tax and rules are constructed.
The impact of other explanatory control variables is measured by the parameters
in the vector β. µi and ηt are individual and time fixed effects, respectively. The
inclusion of individual fixed effects is, besides capturing unobserved heterogeneity,
important to focus on the dynamic nature of the underlying problem. I aim at an
estimate of the impact of changes in the institutional framework on budgetary out-
comes in the form of annual deficits. Hence, the question is how rules and autonomy
affect deficits in the short run, and the inclusion of fixed effects captures all time
invariant factors.
It is important to take the connection of the sub-national level to the higher
level of government into account. The mechanism to tie the hands of lower-level
governments by giving them autonomy might work well in federations, where lower-
level governments have substantial degrees of freedom over their policies and legal
acts. On the contrary, in unitary countries the sub-national level is more or less the
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extension of central government policies. When the sub-national level is not much
more than a branch of the central one, a credible commitment of the center to a no-
bailout strategy might be impossible in any case (even in line with a positive impact
of autonomy on deficits).
Di,t = γΦ
′taxi,t−1 + δΦ′rulesi,t + βXi,t + µi + ηt + εi,t (1.2)
To capture these effects, I estimate models according to equation (1.2) and interact
a set of dummies Φ with the main variables of interest.
Φ′ =
 Φ1
Φ2
 and = 1 if unitary country, 0 otherwise
= 1 if local or regional level in a federal country, else 0
These dummies classify the respective form of government, as given in Table 1.1.
Eventually I end up with separate coefficients on tax autonomy and fiscal rules for
federal and unitary countries.
To address problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, I estimate cluster-
robust forms of the variance-covariance matrix. In some cases the small number
of groups relative to coefficients does not allow to cluster over countries. In that
case I estimate the variance-covariance matrix according to Newey and West (1987)
with standard errors that are robust to both, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(HAC).
As a robustness check, I also estimate dynamic models with a lagged dependent
variable. Unfortunately, this implies an additional problem, since fixed effects esti-
mates are likely to be biased as long as the time span is short (Nickell, 1981). To
control for the bias introduced by the lagged dependent variable together with fixed
effects, I use the bias-corrected version constructed by Bruno (2005) and bootstrap
the standard errors. Judson and Owen (1999) show that this is the appropriate choice
for a panel with my characteristics, i.e. when neither N nor T is large.
The possibility that fiscal rules are the result of, rather than the reason for fiscal
performance, requires a careful analysis of causality. I use an instrumental variable
approach to overcome this hurdle. First, I estimate the factors determining the
fiscal rules index. I include political determinants of the level of government which
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introduces the rules, indicators of the general fiscal stance of the respective country,
as well as dummies for different time periods (the time of the Stability and Growth
Pact, for instance) and further controls, included in Z, into the model.
According to equation (1.3), I estimate a model for each value of the fiscal rules
index j across countries, using the average of covariates during the time span when
the rule was applied:
rulesj = γpolj + δbudgetj + θtimej + βZj + εj (1.3)
Furthermore I estimate a fixed effects model to capture the variance in rules over
time according to the model in equation (1.4):
rulesi,t = γpoli,t + δbudgeti,t + θtimei,t + βZi,t + µi + εi,t (1.4)
Ideally, this step offers candidates for instruments. Finally, I re-estimate equation
(1.1) and use instruments for the fiscal rules index. I spend additional attention to
the validity of instruments in Section 1.6.3.
This identification procedure corrects some drawbacks of former empirical ap-
proaches. First, the focus on the within variance with time-varying indicators allows
identification of the effects in the short run. Second, including the lagged value of tax
autonomy creates a better reflection that decision makers form their expectations by
observed values from the previous period. Last, the proper choice of instruments can
eliminate a potential source of endogeneity.
1.5 Data
I use aggregate data for sub-national sectors to investigate the deficit bias which
might occur due to the relationships between different governmental layers in Euro-
pean countries. All EU15 members are included over a period ranging from 1995 to
2008. I include regional and local governments as separate entities in the four federal
organized member states. This provides 19 observations per year and 266 in total
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over the fourteen years covered by my data set.5
The dependent variable is a measure of the budgetary position in each year. While
several possible definitions are at hand, I chose to use annual deficits as a share of
revenues. Other possibilities are defining the dependent variable as the deficit per
capita or as a share of GDP. I took the decision in favor of my choice, since this
measure incorporates differences in capabilities to raise revenues, as the deficit is
expressed as a share of the revenue capacity in a given year.6
Two important indicators have to be computed in order to investigate the effects
of fiscal rules and tax autonomy. I construct both indicators as a time-varying index
that captures the development for each country over the entire time period.
First, an indicator of tax autonomy is needed to test whether the dependency on
own tax resources creates incentives to balance the books. The smaller the share of
revenues from own-source taxation is, the higher the expectation over a bailout in
times of fiscal stress. I compute an indicator of the share of own-source tax revenues
in total revenues on each governmental level, respectively. The classification of own-
source revenues is, unfortunately, not straightforward. Other studies rely on the
degree of vertical imbalance or the share of taxes in total revenues, which can be
misleading.7 It is important to distinguish real own-source revenues from revenues
which arise due to tax-sharing arrangements, i.e. taxes collected by a higher level and
automatically transferred to the lower one. The OECD (1999) provides a classification
of the taxing power of sub-national levels. Unfortunately, their Fiscal Decentralization
Database provides only information for two or at most three years, 1995, 2002, and
2005. I use the Revenue Statistics of the OECD, the Taxes in Europe database of
the European Commission, numerous national sources over changes in tax-systems,
and the information provided by Stegarescu (2005) to construct an indicator over
the entire 14 years of the sample. I treat all taxes over which either discretion on
5Please refer to Appendix A1.4 for robustness checks on alternative sample designs. Main results
remain unchanged.
6Taking deficits as a share of revenues or expenditures as the dependent variable follows the pre-
vious studies in this literature. However, the correlation with other possible measures, as expressing
deficits as a share of GDP or in per capita terms, is high. See Table 1.9 in the Appendix A1.2 for
details.
7A good example are German federal states. Their share of tax revenues in total revenues is
substantial, but the share of real own-source taxes is close to zero since they cannot decide on an
individual tax rate.
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Figure 1.2: Revenues from own-source taxation
rates, reliefs, or both are under the power of the sub-national entity as own-source tax
revenues. This measure does not overestimate the revenue autonomy in the presence
of shared taxes.
Figure 1.2 provides a graphical representation of this indicator. The Nordic coun-
tries are characterized by the largest share of autonomous revenues while German
states, both Austrian sectors, Ireland, and the Netherlands have on average very lit-
tle discretion over their revenues. Variation in the indicator is generated due to two
different effects. On the one hand, the tax-system can be changed, equipping lower
level governments with a richer set of instruments or more autonomy over existing
taxes. Some governmental sectors, such as the Spanish regions and the sub-national
Italian sector have implemented considerable changes within this period. On the
other hand, the share of other revenues could also shift when the center re-allocates
resources to lower levels of government. An increasing value of this indicator repre-
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Figure 1.3: Fiscal rules index
sents a higher responsibility at the sub-national level and might help to avoid soft
budget constraints.
Second, I construct another indicator to depict the strength of fiscal rules, i.e. how
stringent borrowing is regulated. Fiscal rules are nowadays frequently used at the
sub-national level in European countries (European Commission, 2009, 2008, 2006;
Sutherland, Price, and Joumard, 2005) to mitigate a deficit bias and to harden the
budget constraint by imposing numerical targets on budgetary variables or limiting
the access to credits. I use the data provided by the European Commission (2009)
to create an index of the strictness of these rules. All fiscal rules which can have
an impact on the deficit are included in the calculation of the index. These are
balanced-budget-rules, debt brakes, and other restrictions on borrowing.8 The orig-
inal EU index is adjusted to the situation of sub-national levels. In the non-federal
8Expenditure ceilings are very rare at the sub-national level and, as in the original EU variable,
excluded for the main analysis of the impact of rules on deficits.
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countries, an average of the rules applying to different levels, weighted by their share
of expenditures in the total sub-national budget, is used.9
Figure 1.3 shows the development of this indicator. The restrictions are relatively
stable over time in one group of countries (Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, and
Finland) while another group (Austria, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden)
has increased the strictness of rules in recent years. Most of these countries intro-
duced national stability pacts as an answer to the limitations arising from European
supranational rules. A third group (Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom) goes without strict rules. When these fiscal arrangements worked
as an effective tool to dampen a deficit bias, a negative coefficient is expected.
The other controls are summarized in Table 1.2. The fiscal position of the central
government def cg rev is included to capture a copycat effect. Sub-national govern-
ments that observe a loose fiscal policy at the national level can follow the example
given by the central government, expecting that they are not sanctioned if the higher
level is profligate as well.
The degree of decentralization is taken into account by the share of sub-national
expenditures in general government expenditures edec. Unfortunately, this indicator
is not able to distinguish between expenditures that could be categorized as com-
pulsory or those that are optional. Nevertheless, the share of expenditures captures
the weight of the sub-national sector in the general budget and how spending propor-
tions are shared between the governmental levels. These shares differ across European
countries, with varying responsibilities and discretion over their exercises.
Figure 1.4 shows the country means over my period of study. The Nordic coun-
tries, for instance, are characterized by a high level of services and responsibilities on
the local level. Danish sub-national governments spend on average more than every
second Danske kroner, followed by their Swedish and Finnish neighbors. The regional
levels of Belgium, Spain, and Germany are responsible for approximately one quar-
ter of total expenditures, accompanied by their local governments with additional,
but lower expenditure shares. The less decentralized countries are France, Portugal,
Luxembourg, and Greece. The plot against the average of own-source tax revenues
indicates that in many cases higher expenditure decentralization is accompanied by a
9The construction of this index is described in detail in Appendix A1.1.
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Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
deficit/revenues Eurostat overall 0.006 0.034 -0.100 0.112
between 0.022 -0.042 0.062
within 0.026 -0.087 0.101
Tax autonomy
tax1 OECD, overall 0.227 0.172 0.000 0.646
own calculations between 0.173 0.003 0.625
within 0.037 0.061 0.370
tax ∗ federal overall 0.152 0.122 0.000 0.343
tax ∗ unitary overall 0.281 0.184 0.041 0.646
Fiscal rules
rules2 EC, overall 0.459 0.357 0.000 1.284
own calculations between 0.311 0.000 1.100
within 0.188 -0.014 1.061
rules ∗ federal overall 0.699 0.277 0.000 1.284
rules ∗ unitary overall 0.284 0.303 0.000 1.008
Controls
def cg rev3 Eurostat overall 0.081 0.113 -0.189 0.621
between 0.074 -0.031 0.276
within 0.087 -0.169 0.556
edec4 Eurostat overall 0.254 0.131 0.043 0.659
between 0.131 0.054 0.598
within 0.029 0.116 0.360
intexp rev5 Eurostat overall 0.942 1.307 0.004 5.875
between 1.303 0.007 5.382
within 0.306 0.042 2.256
outgap Eurostat overall 0.374 1.648 -4.707 5.209
between 0.372 -0.111 1.429
within 1.608 -4.540 5.376
ln totpop Eurostat overall 16.496 1.290 12.913 18.229
between 1.323 12.999 18.225
within 0.028 16.410 16.614
depratio6 Eurostat overall 0.670 0.012 0.636 0.690
between 0.011 0.646 0.685
within 0.006 0.640 0.687
unempl7 Eurostat overall 0.075 0.031 0.019 0.184
between 0.027 0.034 0.123
within 0.017 0.036 0.137
N=19, T=14 (1995-2008), n=266
Definitions: 1revenues from own-source taxes as share of total revenues; 2fiscal rules index; 3central
government deficit as share of revenues; 4 share of sub-national expenditures in general government
expenditures; 5 interest expenditures as share of revenues; 6 share of working population in total
population; 7unemployment rate
Table 1.2: Summary statistics: Deficit estimation
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Figure 1.4: Decentralization over 1995-2008
higher degree of autonomy over tax revenues. As noted before, this is not the case for
some countries, in particular for the German federal states, but also not for Austria,
Ireland, and the Netherlands.
Additional covariates are included to capture cyclical and institutional effects
and to consider the spending needs of lower-level governments. I include the output
gap outgap, the unemployment rate unempl, the ratio of the working age to total
population depratio, the log of total population ln totpop, and interest expenses
intexp rev. All fiscal variables are computed as share of revenues.
Table 1.3 summarizes the additional political variables, which I take into account
for the estimation of fiscal rules themselves. The motivation for the central gov-
ernment to impose restrictions on lower level governments could be determined by
the perception that a soft budget problem is at hand. Thus, the federal structure
itself plays a role and several determinants of the deficit might also be crucial for
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Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ideology1 World Bank, overall 0.376 0.327 0.000 1.000
own calculations between 0.131 0.089 0.589
Beck et al. (2001) within 0.301 -0.213 1.171
herfgov2 World Bank overall 0.666 0.270 0.181 1.000
Beck et al. (2001) between 0.257 0.221 1.000
within 0.101 0.350 1.004
disctrict3 World Bank overall 9.402 6.050 1.000 22.500
Beck et al. (2001) between 5.712 1.000 20.300
within 2.364 5.052 25.352
contract4 Hallerberg et al. (2009) overall 0.425 0.495 0.000 1.000
between 0.465 0.000 1.000
within 0.199 0.068 1.282
debt gg gdp5 Eurostat overall 0.634 0.265 0.061 1.304
between 0.255 0.071 1.102
within 0.091 0.406 1.019
N=19, T=14 (1995-2008), n=266
Definitions: 1index from zero (single party left-wing) to one (single party right-wing); 2Herfindahl
measure of fractionalization (probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to different
political groups); 3district magnitude; 4 form of fiscal governance; 5debt at the general government
level as share of gdp
Table 1.3: Summary statistics: Central government characteristics
the strictness of rules. These issues are taken into account by using some of the
variables already discussed. However, the center must also believe that fiscal rules
are a mean to cure the problem and must be able to implement the rules through the
legislature. Hence, political variables which characterize the central government and
its preferences are related to fiscal rules, since they describe general preferences for a
rules based framework. Most of the data is obtained from the World Bank Database
of Political Institutions 2009 (Beck et al., 2001).
First, to control if the ideological orientation of the government plays a role, an
index over the two main government parties, reaching from zero (left-wing, single
party government) to one (right-wing, single party government), is calculated. There
is no general conjecture over the direction of the impact of this variable, and the sign
could point in either direction.10
Second, the Herfindahl index measures the fractionalization of the ruling coalition.
10Debrun et al. (2008) report evidence that more conservative orientated governments make less
use of fiscal rules.
28
A single party government yields a value of one, while values close to zero indicate
a more dispersed government. This index can be interpreted as the probability that
two randomly picked members of the ruling coalition belong to the same party. The
expected sign of this variable is not clear. On the one hand, a more fragmented
government could be willing to restrict lower levels, because they are able to blame
other coalition members when local or regional politicians complain about new rules.
On the other hand, a less fragmented government might find it easier to pass new
rules through the legislature.
Third, the district magnitude measures the average number of seats in the par-
liament per electoral district. Beside the impact on the effective number of parties,11
the district magnitude might have an additional impact in the sub-national context.
A higher value indicates that more seats are allocated within one electoral district.
Hence, the connection between local politics and the politicians elected into the cen-
tral parliament might be loose. On the contrary, a small district magnitude means
that the representative in the central legislature could be seen as directly responsible
for the respective district. A strong connection to the sub-national level might cause
representatives to be cautious with imposing strict rules, because they do not want
to cross with local politicians and voters.
Last, I include the predicted form of fiscal governance, according to von Hagen and
Harden (1995), Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2007), and Hallerberg, Strauch,
and von Hagen (2009). This literature characterizes whether a delegation or contract
approach of fiscal governance is appropriate for different countries. Centralizing the
budget process could be done by the former approach under which governments give
authority to one special member that is vested with special strategic power. On the
national level the finance minister is typically in charge of this special function. The
latter approach instead relies on contracts between all members of the cabinet with
spending rights. I include the indicator developed in this literature to investigate
whether central governments that are assumed to be contract countries follow this
approach when designing rules for sub-national levels.
11The idea was developed by Duverger (1954), tested empirically by Taagepera and Shugart
(1993) and put in the context of budgetary politics by Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999).
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1.6 Results
This section presents the results of my analysis. After estimating the baseline model
in the first subsection, I investigate the factors which determine the strictness of fiscal
frameworks in the second subsection. The goal is to identify the driving forces behind
fiscal rules in order to use them as instruments for instrumental variable estimations
when fiscal rules are treated as endogenous. The results from these estimations are
presented in the last subsection, where I also discuss my findings in more detail.
1.6.1 The impact of sub-national fiscal rules on budgetary
outcomes
Table 1.4 presents the results of the regressions for budgetary outcomes. The de-
pendent variable in any model is the share of the annual deficit in revenues at the
respective sub-national sector. Positive values arise if expenditures exceed revenues
and all coefficients with a negative sign improve the budgetary position by reducing
deficits.
The first two columns show results from regressions according to equation (1.1),
while the first column (a) does not include neither individual nor time fixed effects,
but panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). I find neither significant effects of the
lagged tax autonomy nor the strength of fiscal rules when I pool all observations and
include a dummy variable for federal countries. As mentioned earlier, including fixed
effects is superior to cross section models since the variation within groups over time
is important. Fixed effects also capture time-invariant preferences for fiscal sustain-
ability. In addition, an F-test (F(18,216)=6.21, p-value 0.00) indicates that significant
individual effects are at present and simple cross section estimations are not efficient.
Therefore, I turn to fixed effect models in columns (b) to (e), since a Hausman test
rejects the appropriateness of random effects (χ2(12)=42.49, p-value=0.00).
Results of model (b) are similar to those from the cross section without any
significant effect of tax autonomy or fiscal rules on deficits. As abovementioned, the
means to cure the deficit bias might be different conditional on whether the respective
country is a unitary one or a federation. To control for the likely different effects I
turn to the estimation of specification (1.2) from column (c) onwards.
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Dependent Variable Cross Section Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) -0.006 -0.101
(0.023) (0.061)
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.195** 0.195 0.153
(0.098) (0.120) (0.096)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.159*
(0.069) (0.056) (0.087)
Fiscal rules
rules -0.012 -0.016
(0.011) (0.010)
rules ∗ unitary -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.033**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
rules ∗ federal 0.002 0.002 0.006
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020)
Controls
def cg rev 0.066** 0.087** 0.076** 0.076* 0.060*
(0.028) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040) (0.035)
edec 0.100*** 0.147* 0.214** 0.214*** 0.127
(0.026) (0.088) (0.087) (0.074) (0.078)
intexp rev 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
outgap -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unempl 0.173 -0.036 -0.047 -0.047 0.001
(0.123) (0.216) (0.209) (0.187) (0.193)
ln totpop 0.007* 0.365** 0.520*** 0.520*** 0.324**
(0.004) (0.180) (0.167) (0.136) (0.133)
depratio 0.326 -0.565* -0.603* -0.603* -0.356
(0.258) (0.322) (0.331) (0.356) (0.396)
trend 0.002*** 0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.000
(0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.001)
federal 0.005
(0.009)
LDV 0.368***
(0.069)
country/year FE No/No Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
R2 0.181 0.223 0.270 0.270
Standard errors in parentheses, see notes for details
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Model (a): pooled regression with panel corrected standard errors, constant term not re-
ported; Model (b) and (c): fixed effect estimation with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation (Newey-West); Model (d): clustered standard errors at the individual level;
Model (e) dynamic panel data estimation, bias correction initialized by Arellano and Bond estima-
tor, bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 repetitions, LDV is the lagged dependent variable.
Table 1.4: Regressions of deficits
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These estimations show encouraging results. The lagged tax autonomy is signifi-
cant for both types of government. Interestingly, coefficients are different across the
two groups. According to the hypothesis of soft budget constraints, sub-national gov-
ernments in federations run lower deficits when their share of own-source tax revenues
in the previous year has been a relatively large share in total revenues. Given an in-
crease in the share of revenues directly at their hands, it might be perceived that these
own generated revenues also have to be used for potential future liabilities, causing
lower present deficits. Sub-national sectors in unitary countries instead show up with
an opposing behavior. These governments might anticipate that they are more or less
the extension of the central government and giving them more autonomy does not
constrain them sufficiently from profligate spending. Nevertheless, when I estimate
the model with cluster robust standard errors in column (d), or a dynamic specifi-
cation in column (e), tax autonomy in unitary countries is not significant anymore.
These findings are in line with those of Rodden (2002): more autonomy over revenues
generated by own-source taxation is an implicit tool to constraint sub-national gov-
ernments in federal organized countries. Although effective in federations, this does
not work for unitary countries.
Fortunately, fiscal rules do, but only for the group of unitary countries. Sub-
national governments in non-federal states overspend less when fiscal rules are stricter
and the access to borrowing is limited. In this case, fiscal rules are an effective tool
to mitigate a deficit bias, although tax autonomy is not. However, this does not hold
true for entities in federally organized states, where in no specification a significant
coefficient is detected. The result of the dynamic model in column (e) corroborates
this result. Fiscal rules prevent only sub-national sectors in non-federal countries
from running high deficits. For the rest of the paper, I consider model (d) as the
preferred benchmark estimation.
Summing up, different types of institutional designs call for different means to
control sub-national public finances. A careful consideration of the intergovernmental
relations is required when fiscal rules should be implemented. Given the overall legal
autonomy, which is characteristical for federal countries, higher autonomy over taxes
yields on average lower deficits. On the other hand, a framework based on fiscal
rules works well in unitary organized countries. This is likely to be the case because
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these governments have no instruments or enough legal autonomy to circumvent the
limitations.
The other covariates are in line with expectations. Lower level governments follow
the example of the center, since larger deficits on that level are positively correlated
with those on the sub-national level. Countries that are more decentralized in terms
of expenditure shares also run on average higher deficits. Demographic changes re-
veal two interesting insights. First, when the total population grows, so do deficits.
Local services are often connected to the number of people that call for them; hence
more people represent larger spending needs. Second, when the share of the working
population grows, budgetary positions improve. All other variables do not have an
impact on deficits which is significantly different from zero in any model.12
1.6.2 The determinants of sub-national fiscal rules
Whereas national fiscal rules are often self imposed, sub-national rules are not. They
are almost always imposed by the central level, and institutional and political vari-
ables of that level have an impact on the strictness of the rules themselves. Even
though one can argue that in federal countries the regional level could impose rules
on the local one, this has not been observed over the last decades. The new fiscal
frameworks in Spain and Austria for instance were both imposed on all sub-national
levels by the central government.13 This section explores which factors induce a
higher reliance on rules, and which circumstances might trigger the adoption of rules.
The first column of Table 1.5 presents the results from an OLS regression according
to equation (1.3) of each single outcome of the fiscal rules index on the average values
over the period in which one set of rules was in force in a given country.14 In other
words, each value of the fiscal rules index appearing in a country is regressed on the
average values of all other covariates during that time. This simple approach reveals
12The dynamic model shows only a significant effect of total population, while for all other
variables estimates are not significantly different from zero.
13Self imposed rules of particular regional governments and their local counterparts are a some-
what new phenomenon. My sample covers data up to 2008, and none of the rules was self imposed
by a regional level or imposed by that level on the local government sector.
14The interpretation of dummies that vary over time such as elections or the stability and growth
pact are in this estimation an indicator over the relative number of events in the respective time
span. For example, sgp takes the value 0.6 if the rules was valid during 6 years of the Stability and
Growth Pact.
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Dependent Variable Cross Section Panel Model
Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Political variables
herfgov -0.641** -0.226** -0.066 -0.394*** -0.138
(0.231) (0.091) (0.074) (0.131) (0.087)
election -0.139 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.015
(0.233) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
ideology -0.112 -0.014 -0.014 0.036 0.011
(0.103) (0.034) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024)
district 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.018*** 0.007*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
contract -0.501** -0.150** -0.064 -0.281*** -0.006
(0.182) (0.070) (0.057) (0.069) (0.051)
Budgetary variables
def rev -0.710 -0.160 -0.156 -0.119 -0.094
(1.754) (0.256) (0.244) (0.269) (0.320)
def rev(t−1) -0.195 -0.111 -0.356 -0.045
(0.262) (0.247) (0.313) (0.291)
debt gg gdp(t−1) -0.036 -0.004 -0.011 0.384** 0.083
(0.169) (0.094) (0.048) (0.153) (0.132)
Timing
sgp 0.374** 0.050* 0.061** 0.063* 0.072**
(0.156) (0.028) (0.025) (0.038) (0.028)
trend 0.018*** 0.002 0.020*** -0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
continues on next page...
34
...continued from previous page
Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Controls
depratio 2.210 3.487* 0.565 7.055** 0.805
(3.315) (2.077) (1.164) (2.816) (1.978)
outgap 0.050 -0.005 0.001 -0.012 -0.005
(0.036) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
unempl 3.337* 0.490 0.242 0.848 -0.597
(1.833) (1.155) (1.120) (1.757) (1.412)
unempl(t−1) 0.688 0.301 -1.464 0.520
(1.080) (0.993) (1.528) (1.300)
tax 0.879** 0.538* 0.422 0.717* 0.717*
(0.363) (0.318) (0.339) (0.398) (0.390)
tax(t−1) 0.561* -0.135 1.350*** -0.097
(0.313) (0.339) (0.407) (0.383)
ln totpop 0.066 0.083*** 0.030* -0.022 0.580
(0.051) (0.029) (0.016) (0.821) (0.681)
edec 0.597 0.200 0.147 -0.594 -0.070
(0.359) (0.197) (0.109) (0.362) (0.324)
local dummy 0.203* 0.353*** 0.101**
(0.100) (0.068) (0.040)
regional dummy 0.291*** 0.436*** 0.117***
(0.102) (0.067) (0.043)
LDV 0.698*** 0.803***
(0.067) (0.065)
Constant -2.484 -3.780** -0.920
(2.350) (1.591) (0.874)
Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.888 0.501 0.853 0.637
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) n=41, (2)-(5) n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Model (a): aggregated estimation according to equation 1.3; Models (b) and (c): pooled
regression with panel corrected standard errors; Model (d): fixed effect estimation with standard
errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West); Model (e): bias correction
initialized by Arellano and Bond estimator, bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 repetitions,
LDV is the lagged dependent variable.
Table 1.5: Determinants of fiscal rules
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interesting insights, at which I look with more sophisticated methods according to
equation (1.4) in columns (b) to (e). The first two remaining models (b and c)
provide cross-sectional evidence, and the last two (d and e) show results from fixed
effect estimations. Models (c) and (e) include also the lagged value of the rules index
in order to account for the persistency of this variable.
The top panel of the table shows the impact of political variables on the rules
index. The first variable herfgov is significant and negative in almost all specifica-
tions, except the dynamic ones in models (c) and (e). A government which consists
of a single party or of one big and one small coalition member, represented by a
higher value of the Herfindahl fractionalization index (i.e. a less fractionalized one),
tends to impose less strict rules. One-party governments might receive more leeway
from their sub-national counterparts and might try to avoid this conflict. Countries
that are supposed to follow a contract approach of fiscal governance at the central
level (Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen, 2009) impose less strict rules on their sub-
national governments. The district magnitude also becomes significant and positive
in the panel specifications.15 This supports the view that rather loose connections to
lower level politics increase the use of fiscal rules at the sub-national level.
None of the other political variables, and neither budgetary ones, have an impact
on the rules themselves. It is important to note that this implies that sub-national
deficits do not have a feedback effect on rules. The only budgetary variable which is
significant in at least one specification is the lagged debt level of the general govern-
ment in the panel specification (d). Central governments impose restrictions when
general fiscal stress is at hand, but do not react to deficits at the sub-national level.
In terms of timing, the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact has (from
1999 onwards) increased the strength of rules. This effect is not surprising since most
national stability pacts were introduced as an answer to the supranational European
fiscal framework in order to force the lower level governments not to counteract central
level fiscal policies. Also not surprising is that rules increase over time, as indicated
by the included linear trend. Out of the other control variables only the demographic
structure, the population size, the sub-national tax autonomy, and unemployment
15Due to the little within variance, I check whether this result is robust when I include time
dummies. The parameter is still significant at the same level.
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have an increasing impact on the implementation of fiscal rules.
To sum up, the fractionalization of the government in power, the district mag-
nitude, and the predicted form of fiscal governance determine the strictness of sub-
national fiscal rules. Ideology of the central government and national elections instead
do not. Neither do the budgetary variables, beside the lagged overall level of debt, as
long as a static model is estimated. However, constituencies in federal countries, as
indicated by the two dummies against the base group of unitary countries, rely more
on rules than their non federal counterparts. Given the results over the effectiveness
of fiscal rules from the previous section, those countries seem to back the wrong horse.
This also could indicate that the political actions of the center to implement rules in
unitary and federal countries might be different. In particular, the timing when the
center implements rules, and whether the present or lagged political variables matter,
may differ as the ultimate results have suggested.
The estimations presented in Table 1.6 show that this is indeed the case. Model (a)
to (e) include separate coefficients for federations and unitary states as well as their
one period lag for one of the political variables per estimated equation, respectively.
For example, column (a) shows a regression with four different coefficients for the
impact of the Herfindahl index on rules: the current value of federal countries, the
lagged value of federal countries, the current value of unitary countries, and finally
the lagged value for this group. Models (b) to (e) continue with this procedure for
the other covariates. Column (f) shows the estimates of the full model, including
lagged and current values of all variables simultaneously.
Model (a) shows that it is rather the one period lag than the current value of the
Herfindahl index which matters. Furthermore, it can be seen that federal countries
do not follow the direction described above. In this case there is a positive relation-
ship, indicating that less fractionalization is associated with stricter rules. In federal
countries the central government might impose those stricter rules in order to tie the
hands of sub-national politicians, which might belong to a different party. A ideolog-
ical position of central governments which is contrary to the majority of sub-national
ones is a frequently observed feature in federal countries. Surprisingly ideology is now
marginal significant at the 90% level for unitary countries when the lags of all vari-
ables are included in the model as shown in (f). Election year effects (b) instead are
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Dependent Variable Fixed Effect Panel Model
Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Herfindahl index (fractionalization)
herfgov -0.381*** -0.387*** -0.443*** -0.358***
(0.129) (0.124) (0.132) (0.132)
herfgov ∗ federal -0.006 -0.078
(0.114) (0.116)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ federal 0.313*** 0.359***
(0.106) (0.102)
herfgov ∗ unitary -0.335 -0.233
(0.229) (0.189)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.482* -0.641***
(0.274) (0.244)
Election year
election 0.016 0.017 0.021 0.014
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
election ∗ federal 0.038 0.038
(0.028) (0.025)
election(t−1) ∗ federal 0.011 -0.008
(0.021) (0.016)
election ∗ unitary 0.003 -0.004
(0.024) (0.021)
election(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.010 -0.012
(0.027) (0.023)
Ideology (1=right-wing single party)
ideology 0.056** 0.041 0.082*** 0.029
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
ideology ∗ federal -0.063 0.027
(0.040) (0.030)
ideology(t−1) ∗ federal 0.021 -0.011
(0.032) (0.030)
ideology ∗ unitary 0.055 0.075*
(0.052) (0.041)
ideology(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.069 0.057
(0.048) (0.042)
District magnitude
district 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
district ∗ federal -0.005 0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
district(t−1) ∗ federal 0.006 0.009**
(0.005) (0.005)
district ∗ unitary 0.011* 0.007
(0.006) (0.005)
district(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.019*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.003)
continues on next page...
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...continued from previous page
Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Contract
contract -0.290*** -0.281*** -0.302*** -0.282***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.065) (0.068)
contract ∗ federal -0.346*** -0.351***
(0.089) (0.080)
contract(t−1) ∗ federal -0.003 0.057
(0.033) (0.037)
contract ∗ unitary -0.090 -0.095
(0.056) (0.070)
contract(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.073 -0.233**
(0.086) (0.098)
Controls
def rev -0.217 -0.153 -0.283 0.054 -0.170 -0.121
(0.241) (0.278) (0.264) (0.252) (0.273) (0.223)
def rev(t−1) -0.293 -0.352 -0.321 -0.264 -0.254 -0.340
(0.275) (0.318) (0.320) (0.307) (0.313) (0.275)
unempl -1.005 0.561 1.345 0.542 0.459 -1.387
(1.466) (1.782) (1.803) (1.828) (1.770) (1.441)
unempl(t−1) -0.291 -1.205 -1.895 -0.856 -1.134 -0.168
(1.256) (1.541) (1.603) (1.530) (1.526) (1.268)
tax 0.613* 0.779* 0.877** 0.875** 0.794* 0.642*
(0.329) (0.403) (0.389) (0.386) (0.412) (0.363)
tax(t−1) 1.190*** 1.336*** 1.351*** 1.309*** 1.322*** 1.139***
(0.371) (0.407) (0.389) (0.392) (0.409) (0.383)
depratio 5.510** 6.750** 8.374*** 8.798*** 6.536** 7.166***
(2.422) (2.795) (2.837) (2.913) (2.862) (2.476)
outgap -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
debt gg gdp 0.428*** 0.354** 0.410*** 0.300** 0.299* 0.482***
(0.128) (0.153) (0.148) (0.152) (0.155) (0.141)
ln pop tot 0.273 -0.134 -0.706 0.067 -0.034 -0.055
(0.658) (0.800) (0.850) (0.784) (0.809) (0.702)
edec -0.630* -0.552 -0.678* -0.423 -0.544 -0.642*
(0.360) (0.363) (0.384) (0.386) (0.375) (0.372)
sgp 0.054 0.061* 0.081** 0.053 0.057 0.050
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036)
trend 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.015** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
R2 0.702 0.636 0.647 0.654 0.642 0.735
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Specification according to model (d) in Table 1.5. Fixed effect estimation with standard
errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 1.6: Determinants of fiscal rules II
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still not observable. As for fractionalization, also the district magnitude seems to be
more important one period lagged for unitary countries, but according to estimation
(d) and (f) signs do not change. A higher value of this variable is still increasing the
rules index. The contract approach in central governments’ fiscal policy instead is
different for both types of countries with respect to the timing. For the federal ones
the actual one is significant and negative, while for the unitary states the one period
lagged value matters.
These results, while interesting on their own, are important to answer a last open
question, namely the causality between rules and fiscal outcomes. My instrumental
variable approach, presented in the next sub-section, builds on the results derived
above. It is important to keep in mind that the proper choice of instruments can be
different for the two distinct types of countries.
1.6.3 Endogeneity, IV results, and discussion
The relationship between budgetary outcomes and fiscal rules might be confounded
by potential endogeneity of the latter. The enacted fiscal policy could be the cause
for - rather than the result of the adoption of fiscal rules. In this case countries
with fiscal difficulties at the sub-national level might impose stricter rules. The
different stringency of fiscal rules across countries could be also driven by an omitted
variable, in particular preferences for fiscal discipline, as noted by Poterba (1996). If
balanced budgets attain an outstanding status in some states, those countries might
impose stricter rules according to their preferences. However, as those preferences are
assumed to not change a lot over time, this effect is captured by including individual
fixed effects. Nevertheless, it has to be secured that the impact of rules on deficits,
as estimated in section 1.6.1, is indeed going from tighter rules to better budgetary
positions (at least in unitary countries).
I use an instrumental variables approach to solve this question. Variables that
satisfy the two properties of valid instruments, namely being uncorrelated with the
error of the regression of equation (1.2), but highly correlated with the rules index,
must be found. This is usually regarded as a complicated task: explanations for the
prevalence of fiscal institutions, for instance political variables which reflect prefer-
40
ences, might be simultaneously connected to the result of fiscal policy. This would
imply that they are correlated with the variable that captures fiscal rules, but also
with the error term.
The context of sub-national budgetary outcomes instead offers a convenient fea-
ture to tackle this hurdle. Rules and institutions for lower level governments are
introduced by a higher level of government. The characteristics that drive the intro-
duction of the rules, as worked out in Section 1.6.2, are correlated with the rules itself
(and might be correlated with the budgetary outcomes of that higher governmental
level), but not with the budgetary position of the governments where the rules are
imposed on. The previous section has shown that political characteristics of the cen-
tral government are indeed related to the strictness of rules. In addition, there was
no feedback effect of deficits, which excludes that central governments introduce rules
when sub-national deficits are regarded as unsustainable. Hence, there are possible
candidates for a set of excluded instruments which are correlated with the endogenous
fiscal rules variables, but are not correlated with the error term in the explanatory
equation. In other words, those variables are likely to be in line with the exclusion
restriction in instrumental variable regressions.
I use the variables which are, according to the previous section, found to be
correlated with the fiscal rules index as instruments. These are the interacted district
magnitude, the form of fiscal governance, and the Herfindahl index of government
fractionalization. The results of these regressions are shown in Table 1.7.16 Column
(a) repeats the estimation without instruments for comparison. Models (b) and (c)
differ only in the way how standard errors are computed. The set of instruments for
these two estimations contains the actual political variables for federations, but the
one-period lag for unitary countries. The absolute value of the coefficient on fiscal
rules in unitary countries is now more or less twice as large as before. This indicates
that the earlier estimate was biased towards zero. In terms of significance both
models make the same predictions, and surprisingly also tax autonomy in unitary
countries is gaining significance. The positive coefficient, however, indicates that
higher autonomy in this group of countries does not work as a limitation but rather
as an augmentation for deficits. In contrast to federations, sub-national governments
16I report the first stage estimations for all regressions using instruments in Appendix A1.3.
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Dependent Variable IV 2SLS Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (a) (b) (c) (d)
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.195 0.365* 0.365** 0.334**
(0.120) (0.190) (0.148) (0.141)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.272*** -0.284*** -0.284*** -0.289***
(0.056) (0.073) (0.075) (0.075)
Fiscal rules
rules ∗ unitary -0.043*** -0.088** -0.088*** -0.079***
(0.014) (0.041) (0.026) (0.024)
rules ∗ federal 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001
(0.015) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021)
full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
country/year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Excluded Instruments none herfgovt ∗ federal herfgovt
districtt ∗ federal districtt
contractt ∗ federal contractt
herfgov(t−1) ∗ unitary herfgov(t−1)
district(t−1) ∗ unitary district(t−1)
contract(t−1) ∗ unitary contract(t−1)
R2 0.173 0.134 0.134 0.147
Hansen J . 3.799 6.083 12.64
Hansen J p-value . 0.434 0.193 0.245
K-P Weak Id. F . 29.97 10.70 10.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Two stage least square estimations. First stage regressions are presented in Table 1.12 of
Appendix A1.3. Set of control variables as before, results not reported here but in Table 1.11 of
Appendix A1.3. Model (a): repetition of the estimation without instrumenting the rules index;
Model (b): cluster-robust standard errors, using the Herfindahl index, the form of fiscal governance
and the district magnitude as instruments for federal countries. For unitary countries the one time
lag of these variables is included; Model (c): same as (b) but with with standard errors robust
to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West); Model (d): present and lagged values are
used as intsruments in both first stage equations, standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 1.7: IV regressions
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in unitary countries are more or less a branch of the center and they may assume the
center to take over liabilities anyway.
The model in column (d) uses the full set of instruments (i.e. lagged and current
values) for both the federal and unitary fiscal rules index. The results are similar
to the previous ones, but the validity of instruments changes slightly. While none
of the models is affected by overidentification (note that the Hansen J-test does
always accept the null of joint validity17), the Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic for weak
identification in models (b) and (c) is superior to (d). Since the models with different
instruments for the unitary and federal index works better, all instruments might not
be suited equally well for the two groups.
To shows this in detail, I present separate regressions for each type of country
in Table 1.8. The estimations labeled ’I’ include only the unitary countries, while
those labeled ’II’ include local and regional sectors of federations. Models (a) use
the full set of instruments, while (b) involves only current values and (c) only lagged
values, respectively. Signs and significances of the two main variables of interest do
not change compared to the estimations before. A higher degree of tax autonomy still
mitigates the deficit bias in federations and exaggerates deficits in unitary countries.
Rules continue to prevent deficits in unitary countries in all specifications, but with
the additional insight that the proper choice of instruments depends on the type of the
country. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic reveals that actual values are better suited
as instruments for federal organized countries, while this is true for the one period
lags for estimating the effect in unitary countries. Also control variables behave
differently, and federal countries respond stronger to cyclical elements such as the
output gap, unemployment, and deficits at the central level. At the end of the day
these regressions confirm and robustify the earlier conclusions.
These results are encouraging for policy makers. Figure 1.5 depicts the marginal
effect of stricter rules in unitary countries in the top panel (a) and the effect of tax
autonomy in federations in the bottom panel (b). The bars on the left show the
actual value of the fiscal rules index and tax autonomy in the year 2008. Signifi-
cant improvements of budgetary positions are potentially feasible through reforms
17The joint null is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. both requirements are fulfilled:
they are uncorrelated with the error term, and the excluded instruments do not have to be included
into the estimated equation.
43
Dependent Variable IV 2SLS Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (a.I) federal (a.II) unitary (b.I) federal (b.II) unitary (c.I) federal (c.II) unitary
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) -0.267** 0.316** -0.259** 0.291** -0.238** 0.321**
(0.110) (0.136) (0.108) (0.131) (0.119) (0.142)
Fiscal rules
rules -0.027 -0.091*** -0.031 -0.085*** -0.043 -0.093***
(0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.036) (0.028)
full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
country/year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Excluded Instruments herfgovt herfgovt herfgov(t−1)
districtt districtt district(t−1)
contractt contractt contract(t−1)
herfgov(t−1)
district(t−1)
contract(t−1)
R2 0.623 0.235 0.624 0.246 0.623 0.232
Hansen J 6.180 2.149 0.822 0.118 0.919 1.452
Hansen J p-value 0.289 0.828 0.663 0.943 0.632 0.484
K-P Weak Id. F 7.491 8.637 14.08 7.975 4.680 16.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=104/143 N=8/11 (federal/unitary) T=14
Notes: Two stage least square estimations. First stage regressions are presented in Table 1.14 of Appendix A1.3. Set of control variables as before, results
not reported here but in Table 1.14 of Appendix A1.3. Separate regressions for federal (a)/(c)/(e) and unitary (b)/(d)/(f) countries. Model (a)/(b): Actual
and lagged instruments; Model (c)/(d): only actual instruments; Model (e)/(f): only lagged instruments. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 1.8: IV regressions
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Figure 1.5: Policy implications
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of rule frameworks and the structure of tax systems. This is particularly true for
countries which currently make little use of those mechanisms. A one standard devi-
ation in unitary countries (0.303, cf. Table 1.2) increase in the rules index decreases
the annual share of deficits in revenues on average by 2.7 percent. A one standard
deviation increase in the tax autonomy of federations (0.122, cf. Table 1.2) causes
a reduction of deficits of about 3.5 percent, ceteris paribus. Hence changes in the
institutional framework, in particular the adoption of another set of fiscal rules or
changing autonomy over taxes, can help to reduce deficits in the short run.
A last issue is whether these two instruments work in isolation or whether there
is an interplay between the two. To check for this, I re-estimate the model and allow
for interaction between the fiscal rules index and tax autonomy.18
The top panel (a) in Figure 1.6 shows a plot of the marginal effect of fiscal rules
in unitary countries. The interaction term is not significant in this case (p-value=0.6,
cf. Table 1.10 in the appendix). The negative impact on deficits remains similar in
terms of magnitude when tax autonomy varies.
Tax autonomy itself was identified as the proper tool for federal countries. The
marginal effect in this case is depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 1.6. Here the
interaction term is significant (p-value=0.03, cf. Table 1.10 in the appendix) and the
figure shows that this tool becomes more effective when fiscal rules are tighter. That
is, even though rules themselves do not help, an increase in tax autonomy should be
considered together with the rules framework. In the policy arena, these results and
in particular the fact that the effectiveness of tools to restrict deficits depends on the
countries’ type should be carefully taken into consideration.
1.7 Conclusion
The main goal of this chapter is to explore which institutional arrangements help to
keep the books of sub-national governments in balance. I focused on two different
mechanisms which are potentially able to constrain the sub-national sector from fiscal
profligacy. On the one hand I investigated the role of own tax resources, since less
autonomy creates incentives to run deficits because of bailout expectations. On the
18Estimates are shown in Table 1.10 of Appendix A1.3.
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Figure 1.6: Marginal effects interaction terms
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other hand, I studied the impact of fiscal rules, which a central government might
impose to restrict the sub-national sector.
My main findings are that a well designed framework of fiscal rules works in
unitary countries, but not per se in federations. Because of the higher autonomy
which local and regional governments in federal countries enjoy, a rules based frame-
work does not help in this case. Here, it is rather higher legal autonomy over tax
instruments that might prevent large deficits at the sub-national sector as a form
of market-preserving federalism (Weingast, 1995). These findings suggest that the
choice of tools depends critically on the type of government and the constitutional
structure. This complements the literature of fiscal rules on the general government
level, where the political environment and the electoral system, for instance, are im-
portant determinants for the effectiveness of fiscal rules (Hallerberg, Strauch, and
von Hagen, 2007). As a result, a suitable framework needs to be tailored to the char-
acteristics of a specific country. More stringent rules do not always result in more
desirable outcomes and neither does a general restriction of tax autonomy.
This chapter is a further step in sub-national public finance in order to explore
how deficits could be avoided and large debts prevented. My findings suggest several
issues for future research. The next step should be to make use of decentralized data
for several European countries. This allows investigating additional effects which
occur horizontally within the sub-national governments in combination with the ver-
tical dimension between governmental levels, as explored in this paper. Another
interesting point is the recent introduction of self-imposed fiscal rules in some regions
of federal countries. Federations often grant autonomy to sub-national governments
which allows them to adopt rules by themselves. The German state of Hesse for ex-
ample, has held a referendum and 70% of voters opted for the introduction of a fiscal
rule into the regional constitution. Since self-imposed rules might be an important
signal to the markets and reflect the preferences of voters, effects might differ from
those of centrally imposed rules in federations. The evaluation of the effectiveness is
an interesting task for future research, once enough data is available.
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A1 Appendix
A1.1 Construction of the rules index
The construction of the rules index follows the European Commission (2009). I adopt
their dataset and calculate the rules index for the sub-national sectors. All balanced
budget rules and debt rules applying to the sub-national sector are taken into ac-
count. All information about the included rules are available on the webpage of the
European Commission. Rules applying to the general government sector are weighted
by the respective sub-national expenditure share in it. The indicator is the sum of
each criterion, devided by the total number of criteria. Each criteria itself is devided
by the maximum score, i.e. all variables are forced to be between zero and one.
• Criterion 1: statutory base of the rule
The score of this criterion index is constructed as a simple average of the two
elements below:
• Criterion 1a: Statutory or legal base of the rule
4 is assigned for a constitutional base
3 if the rule is based on a legal act (e.g. Public finance Act, Fiscal Respon-
sibility Law)
2 if the rule is based on a coalition agreement or an agreement reached by
different general government tiers (and not enshrined in a legal act)
1 for political commitment by a given authority (central or local government,
Minister of Finance)
• Criterion 1b: Room for setting or revising objectives
3 if there is no margin for adjusting objectives (they are encapsulated in the
document underpinning the rule)
2 there is some but constrained margin in setting or adjusting objectives
1 there is complete freedom in setting objectives (the statutory base of the
rule merely contains broad principles or the obligation for the government
or the relevant authority to set targets)
• Criterion 2: Nature of the body in charge of monitoring respect of the rule
The score of this variable is augmented by one point in case there is a real time
monitoring of compliance with the rule (e.g. existence of alert mechanisms in
case there is a risk of non-respect of the rule).
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3 if there is a monitoring by an independent authority (Fiscal Council, Court
of Auditors or any other Court) or the national Parliament
2 monitoring by the Ministry of Finance or any other government body
1 no regular public monitoring of the rule (there is no report systematically
assessing compliance)
• Criterion 3: Nature of the body in charge of enforcement of the rule
3 enforcement by an independent authority (Fiscal Council or any Court)
or the National Parliament
2 enforcement by the Ministry of Finance or any other government body
1 no specific body in charge of enforcement
• Criterion 4: Enforcement mechanisms of the rule
The score of this variable is augmented by 1 point in case escape clauses are
foreseen and clearly specified.
4 there are automatic correction and sanction mechanisms in case of non-
compliance
3 there is an automatic correction mechanism in case of non-compliance and
the possibility of imposing sanctions
2 the authority responsible is obliged to take corrective measures in case of
non-compliance or is obliged to present corrective proposals to Parliament
or the relevant authority
1 there is no ex-ante defined actions in case of non-compliance
• Criterion 5: Media visibility of the rule
3 is assigned if the rule observance is closely monitored by the media, and if
non-compliance is likely to trigger a public debate
2 for high media interest in rule-compliance, but non-compliance is unlikely
to invoke a public debate
1 for no or modest interest of the media
A1.2 Additional tables
Deficit (1) (2) (3)
as share of revenues (1) 1.000
in Euro per capita (2) 0.887 1.000
as share of GDP (3) 0.900 0.955 1.000
Notes: Correlation between different indicators of sub-national deficits.
Table 1.9: Correlation of deficit measures
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A1.3 Additional regression results
Results interaction model
Dependent Variable Interaction Terms
Deficit/Revenues
Unitary countries
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.380**
(0.156)
rules ∗ unitary -0.107**
(0.039)
rules ∗ tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.040
(0.075)
Federal countries
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.087
(0.092)
rules ∗ federal 0.006
(0.021)
rules ∗ tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.172**
(0.075)
Controls
def cg rev 0.074*
(0.042)
edec 0.181*
(0.087)
intexp rev 0.002
(0.008)
outgap -0.000
(0.002)
unempl -0.148
(0.146)
ln pop tot 0.607***
(0.172)
depratio -0.511*
(0.294)
trend -0.001
(0.001)
country/year FE Yes/Yes
R2 0.289
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Results for a regression allwong for interactions between rules and tax(t−1). Marginal effects
presented in pictures 1.6 (a) and (b).
Table 1.10: Results interaction model
51
Details to Table 1.7
Dependent Variable IV 2SLS Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (a) (b) (c) (d)
Controls
def cg rev 0.076* 0.076* 0.076** 0.077**
(0.040) (0.042) (0.037) (0.036)
edec 0.214*** 0.197** 0.197** 0.201**
(0.074) (0.085) (0.088) (0.088)
intexp rev -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
outgap -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unempl -0.047 -0.097 -0.097 -0.092
(0.187) (0.215) (0.215) (0.214)
trend 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
ln pop tot 0.520*** 0.544*** 0.544*** 0.542***
(0.136) (0.160) (0.168) (0.167)
depratio -0.603* -0.429 -0.429 -0.481
(0.356) (0.404) (0.377) (0.359)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Two stage least square estimations. Table shows the results for control variables included
in the estimations but not presented in the text in table 1.7. First stage regressions are presented
below. Model (a): repetition of the estimation without instrumenting the rules index; Model (b):
cluster-robust standard errors, using the Herfindahl index, the form of fiscal governance and the
district magnitude as instruments for federal countries. For unitary countries the one time lag
of these varibales is included; Model (c): same as (b) but with with standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West); Model (d): present and lagged values are
used as intruments in both first stage equations, standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 1.11: Results of controls according to Table 1.7
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Model (b) Model (c) Model (d)
Equation: rules∗ unitary federal unitary federal unitary federal
Excluded instruments
herfgov ∗ federal -0.187* 0.221*** -0.187* 0.221*** -0.168 0.067
(0.098) (0.058) (0.108) (0.073) (0.116) (0.063)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ federal -0.022 0.255***
(0.098) (0.082)
contract ∗ federal 0.119** -0.502*** 0.119*** -0.502*** 0.033 -0.447***
(0.061) (0.025) (0.046) (0.093) (0.037) (0.085)
contract(t−1) ∗ federal 0.114*** -0.053***
(0.038) (0.018)
district ∗ federal -0.000 0.007* -0.000 0.007** -0.008 0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
district(t−1) ∗ federal 0.010* -0.002
(0.005) (0.004)
contract ∗ unitary -0.061 0.019
(0.071) (0.022)
contract(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.265** 0.032 -0.265*** 0.032 -0.216** 0.026
(0.126) (0.025) (0.103) (0.020) (0.107) (0.018)
district ∗ unitary 0.008* 0.001
(0.005) (0.001)
district(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.022*** 0.001 0.022*** 0.001 0.016*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
herfgov ∗ unitary -0.256 0.044
(0.175) (0.046)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.771*** 0.005 -0.771*** 0.005 -0.557** -0.026
(0.258) (0.025) (0.177) (0.024) (0.224) (0.039)
Other
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 2.083** 0.017 2.083*** 0.017 2.117*** -0.026
(0.822) (0.078) (0.668) (0.096) (0.610) (0.108)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.604* 1.839*** -0.604** 1.839*** -0.538** 1.840***
(0.338) (0.326) (0.246) (0.189) (0.243) (0.174)
def cg rev -0.047 -0.001 -0.047 -0.001 -0.093 0.016
(0.222) (0.033) (0.162) (0.044) (0.160) (0.046)
edec -0.594** 0.158 -0.594* 0.158 -0.686* 0.121
(0.260) (0.177) (0.345) (0.129) (0.354) (0.121)
intexp rev 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.011
(0.055) (0.016) (0.038) (0.014) (0.040) (0.014)
outgap 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000
(0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
unempl -0.860 0.087 -0.860 0.087 -0.538 -0.147
(1.644) (0.399) (1.171) (0.274) (1.140) (0.252)
ln pop tot 0.421 0.313 0.421 0.313 0.277 0.196
(0.909) (0.459) (0.625) (0.324) (0.630) (0.312)
depratio 4.733* 0.180 4.733** 0.180 4.897** 0.388
(2.664) (0.747) (2.285) (0.546) (2.380) (0.653)
trend -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.002
(0.016) (0.005) (0.028) (0.007) (0.028) (0.009)
R-squared 0.588 0.748 0.588 0.748 0.608 0.763
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: First stage regressions for the results presented in table 1.7. Endogenous variables in the
second stage is the fiscal rules index for both types of government.
Table 1.12: First stage regressions to Table 1.7
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Details to Table 1.8
Dep. Var. IV 2SLS Panel Model
Def./Rev. (a.I) federal (a.II) unitary (b.I) federal (b.II) unitary (c.I) federal (c.II) unitary
Controls
def cg rev 0.162*** 0.028 0.159*** 0.029 0.155*** 0.028
(0.044) (0.051) (0.044) (0.052) (0.049) (0.051)
edec 0.376* 0.021 0.378* 0.028 0.381* 0.020
(0.227) (0.101) (0.226) (0.102) (0.223) (0.102)
intexp rev -0.011 0.012 -0.010 0.012 -0.009 0.013
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
outgap 0.017*** -0.001 0.017*** -0.001 0.017*** -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
unempl 1.262*** -0.318 1.287*** -0.309 1.347*** -0.319
(0.290) (0.238) (0.294) (0.238) (0.322) (0.238)
ln pop tot 1.113*** 0.238 1.115*** 0.240 1.119*** 0.237
(0.172) (0.239) (0.172) (0.237) (0.172) (0.239)
depratio 0.884 -0.638* 0.992 -0.658* 1.258 -0.634*
(0.823) (0.351) (0.811) (0.341) (1.053) (0.355)
trend 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=104/143 N=8/11 (federal/unitary) T=14
Notes: Two stage least square estimations. Table shows the results for control variables included
in the estimations but not presented in the text in table 1.8. First stage regressions are presented
below. Separate regressions for federal (a)/(c)/(e) and unitary (b)/(d)/(f) countries. Model (a)/(b):
Actual and lagged instruments; Model (c)/(d): only actual instruments; model (e)/(f): only lagged
instruments. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 1.13: Results of controls according to Table 1.8
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Equation: rules Model (a.I) Model (a.II) Model (b.I) Model (b.II) Model (c.I) Model (c.II)
Excluded instruments
herfgov 0.079 -0.260 0.168 -0.649***
(0.096) (0.170) (0.105) (0.148)
herfgov(t−1) 0.279** -0.619*** 0.242* -0.828***
(0.118) (0.229) (0.132) (0.184)
contract -0.450*** -0.067 -0.488*** -0.189**
(0.088) (0.082) (0.109) (0.091)
contract(t−1) -0.077* -0.196** -0.372*** -0.251***
(0.039) (0.097) (0.107) (0.094)
district 0.020* 0.004 0.010 0.015***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
district(t−1) -0.009 0.015*** 0.011 0.018***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
Other
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 2.101*** 2.749*** 2.048***
(0.540) (0.450) (0.584)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal 1.448*** 1.445*** 1.553***
(0.302) (0.326) (0.415)
def cg rev 0.006 -0.242 -0.135 -0.190 0.043 -0.255
(0.139) (0.236) (0.154) (0.227) (0.224) (0.242)
edec 1.434* -0.812** 1.278 -0.911** 1.267 -0.787*
(0.831) (0.408) (0.852) (0.433) (1.058) (0.408)
intexp rev 0.057* -0.018 0.062* 0.022 0.086* -0.014
(0.030) (0.056) (0.034) (0.055) (0.049) (0.053)
outgap 0.016 0.000 0.026 0.003 0.047** 0.000
(0.015) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.023) (0.008)
unempl 0.585 -1.686 2.276 -1.104 2.775 -1.864
(1.380) (1.723) (1.545) (1.457) (1.898) (1.704)
ln pop tot 1.023 0.835 1.968*** 0.257 1.490* 0.898
(0.664) (1.201) (0.706) (1.137) (0.887) (1.173)
depratio -1.038 3.185 -0.024 3.492 4.702 3.073
(4.082) (2.697) (3.286) (2.705) (5.066) (2.528)
trend 0.010 -0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.006 -0.002
(0.020) (0.047) (0.017) (0.044) (0.028) (0.048)
R-squared 0.846 0.729 0.831 0.686 0.772 0.722
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: First stage regressions for the results presented in table 1.8. Endogenous variables in the
second stage is the fiscal rules index for both types of government.
Table 1.14: First stage regressions to Table 1.8
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A1.4 Robustness check: federal specification
Throughout the text I used two different data points for each federal country, i.e. I
included the local and regional level as separate observations. Table 1.15 shows the
results of two robustness checks in order to proof whether results remain unchanged
when the data is treated differently.
Model (a) repeats the previous results of model (d) in table 1.4 for comparison.
The next column shows a regression where I merged the local and regional government
in the four federal countries. Instead of 19 observations per year the dataset now
consists out of 15, one for each included country. However, results remain unchanged
and the main conclusions are as before.
As a last check, I estimate different coefficients for the local and regional level in
federations. That means that Φ now becomes the following:
Φ′ =

Φ1
Φ2
Φ3
 and
= 1 if unitary country, 0 otherwise
= 1 if local level in a federal country, else 0
= 1 if regional level in a federal country, else 0
However, results are in line with the previous findings. The signs and magnitude
of coefficients for tax(t−1) are similar for the local and regional level. Rules remain
insignificant in both cases.
56
Dependent Variable Fixed Effects Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (1) (2) (3)
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.195** 0.186* 0.194**
(0.098) (0.099) (0.097)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.272*** -0.309*
(0.069) (0.180)
tax(t−1) ∗ regional -0.300***
(0.076)
tax(t−1) ∗ local -0.332*
(0.174)
Fiscal rules
rules ∗ unitary -0.043*** -0.048*** -0.044***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
rules ∗ federal 0.002 0.029
(0.014) (0.023)
rules ∗ regional 0.016
(0.017)
rules ∗ local -0.019
(0.017)
Controls
def cg rev 0.076** 0.120*** 0.074**
(0.036) (0.039) (0.037)
edec 0.214** 0.232** 0.200**
(0.087) (0.114) (0.090)
intexp rev -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
outgap -0.000 -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unempl -0.047 -0.215 -0.059
(0.209) (0.242) (0.210)
trend 0.005 0.002 0.006
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
ln pop tot 0.520*** 0.526** 0.514***
(0.167) (0.223) (0.168)
depratio -0.603* -0.668* -0.615*
(0.331) (0.392) (0.340)
R2 0.270 0.289 0.177
Number of Groups 19 15 19
Number of Observations 247 195 247
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Model (a): repetition of the estimation of model (d) in table 1.4 for comparison; Model (b):
the local and regional level in federal countries are merged; Model (c): individual coefficients for
the regional and local level in federal countries. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 1.15: Separate coefficients for local and regional governments
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Chapter 2
Business taxes and the electoral
cycle1
2.1 Introduction
The last decades have seen a strong and rising interest in identifying the determinants
of corporate tax setting behavior. Recent theoretical and empirical papers stress that
corporate tax rate choices are influenced by the size and structure of the economy,
the government’s budgetary situation and tax competition (see e.g. Bucovetscy, 1991;
Wilson, 1999; Buettner, 2003; Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2007). One aspect
that has been rather neglected though is the impact of political economy determinants
on corporate tax rates. One key question in this area is whether politicians engage
in opportunistic behavior and deliberately manipulate government policies over the
course of the electoral cycle in order to increase their reelection prospects.
Traditional papers in this area suggest that, in a world with asymmetric infor-
mation, incumbent politicians have an incentive to signal their competency by in-
creasing public spending prior to elections in order to boost the economy (see e.g.
Nordhaus, 1975). Empirical evidence for this type of spending cycles has been rather
mixed though (see e.g. Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) and Drazen (2000) for an
overview). A more recent strand of the theoretical literature has suggested that politi-
cians may use adjustments of short-run policy instruments, like tax policy choices,
1This chapter is based on joint work with Nadine Riedel. Special thanks go to her.
58
to demonstrate their competency to the electorate rather than through spending-
induced changes of the economic conditions (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2001).
This predicts a political budget cycle in tax rates in the sense that tax increases tend
to be delayed until after the election, while the probability of tax decreases is in-
creased in the election year and the year prior to the election. While political budget
cycles in key budgetary elements such as spending and deficits are frequently found in
European data, empirical evidence for this type of systematic tax rate manipulation
is, however, scarce at best.
The present chapter contributes to this literature and tests for political cycles
in tax rate adjustments. Our empirical analysis uses the German local business tax
which is set autonomously by German municipalities as a testing ground. The analysis
is based on a unique and rich panel data base of around 8000 German municipalities
and their political, social, and budgetary situation for the time period between 2000
and 2008. As election dates vary across local councils, the data allow us to disentangle
effects related to the timing of elections from common trends.
Descriptively, our data suggest a strong trend to increase the local business tax
rate during the covered time period. While more than half of the communities in our
sample raised their local business tax rate once or more during our sample period,
only a small fraction of around 5% of the communities enacted a tax decrease. This
pattern largely reflects a number of expenditure shocks at the local level driven by
rising costs for the provision of social services and a number of reforms that shifted
public responsibilities to the local level. As a result, communities were forced to
adjust their local business tax rates as the major revenue instrument at their own
discretion.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the timing of these local business tax rate
changes and to test whether it follows a systematic pattern induced by the electoral
cycle. To do so, we estimate panel models which determine the effect of elections
on the annual growth rate of local business taxes. In robustness checks, we also
use logistic models to determine the impact on the probability that a municipality
increases or decreases its local business tax rate. Our results provide strong evidence
in favor of an electoral cycle. Specifically, we find that tax rate growth and the
probability to observe an increase in the local business tax rate are significantly lower
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in election and pre-election years, while they jump up in the post-election years. The
effects are quantitatively important. Our preferred estimates suggest that, relative to
other years, the growth rate of local business tax rates is reduced by around 40% in
election years and increased by around the same amount in post-election years. This
result is robust to controlling for a large number of economic, social, and budgetary
characteristics as well as municipality fixed effects.
As indicated above, our paper relates to the empirical literature on political bud-
get cycles. The majority of this literature focuses on spending cycles and reports
mixed evidence (see Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen, 1997). However, for European
countries spending cycles are frequently observed in the data after the set-up of the
European Monetary Union (see Mink and de Haan, 2005, among others). We are
aware of only three earlier papers that assess political cycles in tax rates. Mikesell
(1978) and Nelson (2000) analyze the effect of elections on the adjustment of US state
taxes in the post-war period. While they do find patterns which are in line with the
notion of political tax cycles, their identification approach is purely descriptive and
does not account for any type of heterogeneity between US states. Thus, their quali-
tative and quantitative results may suffer from problems related to omitted variables.
A recent paper by Dahlberg and Mo¨rk (2011) provides evidence for electoral effects
on tax rate changes by combining Swedish and Finish data on local governments. In
their study, variation in election dates arises only between the two groups of Swedish
and Finish municipalities which differ in their institutional characteristics and may
be subject to heterogeneous shocks. Our estimation approach tackles these problems
by exploiting variation in election timing across federal states within the same coun-
try and by controlling for both time-constant and time-varying heterogeneity in the
social, political, and budget situation of municipalities.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides a brief
theoretical motivation for our analysis, Section 2.3 presents our data set and gives an
overview over the institutional background for the German local business tax. Our
estimation strategy is described in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the results and
Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Theory and related literature
One of the main elements of fiscal policy is politics. As Tufte (1978) summarizes, “as
goes politics, so goes economic policy and performance. This is the case because, as
goes economic performance, so goes the election.” This relationship has been studied
extensively by the theoretical and empirical literature on political business cycles and
political budget cycles. The central idea of a political business cycle is that politicians
have an incentive to implement demand-increasing policy measures prior to elections
in order to boost the economy which then affects key macroeconomic variables, such
as unemployment, output, and inflation (Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976). The em-
pirical evidence for such a political cycle in macroeconomic performance is, however,
rather mixed (see Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) and Drazen (2000) for an
overview). On theoretical grounds these models were criticized for their assumption
of non-rational and myopic voters, which are easy to fool by such means.
Subsequent papers drop the irrationality assumption and focus on information
asymmetries between voters and politicians. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff
(1990) investigate fiscal choices in a game where politicians signal their level of com-
petence. As a result, fiscal policies are distorted in election years. An important
difference to the earlier papers is that these models predict distortions in main bud-
getary concepts, such as spending, revenues, deficits, and taxes rather than in macroe-
conomic indicators. It has been argued that politicians may want to implement ex-
pansionary politics in election and pre-election periods to signal their competency
to the electorate by a higher level of public good supply at constant levels of taxa-
tion or by implementing low-tax policies for a given public good provision. Beyond
these signaling considerations, incumbents may want to implement political actions
in pre-election years in a very general sense, which are likely to be appreciated by the
electorate and which might thus increase their reelection probability. Analogously,
as voters face high costs of ousting unpopular politicians from office in non-election
years and “unpopular actions in nonelection years may be heavily discounted by elec-
tion time” (Nelson, 2000, p. 544), politicians have an incentive to implement unpop-
ular decisions at the beginning of the election period when the time span to the next
election is as large as possible.
61
Following most of the empirical literature, we do not aim at providing an explicit
test of political budget cycle models. As noted by Kneebone and McKenzie (2001),
doing so is difficult since a measure for government competency is needed. Instead,
we test a reduced form of political budget cycle models by investigating whether tax
rate changes are determined by election dates. There is a large and still growing
literature testing for election effects in public policy. Most of this literature finds
evidence in favor of political budget cycles across European and OECD countries.
Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) provide an exhaustive overview. Recent work
of Schuknecht (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Shi and Svensson (2006)
report results which are in line with political spending cycles at the national level.
Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2007) show that public debt of European Union
countries tends to increase more in election years. In particular after the set-up of
the European Monetary Union members of the Eurozone have systematically run
fiscal expansions during elections years (Buti and van den Noord, 2003; von Hagen,
2006; Mink and de Haan, 2005; Efthyvoulou, 2012). Similar evidence for an effect of
elections on debt in OECD countries is found by Alt and Dreyer Lassen (2006).2
Using data collected at the country level obviously has a number of limitations,
first and foremost that it commonly does not allow to perfectly control for all other
institutional and monetary differences across countries. Following Rogoff’s advice to
“look at data for state and local elections, instead of concentrating solely on the small
number of observations available for national elections” (Rogoff, 1990, pp. 34), using
a panel at the sub-national level with data for several regions or local governments
which operate under similar regulations in one country can solve this problem. Empir-
ical contributions using sub-national data commonly find election effects in budgetary
components. As the first empirical contributions using sub-national data, Blais and
Nadeau (1992) find that government spending of Canadian provinces does increase
in election years and this extra spending translates into a higher deficit, while Rosen-
berg (1992) finds a significant increase of spending in pre-election years for Israeli
2This paper confirms a political budget cycle conditional on the degree of transparency of the
budget process and qualifies the results of Brender and Drazen (2005). They claim that budget
cycles are only a phenomenon of countries which recently have become a democracy. However,
according to the vast majority of studies the occurrence of political budget cycles across European
countries is a well established result.
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municipalities.3 However, the advantage of institutional homogeneity and more data
points when using sub-national data comes at a cost: in most of the applications,
local election dates do not vary across observations.
The focus of our paper is on business tax rates as one of the most directly visible
elements of local public finance. Some of the earlier studies do investigate electoral
effects in revenues, in particular the share of revenues generated by taxation. How-
ever, it is not obvious why these revenue shares should be a signal of competence
to voters. Lower revenues at a given tax rate for instance could be seen as exactly
the opposite, the government’s inability to administer the tax collection. A notable
exception is the paper of Dahlberg and Mo¨rk (2011) which also accounts for changes
in statutory tax rates.
Apart from that, the effect of electoral cycles on tax setting behavior is rather
unexplored. We are aware of only two studies which, in a descriptive way, assess
the effect of elections on the tax policy choice of US states. Mikesell (1978) and
Nelson (2000) investigate how electoral cycles impact on the changes in tax rates and
the adoption of new taxes for US states. Both papers report evidence for a strong
political cycle as tax increases occur with a higher frequency the larger the time until
the next election. However, results are based on a purely descriptive approach and do
not account for cross-sectional or longitudinal heterogeneity which may be correlated
with the states’ tax policy and confound the results.
We account for these shortcomings and use a more rigorous empirical identification
strategy to test for political cycles in the context of the German local business tax. If
the above theoretical incentives are relevant for political decision making, local politi-
cians in Germany may want to signal their competency to the electorate by keeping
local business taxes low, for a given amount of public good provision. Following this
line of argument, we expect a reduced probability for tax increases prior to elections
3Other studies with a focus on sub-national governments provide evidence for electoral cycles
in spending and deficits for the German state level (Galli and Rossi, 2002), for Sweden (Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2001), for regional governments in Russia (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004), and for
Colombian municipalities (Drazen and Eslava, 2010). Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Baleiras and
da Silva Costa (2004) provide evidence for political expenditure cycles for Portuguese municipalities,
as does Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) for Canadian provinces. Dahlberg and Mo¨rk (2011) show
that elections impact on public employment using data for Sweden and Finland. The fact that these
studies do find political budget cycles for well established democracies casts further doubt on the
new-democracy hypothesis of Brender and Drazen (2005).
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and a higher one once the election took place. Note in this context that, beyond
the competence signal, increases in the local business tax might be unpopular with
voters in a very direct sense as tax increases likely exert an effect on the inhabitants’
after-tax income. The German local business tax is levied on non-incorporated as
well as incorporated businesses and reduces their after-tax income. Business owners
are often residents and hence voters in the community. They also act as an influen-
tial multiplier, since they can easily express their opinion over public policies to their
costumers which are part of the electorate. In addition, several studies suggest that
a significant fraction of corporate and business taxes are borne by workers (see e.g.
Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini, 2007; Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2007), which
may also make business tax increases unpopular with the electorate given that they
anticipate the negative income effect.
Following these considerations, we will assess the existence of electoral cycles in
the tax rate setting behavior of German municipalities. Precisely, we will investigate
whether business tax rates are significantly reduced in pre-election and election years,
and significantly increased in post-election years. In doing so, we use panel estimators
and exploit that local election dates in Germany vary across federal states. This allows
us to separate common shocks to all municipalities from potential effects related to
the electoral cycle.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Institutional background
The testing ground for our empirical analysis is the local government sector in Ger-
many. The German federal system consists of three tiers: the federal, state, and local
governments. There are sixteen states and around 12,000 municipalities in Germany.
The power to levy an individual tax rate on business income is restricted to the
federal and the local government level.
The responsibilities of local governments vary only slightly across German states.
Their main mandatory tasks include the construction and maintenance of roads, sew-
erage, kindergartens and primary schools. Other responsibilities, such as the main-
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tenance of cultural or sport facilities, tourism, and public transport are optional. In
addition, local governments are responsible to provide certain social benefits to the
unemployed and the poor. Our sample period is characterized by rising expendi-
tures at the local level due to increasing social costs and a number of federal reforms
which shifted additional spending burdens on to the local government level. Exam-
ples are the law for the provision of additional kindergarten capacities by the local
level (‘Gesetz zum Ausbau der Kindergartenbetreuung’) and additional social secu-
rity payments for the elderly and the unemployed (see e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank,
2000, 2007).
While a major fraction of the funds for the provision of these services comes from
state grants and redistributed tax revenues collected by higher levels of government,
local communities have discretion over two tax instruments at their disposal: the local
business tax (Gewerbesteuer) and a local property tax (Grundsteuer). In revenue
terms, the local business tax is by far the more important revenue source for local
jurisdictions and significantly contributes to local government revenues. The average
tax rate set by German municipalities is 16.25% and makes up a considerable fraction
of the tax burden on firms in Germany.4 The tax base is defined as firm profit earned
within the boundaries of a municipality, town, or city. The tax applies to both
the incorporated and non-incorporated sector. The tax base definition follows the
corporate and income tax law. While the tax base law is set at the national level and
thus applies to all municipalities in Germany, the local council of each municipality
can decide autonomously upon a so-called tax collection rate. The rate chosen is valid
for at least the next entire budget year. At the local level, a budget year corresponds
to the calendar year. Municipalities can change their tax rates from year to year, but
not during the year. There is no upper bound for the tax rate, but a lower bound
was introduced in 2004.5 The majority of the local business tax revenues remains
directly with the municipalities. A small share has to be transferred to the central
and regional level though, as an element of the German federal equalization scheme.
On the policy side, the election and legislative processes of local councils must
be in line with the municipal codes of their states. Our empirical analysis exploits
4The current corporate tax rate at the national level is 15%.
5The idea was to prohibit very low tax rates chosen by a small number of “tax haven” commu-
nities before 2004.
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the fact that the election dates of local councils differ across federal states. The
election years for the eight states included in our analysis are listed in Table 2.1.
Apart from this difference, municipal codes are similar across states with respect to
business taxation. In particular, in all federal states a simple majority of votes in the
local council is required to enact a change in the local business tax rate. Moreover, in
all states, a large number of parties tend to take part in local elections, including the
major parties which also operate at the regional or national level as well as numerous
local parties and candidates.6
federal state years
Schleswig-Holstein 1998 2003 2008
Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen) 1996 2001 2006
North Rhine-Westphalia (Nordrhein-Westfalen) 1999 2004 2009
Hesse (Hessen) 1996 2001 2006
Rhineland-Palatinate (Rheinland-Pfalz) 1999 2004 2009
Baden-Wuerttemberg 1999 2004 2009
Bavaria (Bayern) 1996 2002 2008
Saarland 1999 2004 2009
Notes: Election years for local councils according to the federal state wherein the local governments
are located.
Table 2.1: Elections at the local level
The homogeneity of the political and administrative legislation is an advantage
of our data set. This offers convenient features to test our hypothesis, in particular
the fact that all communities have exactly the same fiscal policy tools at hand.
2.3.2 Data set
Our data set covers German communities in the period between 2000 and 2008.7 The
data accounts for all municipalities in West German states (except the city states of
Bremen and Hamburg8). We disregard communities in Eastern Germany which joined
6Note in this context that one important difference between elections at the local level compared
to state or federal elections is that commonly a larger number of small parties is represented in the
local council as with the former no minimum threshold of votes has to be passed in order to be
considered for the allocation of seats.
7Some data, like electoral results, are also collected for years prior to our sample period in order
to determine whether our first sample year (the year 2000) is a post-election year and to determine
the composition of the local council in the first sample years.
8We exclude the city states, because local and regional budgets are not easy to separate in this
context.
66
Notes: All light gray shaded municipalities are included. Dark gray shaded areas in Lower Saxony
belong to a municipal union and are dropped from the sample. Black shaded municipalities were
subject to mergers during our period and are also dropped.
Figure 2.1: Sample
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the Federal Republic of Germany in the reunification of 1990 as a major fraction of
those communities was subject to mergers and local government reforms after the
German reunification. Furthermore, we exclude West German municipalities which
were subject to a merger and those belonging to a municipal union in Lower Saxony.
Eventually, we end up with a sample of 7738 municipalities.9 Figure 2.1 presents a
graphical representation of our sample.
7314
373
36 13 2
0
2 ,
0 0
0
4 ,
0 0
0
6 ,
0 0
0
8 ,
0 0
0
n
u
m
b e
r  
o f
 
m
u
n
i c
i p
a l
i t i
e s
 
( t a
x  
d e
c r
e a
s e
)
0 1 2 3 4
3319 3377
882
130 26 3 10
2 ,
0 0
0
4 ,
0 0
0
6 ,
0 0
0
8 ,
0 0
0
n
u
m
b e
r  
o f
 
m
u
n
i c
i p
a l
i t i
e s
 
( t a
x  
i n
c r
e a
s e
)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Notes: Left (right) panel shows the sum of municipalities over absolute number of negative (positive)
changes. No municipality increased the tax rate more than six times or decreased more than four
times within our panel.
Figure 2.2: Tax changes
As mentioned above, we observe a rising trend in local business tax rates during
our sample period. A majority of communities raised their local business tax rate at
least once. Only a small number of municipalities observes two or more changes, see
Figure 2.2 for details. In contrast to the large number of tax hikes, declines of local
business tax rates are rare. Only around 5% of the municipalities in our data lowered
their tax rates at least once within our sample period.
9Public finance data is not available for one year in the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein.
Results remain unchanged when we exclude them from the sample.
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This pattern may on the one hand reflect increased funding needs of local mu-
nicipalities as rising social costs and reforms which shifted additional obligations to
the local level put pressure on community finances. On the other hand, our sample
period is also characterized by two major declines in the federal corporate tax rate
(in 2001 and 2008) which might - in a vertical tax competition framework - increase
the communities’ incentive to raise their local business tax rate.10
Figure 2.3 depicts the geographical distribution of tax rate changes, showing that
tax hikes and cuts are not exclusive to particular federal states.
We augment our data set by detailed information on socio-economic and political
characteristics of the communities in our data. Descriptive statistics are presented in
Table 2.2. First, we include the total number of inhabitants to capture differences in
community size. The variable points to a strong heterogeneity between the munici-
palities in our data which includes small jurisdictions with less than 10 inhabitants
as well as the city of Munich with 1.3 million people. Second, we include a number
of socio-economic variables, precisely the share of young inhabitants below the age of
15 and the share of old inhabitants above the age of 65 as the demographic structure
may affect local business tax choices. Third, to capture employment effects, we in-
clude the local unemployment rate, defined as the number of unemployed as a share
of total population.11
Furthermore, we add four indicators for the municipalities’ fiscal performance and
economic capacity to our data set. First, we include public borrowing in each year,
defined as the share of revenues that is generated by new credits, less amortization of
debts. Second, we include the total outstanding debt in per capita terms. This value
is obtained at the county level, but it also includes municipality-specific information
on debt of hospitals and other city owned companies like transportation or sewage.
Third, to control for the prosperity of a community in terms of per capita income
and wealth, we also include a variable for the average private per capita income level.
Last, we control for mandatory provision of services by including expenditures. All
described variables show a considerable cross-sectional and longitudinal variation as
10This is in line with the finding of the vertical tax element presented in chapter three of this
thesis.
11Due to confidentiality reasons, this variable is censored if less than three people are unemployed.
In this case the variable is set equal to zero.
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Figure 2.3: Number of changes (decreases/increases)
Notes: left (right) panel shows municipalities colored according to the number of tax cuts (hikes).
Dotted areas are not included.
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Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Controls
credits -.002 .073 -2.828 .685
unemployment .029 .013 0.000 .190
young .163 .033 0.000 .600
old .180 .042 0.000 .500
city .183 .387 0.000 1.000
debt 2.368 1.034 .481 6.831
population 7947.075 31778.29 3.000 1326807
income 17462.470 1831.300 13222.000 29938.000
expenditures 1.008 6.323 0.000 1053.085
Party controls - seat shares
cdu .246 .234 0.000 1.000
spd .163 .180 0.000 1.000
gruene .014 .035 0.000 .375
fdp .011 .033 0.000 .583
farright .000 .005 0.000 .226
farleft .000 .003 0.000 .154
other .565 .382 0.000 1.000
Raw tax data
collection rate 336.386 31.860 0 900
diff. collection rate 1.296 6.571 -150 200
Dependent variables
τ binary .007 .084 0.000 1.000
τ binary .081 .273 0.000 1.000
τ growth .369 1.974 -61.224 100
Changes (Dep.var excluding zeros)
τ binary if 6= 0 .080 .271 0.000 1.000
τ binary if 6= 0 .920 .271 0.000 1.000
τ growth if 6= 0 4.177 5.312 -61.225 100
N=69642, T=9 (2000-2008), n=7738
Notes: credits: new credits minus repayments as share of annual revenues (public finance data is
not available for the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein for the years 2000 to 2002.), unemployment:
unemployed people as share of total population (data is censored if less than three people are
unemployed. The share is set to zero in that case.), population: number of inhabitants, young:
share of inhabitants under 15 years of age, old: share of inhabitants over 65 years of age (Population
data for the year 2000 is missing and imputed through the group mean.) city: dummy varibale,
debt: total municipal debt per capita (county level), income: income in Euro per capita (county
level), expenditures: per capita expenditures on voluntary services. Party controls are the respective
seat shares in the local council. Collection rate: statutory business tax collection rate.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics
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indicated by large standard deviations.
Finally, we include detailed information on the seat shares of the political parties
in the municipal council. We directly observe the share of the four main parties, which
also run for national or regional elections. These are the center-right conservative
party (CDU), the center-left social democrats (SPD), the liberal party (FDP), and
the Green party (Gruene). We create aggregated values for parties at the far-left of the
political spectrum (comprising Die Linke, the former PDS, and the former WASG), for
parties at the far-right of the political spectrum (comprising the nationally organized
extreme right parties NPD, DVU, Die Republikaner, and some right wing parties)
and an aggregated value for all remaining political parties which mainly are locally
operating civil parties.
2.4 Identification
Our baseline analysis focuses on tax rate changes in the form of the annual percentage
change of the tax rate:
τ growthi,t =
taxi,t − taxi,t−1
taxi,t−1
(2.1)
Alternative specifications use binary dependent variables τ binary and τ binary to assess
the determinants of the general probability that a community increases and decreases
its tax rate. The variable τ is coded one if the statutory tax rate increased from the
previous to the current year, and zero otherwise. Formally,
τ binaryi,t =
 1 if taxi,t − taxi,t−1 > 00 otherwise (2.2)
τ binary is defined analogously for tax decreases. The generic model estimated for the
various definitions of τ is specified as
τi,t,s = t
′
t,sδ + x
′
i,tβ + εt + µi,s + i,t (2.3)
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where t is a set of time period specific dummies, which we relate to election dates to
test for an electoral cycle. In our main analysis, we include dummy variables for the
year before an election is held, the election year, and the year after the election.
t′ =

tt−1
tt
tt+1
 and

=1 in the pre-election year, 0 otherwise
=1 in the election year, 0 otherwise
=1 in the post-election year, 0 otherwise
(2.4)
These variables vary across federal states s. Individual municipalities i within the
borders of one state share common election dates, but variation arisis across the
German states.
In addition, the estimations include a full set of year fixed effects ε to capture
common shocks over time affecting all our sample communities. As election dates vary
across communities in different states, election effects captured by the vector t and
the time fixed effects are both identified. Thus, the approach resembles a difference-
in-difference framework in which communities with no election in a particular year
act as a control group to identify the effect of elections on the tax setting behavior
in the treatment group of communities with an election (and on those communities
in a pre- and post-election year respectively).
We include community fixed effects µi in the baseline model which absorb time-
constant heterogeneity between jurisdictions or a full set of state fixed effects µs which
absorb potential effects related to institutional differences between states.
In terms of control variables, x gathers other determinants as described in the
previous section that are related to the decision whether or not to change the tax
rate and vary across municipalities i and over time t. In some specifications x also
includes political variables.
The baseline model is estimated with usual panel data estimators. To estimate
the models where our dependent variable comes in a binary form, we use a logit
transformation and report the average marginal effects. Due to the nature of our data,
serial correlation of errors is not a major problem. However, we cluster standard errors
at the municipal level. We also present standard errors clustered at the state-year level
73
to capture potential correlation of residuals at these units. Note that clustering at the
state level is infeasible since the number of groups is small. Nevertheless, Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) show that standard errors might be underestimated
in the presence of serial correlation when clustering is conducted at the state-year
rather than state level. Therefore, we also make use of two-way clustering at the
state-year and individual level (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2011). We spent
particular attention to this when it comes to the presentation of our result.
2.5 Results
Table 2.3 presents the result of the estimation model outlined in equation (2.1). In
specifications (a) to (d) we regress the annual growth rate of the local business tax on
the set of dummy variables for the pre-election, election and post-election year as well
as a full set of community fixed effects and time-varying community characteristics.12
Model (a) assumes independence of the errors across observations. In models (b)
and (c) standard errors are clustered at the community level (model (b)) and state-
year level (model (c)) respectively. Model (d) accounts for two-way clustering of
the standard errors at the state-year level and community level as described above.
Additional to coefficient estimates and standard errors, the table reports the p-values
and 95% confidence intervals for the coefficient estimates.
The specifications confirm the hypothesis of an electoral cycle in tax setting be-
havior. Specifically, the coefficient estimates for the dummy variables tt−1 and tt have
a negative sign, while the coefficient estimate for the post-election year is positive. In
specifications (a) and (b) all three coefficient estimates turn out statistically signifi-
cant, indicating that the growth rate in the business tax is reduced by 0.09 in the year
prior to the election and by 0.16 in the election year. Evaluated at the sample mean
(=0.37, cf. Table 2), this corresponds to a drop in the growth rate by 24% and 43%
respectively. In the post election year, the estimation suggests that the growth rate
is significantly increased by 0.17, or evaluated at the sample mean, by 47%. Models
(c) and (d) equally derive a significant election year and post-election year effect,
12The table depicts the coefficient estimates for the electoral dummies only. The coefficient
estimates for the control variables are reported in Table 2.10 in the appendix.
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Dependent Variable Individual Fixed Effect Model State Fixed Effect Model
τ growth (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
tt−1 -0.091 -0.088
s.e. 0.023 0.023 0.107 0.106 0.109 0.109
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.396 0.391 0.423 0.418
95% CI (-0.137 - -0.046) (-0.137 - -0.046) (-0.304 - 0.122) (-0.300 - 0.117) (-0.307 - 0.130) (-0.301 - 0.125)
tt -0.159 -0.163
s.e. 0.024 0.027 0.080 0.080 0.079 0.079
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.046 0.044 0.039
95% CI (-0.207 - -0.111) (-0.212 - -0.107) (-0.318 - -0.000) (-0.315 - -0.003) (-0.321 - -0.005) (-0.318 - -0.008)
tt+1 0.173 0.168
s.e. 0.024 0.026 0.089 0.089 0.091 0.090
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.057 0.053 0.069 0.063
95% CI (0.125 - 0.220) (0.121 - 0.224) (-0.006 - 0.351) (-0.002 - 0.347) (-0.014 - 0.350) (-0.009 - 0.345)
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clustering no community state-year two-way state-year two-way
Notes: Dependent variable: annual percentage change in the statutory business tax rate. Coefficients for the pre-election, election, and post-election are
reported. Coefficients on other controls are shown in Table 2.10 in the Appendix A2. Model (a) to (d) include individual fixed effects, models (e) and (f) state
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the reported level. p-values in bold indicate that coefficients are significant at the 10% level.
Table 2.3: Regression results
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while the coefficient estimate for the pre-election year loses its statistical significance.
Taken together, this pattern is consistent with the theoretical considerations in Sec-
tion 2 and suggests that politicians indeed tend to keep local business taxes low by
avoiding changes prior to elections and implement tax increases in post-election years
when the time gap to the next election is maximized.
Models (e) and (f) of Table 2.3 reestimate these baseline regressions replacing the
community fixed effects by a full set of state fixed effects. Again, the models account
for clustering of the standard errors at the state-year level and for two-way clustering
at the state-year and community level respectively. This modification leaves both,
the qualitative and quantitative results unchanged.
We note that the control variables exhibit the expected signs (see Table 2.10 in
the appendix for results). Interestingly, the coefficient estimate for the community’s
newly issued debt relative to revenues (’credits’) is positive and statistically significant
in all specifications, indicating that those communities with high financing needs, as
proxied by new debt issues, tend to observe higher tax rate growth than other juris-
dictions. The coefficient estimates for all other control variables turn out insignificant
in the specifications that control for community fixed effects when we cluster at the
state-year level. The specifications which include state-fixed effects further suggest
that large and high-income communities tend to observe lower growth rates of the
local business tax within our sample period. This may be related to the fact that
communities receive a fixed share of the lagged personal income tax paid by their
residents.13 Rich communities with high average incomes thus receive higher tax
revenues and may be less affected by reforms within our sample period that shifted
additional tasks and spending obligations to the community level.
As described in Section 2.3.1, our sample period was characterized by a strong
upward trend in local business taxes. While every second community increased its
local business tax rate at least once during our sample period, only a minor frac-
tion of communities opted for a tax rate reduction. To assess whether the impact of
election dates on tax rate increases differs from its impact on tax rate decreases, we
transform our dependent variable to capture positive growth rates (τ growth) and neg-
ative growth rates (τ growth) separately. Thus, in the construction of τ growth (τ growth),
13Note, however, that the personal tax instruments are set at the national level.
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Dependent Variable τ growth τ growth
(a) (b) (c) (d)
tt−1 -0.099 -0.095 0.007 0.006
(0.103) (0.107) (0.021) (0.021)
tt -0.147* -0.150* -0.012 -0.013
(0.077) (0.078) (0.012) (0.012)
tt+1 0.190** 0.185** -0.017 -0.017
(0.088) (0.091) (0.012) (0.013)
Fixed Effects individual state level individual state level
Notes: Time FE included in all models. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. Models
(a) and (c) include individual fixed effects, models (b) and (d) state dummies. For results of control
variables refer to Table 2.11 in the Appendix A2.
Table 2.4: Tax cuts vs. tax hikes
community-year observations with negative (positive) tax rate growth are treated as
zero. Specifications (a) to (d) of Table 2.4 reestimate our baseline model accounting
for the modified dependent variables. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year
level and specifications (a) and (c) ((b) and (d)) include a full set of community
fixed effects (state fixed effects). We find the baseline results confirmed in specifica-
tions (a) and (b) that investigate the impact of the electoral cycle on positive growth
rates in the local business tax measure. Thus, increases in local business tax rates
tend to be significantly reduced in the election years and significantly increased in
the post-election years. Repeating the same exercise for the negative business tax
growth τ growth derives statistically insignificant coefficient estimates for all three elec-
tion dummies. As the number of business tax reductions observed in our data is tiny
(less than 1% of the community-year observations), this likely reflects imprecisions
in the estimated effects due to limited variation in the data.
The fact that many communities do not observe a tax rate change within our
sample period further suggests that a binary regression model may fit the data bet-
ter. Thus, we additionally run estimation models that test for a potential impact
of the election cycle on the community’s probability to increase or lower the local
business tax rate. Table 2.5 presents the results for the marginal effects of a logit
model including state level and year fixed effects.14 Model (a) assesses the effect of
14The coefficient estimates are presented in Table 2.12 in the appendix. We also estimated
conditional logit models which account for unobserved heterogeneity across jurisdictions but suffer
from the shortcoming that there are no convenient possibilities to compute marginal effects. The
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Dependent Variable τ binary τ binary
(a) (b)
tt−1 -0.013 -0.004*
(0.017) (0.002)
tt -0.031** -0.002
(0.012) (0.002)
tt+1 0.035** 0.001
(0.017) (0.002)
Notes: Marginal effects for the different points of time in the electoral cycle. Underlying regressions
are presented in Table 2.12 in the Appendix A2
Table 2.5: Marginal effects
the election cycle on a community’s probability to increase its tax rate while model
(b) assesses the effect on the probability for a tax decrease. In line with the previous
results, our findings are confirmed in the specification for tax hikes while the coeffi-
cient estimate for election dummies turn out insignificant in most instances for the
tax cuts. The findings of model (a) also quantitatively correspond to our baseline
estimates. Calculating marginal effects suggests that the probability to observe a tax
increase is reduced by 3.1 percentage points in the election year and jumps up by 3.5
percentage points in the post-election year. Relative to the unconditional probability
for a tax increase/decrease, this corresponds to a change by 38% and 43%.
In a robustness check, we assess whether the election cycle is related to changes in
the composition of the city council. In general, German local politics are characterized
by a large number of parties as membership in the local city council is not tied to
obtaining at least 5% of the votes like it is the case in national elections. Thus,
besides the nationally operating parties, a number of civil parties are active at the
local level which are mainly concerned with local policy issues and are thus difficult to
classify in the left-right-spectrum. In addition, the ideology of nation-wide operating
parties is sometimes difficult to capture at local level politics. To nevertheless assess
whether changes in the distribution of seats across parties impacts on the political
business cycle determined in this paper, we classify parties in right wing parties and
left wing parties which are likely to form coalitions. From this information, we define
a dummy variable indicating major changes in the composition of the local council.
qualitative results of the conditional logit model are in line with those of the logit model including
only state dummies though.
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Dep. Variable τ growth τ growth τ growth
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
tt−1 -0.097 -0.096 -0.103 -0.102 0.005 0.006
(0.117) (0.118) (0.113) (0.115) (0.022) (0.023)
tt -0.146 -0.151 -0.141 -0.147* -0.004 -0.005
(0.093) (0.092) (0.088) (0.088) (0.012) (0.013)
tt+1 0.194* 0.189* 0.210** 0.203** -0.016 -0.014
(0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.101) (0.013) (0.014)
tt−1 · change 0.045 0.054 0.031 0.047 0.014 0.007
(0.107) (0.096) (0.096) (0.088) (0.019) (0.019)
tt · change -0.021 -0.017 0.014 0.020 -0.035 -0.037
(0.099) (0.093) (0.084) (0.076) (0.027) (0.032)
tt+1 · change 0.017 0.022 0.018 0.031 -0.002 -0.010
(0.127) (0.118) (0.114) (0.104) (0.026) (0.023)
Fixed Effects individual state level individual state level individual state level
Notes: All regressions include a constant and time fixed effects. Models (a), (c), (e) include indi-
vidual fixed effects, remaining models include state dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the
state-year level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For results of control variables refer to Table 2.13
in the appendix.
Table 2.6: Interaction with council changes
The variable takes on the value 1 if an election destroys or brings about a majority
for one of the blocs. Since civil parties receive a significant fraction of vote shares at
the local level, direct changes from a left-wing to a right-wing majority or vice versa
are rather rare though. The idea of this measure is to capture perturbations in the
council majorities rather than ideological differences. Table 2.6 reports the results of
specifications which reestimate our baseline model augmenting the set of regressors by
interaction terms between the election dummies and the dummy variable indicating
major changes in the composition of the local council as defined above. As indicated
in the table, the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms turn out insignificant
and simultaneously do not change the pattern of our baseline estimates. This suggests
that on average the election cycle in tax setting behavior is not related to elections
which do or do not change city council majorities.
Furthermore, we assess the robustness of our results to including a control variable
for the lagged level of the local business tax rate. The results are presented in Table
2.7. Specification (a) reestimates our baseline model using the growth rate in the
business tax as dependent variable. The coefficient estimate for the lagged level
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Dependent Variable τ growth τ binary τ binary
(a) (b) (c)
taxt−1 -0.106*** -0.010** 0.011***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.003)
tt−1 -0.063 -0.153 -0.401
(0.083) (0.427) (0.355)
tt -0.177** -0.512** 0.042
(0.067) (0.243) (0.354)
tt+1 0.054 0.539* 0.001
(0.071) (0.310) (0.344)
Notes: Model (a) includes municipal fixed effects, (b) and (c) state level fixed effects. Time fixed
effects always included. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. For results of control variables refer to Table 2.14 in the appendix.
Table 2.7: Inclusion of the lagged tax level
of the business tax rate turns out negative and statistically significant indicating
mean reversal in the communties’ business tax setting behavior. Moreover, again,
the coefficient estimates for the election year and post election year dummy turn out
negative and positive respectively, whereas only the former is statistically significant
at conventional significance levels though. Specifications (b) and (c) augment the
binary models by the lagged level of the tax rate. Specification (b) presents the results
for the election cycle on a community’s probability to increase its tax rate. In line with
intuition, the coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable turns out negative
suggesting that communities with a high local business tax are less likely to observe
a tax increase. The specification also confirms our baseline findings qualitatively
and quantitatively whereas both, the coefficient estimates for the election and post-
election dummies now turn out statistically significant. The average marginal effect
in the election year is -3.0 percentage points and the marginal effect of the post-
election year is also comparable to the previous findings indicating an increase in
probability of 4.6 percentage points. Specification (c) reports analogous results for
the binary model indicating tax rate decreases. Here, in line with intuition, the
lagged dependent variable turns out positive and statistically significant, indicating
that communities with a high local business tax have a higher probability to observe
tax decreases. Apart from that the results resemble our baseline findings in the sense
that the coefficient estimates for electoral dummies turn out statistically insignificant.
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Dependent Variable τ effective τdifference
(a) (b)
tt−1 -0.090 -0.271
(0.096) (0.391)
tt -0.144** -0.505*
(0.072) (0.280)
tt+1 0.164** 0.607*
(0.081) (0.326)
Notes: Time and individual FE included in all models. Standard errors are clustered at the state-
year level. Dependent variable in (a) is the effective tax rate, in (b) the first difference. For results
of control variables refer to Table 2.15 in the appendix.
Table 2.8: Other definitions of the dependent variable
In our baseline model, the growth rate of the dependent variable is calculated
based on the community’s statutory local business tax rate. A particular feature of
the German local business tax is that a firm’s local business tax payment is itself
deductible from its tax base (’self-deductibility’), implying that the firm’s effective
tax burden falls short from the statutory one.15 As a robustness check, we thus rees-
timate our baseline model defining the growth rate in the effective local business tax
accounting for the deductibility of the tax. The results are presented in specification
(a) of Table 2.8 and qualitatively and quantitatively resemble our baseline findings.
As an additional modification, specification (b) reruns the baseline specification us-
ing the change in the local business tax rate as the dependent variable instead of the
growth rate. Again, the findings are comparable to our baseline estimates.
Our baseline model includes three dummy variables to capture the electoral cy-
cle: a dummy variable for the pre-election year, a dummy variable for the election
year and a dummy variable for the post-election year. As elections for local councils
take place every five years (every 6 years in Bavaria), the two remaining years act
as baseline category. In Table 2.9 we reestimate our baseline model using the local
business tax growth rate as the dependent variable and including indicator variables
for the election year, for the first year after the election, for the second year after the
election, for the first year prior to the election, and for the second year prior to the
15Self-deductibility of the local business tax implies that the corporate tax payment T is calculated
as T = t(pi − T ), with t denoting the local business tax rate (in percentage values) and pi denoting
the company profits. Rearranging derives T = t/(1 + t)pi. Hence, the statutory local business tax
rate which is, for example, implied by a local business tax of 16.25% is 0.1625/1.1625=14%.
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Dependent Variable τ growth
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
tt−2 -0.022
(0.076)
tt−1 -0.081
(0.099)
tt -0.167**
(0.079)
tt+1 0.229***
(0.086)
tt+2 0.108
(0.117)
Notes: Time and individual FE included in all models. Standard errors are clustered at the state-
year level. Dependent variable in (a) is the effective tax rate, in (b) the first difference.
Table 2.9: Different time points of the electoral course
election separately. The pattern is very consistent with our theoretical considerations
in the sense that we find a negative, but small and insignificant coefficient estimate in
the specification (a) which includes a dummy variable for years two years prior to the
election. In specification (b) we include a dummy variable for the pre-election year
and find a negative effect which is larger in absolute terms than in the previous spec-
ification, although still not significant. In specification (c) which includes a dummy
variable for the election year, the effect is negative and again larger in absolute terms
than in the previous two specifications, which now also gains statistical significance.
Including only a dummy variable for the first year after the election yields a positive
and statistically significant coefficient estimate, confirming our baseline estimations
(see specification (d)). Rerunning the specification with a dummy variable indicating
the second post-election year again yields a positive coefficient estimate which, in line
with expectation, is smaller though and does not fully gain statistical significance.
To conclude, the results in this section are in line with an election cycle in tax
rate setting. In particular, we find that tax rate growth is significantly reduced in
the election year and significantly increased in the first post-election year.
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2.6 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to assess whether there is an electoral cycle in the tax
setting behavior of local communities. For that purpose, we exploited rich panel
information on a large set of communities in Germany. As the election dates for
local councils in Germany vary across states, our data allows us to disentangle effects
related to electoral cycles from common trends. Using conventional fixed effects
panel methods and logit estimations, and controlling for time-constant and time-
varying heterogeneity between the communities, our results provide strong evidence
that tax setting is affected by election dates. Specifically, our findings suggest that
the tax rate growth is significantly reduced in election years, while it jumps up in the
post-election years. The effects turn out quantitatively important and suggest that,
evaluated at the sample mean, tax rate growth is decreased and increased by around
40% in the pre- and post-election year respectively. Thus, our findings suggest that
political economy determinants, in particular the timing of elections, affect the tax
policies of local communities.
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A2 Appendix
A2.1 Detailed tables
Dependent Variable Individual Fixed Effect Model State Fixed Effect Model
τ growth (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
credits 0.313*** 0.313*** 0.313*** 0.313*** 0.404*** 0.404***
(0.110) (0.111) (0.105) (0.111) (0.092) (0.090)
income 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 -0.433** -0.433**
(0.581) (0.545) (1.481) (1.472) (0.206) (0.197)
debt -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 0.022 0.022
(0.042) (0.035) (0.093) (0.093) (0.023) (0.022)
expenditures -0.043 -0.043 -0.043 -0.043 -0.054 -0.054**
(0.028) (0.081) (0.042) (0.071) (0.033) (0.023)
unemplyment -3.060** -3.060** -3.060 -3.060 -0.422 -0.422
(1.425) (1.364) (2.127) (2.132) (1.890) (1.850)
population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
young 0.409 0.409 0.409 0.409 0.423 0.423
(0.694) (1.422) (1.313) (1.394) (0.393) (0.368)
old -0.307 -0.307 -0.307 -0.307 0.232 0.232
(0.683) (1.262) (1.131) (1.207) (0.297) (0.275)
city -0.003 -0.003
(0.025) (0.022)
spd 0.322 0.322* 0.322 0.322 0.049 0.049
(0.197) (0.180) (0.269) (0.268) (0.077) (0.071)
cdu 0.392** 0.392*** 0.392 0.392 0.033 0.033
(0.156) (0.150) (0.333) (0.335) (0.053) (0.048)
fdp -2.039** -2.039*** -2.039 -2.039 -0.440 -0.440**
(0.829) (0.707) (1.715) (1.698) (0.307) (0.220)
gruene 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 -0.273 -0.273
(0.715) (0.992) (1.174) (1.224) (0.285) (0.270)
farleft 1.228 1.228 1.228 1.228 1.647 1.647
(4.124) (2.482) (2.834) (2.825) (2.625) (2.971)
farright 1.404 1.404 1.404 1.404 -1.570 -1.570
(2.698) (1.976) (1.704) (1.951) (1.139) (1.142)
R2 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.017 0.004
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clustering no community state-year two-way state-year two-way
Notes: Results of control variables for the estimations presented in Table 2.3 in the text. All
models include time fixed effects, constant term not reported. n=66403, N=7738, standard errors
are clustered at the reported level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.10: Regression results
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Dependent Variable τ growth τ growth
(a) (b) (c) (d)
credits 0.287*** 0.375*** 0.026 0.029
(0.086) (0.078) (0.040) (0.044)
income 0.789 -0.305* -0.770** -0.128*
(1.427) (0.181) (0.368) (0.071)
debt -0.021 0.023 0.002 -0.001
(0.084) (0.023) (0.021) (0.005)
expenditures -0.013 0.009 -0.030 -0.063*
(0.039) (0.022) (0.054) (0.037)
unemployment -3.100 -1.513 0.040 1.091**
(2.042) (1.789) (0.520) (0.458)
population 0.000** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
young -0.173 0.416 0.582 0.008
(0.839) (0.359) (1.179) (0.172)
old 0.859 0.391 -1.166 -0.160*
(0.732) (0.266) (0.996) (0.091)
city -0.011 0.009
(0.021) (0.014)
spd 0.301 0.058 0.021 -0.010
(0.242) (0.072) (0.077) (0.024)
cdu 0.366 0.020 0.026 0.012
(0.325) (0.048) (0.074) (0.018)
fdp -2.755 -0.294 0.716 -0.147
(1.675) (0.286) (0.434) (0.145)
gruene 0.308 -0.135 -0.181 -0.138
(1.030) (0.255) (0.391) (0.128)
farleft 0.543 -0.559 0.685 2.206***
(2.812) (2.633) (0.507) (0.638)
farright 0.962 -1.747* 0.442 0.177
(1.684) (1.031) (0.673) (0.408)
Fixed Effects individual state level individual state level
Notes: Results of control variables for the estimations presented in Table 2.4 in the text. All
models include time fixed effects. n=66403, N=7738, standard errors clustered at the state-year in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.11: Regression results
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Dependent Variable τ binary τ binary
(a) (b)
tt−1 -0.198 -0.622*
(0.279) (0.343)
tt -0.547** -0.288
(0.219) (0.258)
tt+1 0.416** 0.142
(0.198) (0.248)
credits 0.852*** -0.932**
(0.212) (0.451)
income -0.707 1.744***
(0.523) (0.478)
debt 0.037 -0.018
(0.089) (0.088)
expenditures 0.046 0.138***
(0.033) (0.033)
unemployment -0.729 -1.972
(3.934) (5.868)
population -0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
young 0.876 -1.380
(0.586) (2.157)
old 1.341*** -0.673
(0.474) (1.469)
city 0.061 0.026
(0.062) (0.138)
spd 0.154 0.361
(0.171) (0.345)
cdu 0.202* 0.120
(0.104) (0.274)
fdp -0.732 3.078***
(0.564) (0.943)
gruene -0.946 3.391***
(0.684) (1.015)
farleft 9.631* -14.588
(5.577) (11.078)
farright -5.522 11.117***
(5.469) (3.450)
Constant 4.155 -21.715***
(4.966) (4.664)
Notes: Results for the logit estimations of the marginal effects presented in Table 2.5 in the text.
All models include time and state fixed effects. n=66403, N=7738, standard errors clustered at the
state-year in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.12: Logit coefficient estimates
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Dependent Variable τ growth τ growth τ growth
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
credits 0.309*** 0.403*** 0.286*** 0.375*** 0.024 0.028
(0.106) (0.093) (0.087) (0.079) (0.040) (0.045)
income 0.081 -0.430** 0.882 -0.304 -0.801** -0.127*
(1.545) (0.208) (1.497) (0.184) (0.379) (0.072)
debt 0.013 0.024 0.008 0.025 0.005 -0.001
(0.106) (0.023) (0.097) (0.022) (0.021) (0.005)
expenditures -0.045 -0.056* -0.016 0.007 -0.029 -0.063*
(0.043) (0.033) (0.039) (0.022) (0.055) (0.037)
unemployment -3.038 -0.398 -3.081 -1.484 0.043 1.086**
(2.130) (1.901) (2.042) (1.797) (0.532) (0.464)
population 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
young 0.405 0.416 -0.178 0.413 0.583 0.003
(1.312) (0.394) (0.839) (0.359) (1.179) (0.173)
old -0.313 0.225 0.860 0.389 -1.173 -0.164*
(1.132) (0.299) (0.741) (0.268) (0.995) (0.092)
city -0.003 -0.013 0.010
(0.026) (0.022) (0.014)
spd 0.360 0.044 0.348 0.050 0.012 -0.007
(0.274) (0.079) (0.244) (0.075) (0.080) (0.023)
cdu 0.425 0.034 0.395 0.022 0.030 0.012
(0.339) (0.055) (0.330) (0.050) (0.075) (0.019)
fdp -1.942 -0.457 -2.675 -0.309 0.733 -0.148
(1.761) (0.317) (1.719) (0.295) (0.444) (0.148)
gruene -0.009 -0.322 0.193 -0.171 -0.202 -0.151
(1.197) (0.294) (1.051) (0.263) (0.406) (0.130)
farleft 1.488 1.747 0.721 -0.418 0.767 2.165***
(2.802) (2.618) (2.791) (2.635) (0.514) (0.633)
farright 1.691 -1.548 1.109 -1.771* 0.582 0.223
(1.663) (1.131) (1.624) (1.018) (0.719) (0.416)
constant -0.549 4.650** -8.459 3.422* 7.911** 1.228*
(14.952) (1.994) (14.456) (1.765) (3.698) (0.695)
Fixed Effects individual state level individual state level individual state level
Notes: Results of control variables for the estimations presented in Table 2.6 in the text. All
models include time fixed effects. n=66403, N=7738, standard errors clustered at the state-year in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.13: Regression results
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Dependent Variable τ growth τ binary τ binary
(a) (b) (c)
credits 0.048 0.708*** -1.273***
(0.099) (0.239) (0.465)
income -4.463*** -0.690 2.144***
(1.547) (0.596) (0.634)
debt 0.205** 0.171** -0.218*
(0.093) (0.069) (0.112)
expenditures -0.076* 0.022 0.158***
(0.044) (0.074) (0.037)
unemployment -2.790 3.564 -0.767
(1.749) (4.716) (7.133)
population -0.000*** -0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
young 0.479 1.187 -3.153
(1.290) (1.139) (3.045)
old 0.469 1.861*** 1.510
(1.056) (0.675) (1.695)
city 0.072 -0.274
(0.070) (0.176)
spd -0.296 0.279 0.889
(0.246) (0.215) (0.684)
cdu -0.424 0.274 0.564
(0.279) (0.246) (0.372)
fdp 1.469 2.665*** -1.706
(1.641) (0.890) (2.585)
gruene 0.571 0.979 0.508
(1.128) (0.899) (1.960)
farleft -3.335 5.923 -33.096**
(2.679) (5.912) (14.604)
farright 2.478 -10.363 11.282***
(1.794) (6.727) (4.201)
Constant 78.364*** 6.150 -29.092***
(16.594) (6.514) (5.847)
Notes: Results for controls of the estimations presented in Table 2.7 in the text. Model (a) includes
municipal fixed effects, (b) and (c) state level fixed effects. Time fixed effects always included.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.14: Regression results
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Dependent Variable τ effective τdifference
(a) (b)
credits 0.294*** 1.123***
(0.096) (0.374)
income 0.082 0.606
(1.338) (5.226)
debt -0.014 -0.057
(0.083) (0.323)
expenditures -0.031 -0.125
(0.032) (0.127)
unemployment -2.810 -10.676
(1.912) (7.408)
population 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
young 0.086 2.000
(0.985) (4.498)
old 0.021 -0.410
(0.852) (3.878)
spd 0.283 1.185
(0.242) (0.973)
cdu 0.345 1.543
(0.301) (1.309)
fdp -2.016 -8.063
(1.522) (6.680)
gruene 0.421 -0.236
(1.119) (4.183)
farleft 0.830 3.876
(2.607) (10.847)
farright 1.348 4.595
(1.549) (6.090)
Notes: Results for controls of the estimations presented in Table 2.8 in the text. Time and individual
FE included in all models. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. Dependent variable
in (a) is the effective tax rate, in (b) the first difference.
Table 2.15: Other definitions of the dependent variable
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Chapter 3
Strategic fiscal interaction across
borders
Evidence from French and German local governments along
the Rhine-Valley1
3.1 Introduction
Over the last decades the mechanisms driving strategic fiscal policy interactions be-
tween governments have been a focus of academic study and public debate. While
public discussion tends to focus on tax competition, tax evasion, and international
tax havens, the academic literature focused first on the fiscal arrangements of local
governments within the same country. The literature on fiscal federalism emphasizes
that there can be two kinds of externalities from multi-tiered government systems.
On the one hand, horizontal externalities can arise when the fiscal choices of one ju-
risdiction affect the fiscal decisions made by other competing jurisdictions at the same
level of government. This can happen because governments try to attract a mobile
tax base (see Wilson (1999) for a survey) or politicians attempt to maximize their
re-election prospects (Besley and Case, 1995). On the other hand, vertical externali-
ties can arise as a result of fiscal interactions between different layers of government,
1This chapter is based on joint work with Aure´lie Cassette and Edoardo Di Porto. Special
thanks go to both of them.
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and particularly if these different layers share a common tax base.
The existing empirical literature on horizontal fiscal policy interactions can be
differentiated by the level of government studied. Strategic interactions have either
been investigated at the local domestic level or at the central international level.
This chapter contributes to the literature by taking into account that local level
government tax interactions can involve national borders. The key question to be
answered in this chapter is whether local governments of one country interact only
with their domestic neighbors or also with their foreign counterparts which are part
of another country. Our data set is made up of the municipalities in the French-
German border area, located along the Rhine River. Our main results confirm internal
interactions within each of the two countries, but we do not find interactions between
German and French jurisdictions in either direction.
The relevance of our question has increased by two trends which shaped tax
systems in Europe - the process of European integration, and fiscal decentraliza-
tion. When national governments decide to transfer responsibilities to sub-national
governments, they need to find ways to finance them. This is usually done by ei-
ther increasing tax autonomy by devolving local taxation powers through new tax
instruments or increasing the transfers from central government. Endowing local ju-
risdictions with specific local taxes has consequences on the fiscal interactions of the
respective governments, especially if these taxes affect a mobile tax base. In addition,
the process of economic integration among the countries of the European Union has
raised numerous questions related to fiscal coordination among member states. It is
important to note that, in a highly integrated economic area, such as the European
Union, products and factors are free to move across borders. While indirect taxation
is harmonized by several agreements, factor income taxation is not. In the absence
of taxation and other infrastructural or institutional barriers, investment will focus
on areas where production costs are lower. The introduction of taxes distorts the
investment decision because firms are lured to locations where after-tax profits are
higher. For this reason, business and corporate taxation is attracting a great deal of
attention as an element important for the operation of the internal market. Against
this background, an investigation of the interactions among local governments with
substantial discretion over taxes in different countries is an important question which
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has not been answered yet.
So far the literature may have neglected this issue because this question is an em-
pirically demanding one. It is important to account for the other than local elements
of the tax system that affect a firm’s net-of-tax profits. These elements vary across
countries, but not across jurisdictions in the same country. If foreign jurisdictions
and their different taxation systems are taken into account, elements of the tax code
adopted by higher governmental levels come into play. Local particularities even-
tually generate a multifaceted bandwidth of potential after-tax profits in different
regions beyond national borders.
However, the scope for lower level governments to attract mobile factors is limited.
For example, it is very unlikely that communities in Lapland observe and react to
the fiscal choices made in Andalusia, and the literature on local interactions shows
that proximity of jurisdictions matters. Also, tax interactions will only occur if
sub-national governments have sufficient discretion over fiscal instruments and are
able to influence the after-tax profits of firms. These conditions explain our choice
of the regional sample. The German-French context is an interesting example of
proximate countries where business is taxed at the local level. In both countries local
governments have a major impact on the overall tax burdens of firms. French and
German municipalities can set taxes on business activities and on property which
increase firms’ tax liabilities. Proximity is also taken into account, since Germany
and France share a common border along the Rhine Valley. The empirical analysis in
this chapter tackles the question of whether those local governments on any side of
the border interact with their foreign neighbors when they decide upon fiscal policy.
To do so, we estimate tax reaction functions which differentiate between the spatial
interactions with respect to the origin of the neighbors.
Our main results show that spatial correlation between the taxes set by local
governments is driven exclusively by domestic effects. We also distinguish between
an effect due to proximity along the border and one potentially arising out of infras-
tructural disadvantages. The Franco-German border coincides with the Rhine River
which can be crossed only where infrastructure, such as ferries or bridges, allows. We
find that this effect does not change the main finding that local interactions are a
domestic issue.
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This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes sub-national tax sys-
tems and the institutional background in France and Germany. Section 3.3 reviews
the empirical literature. Section 3.4 presents the empirical specification and the pe-
culiarities of our context. Section 3.5 introduces the data set and section 3.6 presents
the results. This chapter comes to a close in section 3.7 with providing concluding
remarks.
3.2 Business taxation in France and Germany
In general, sub-national governments have two main sources of revenue: the taxes
they impose with their own discretion over tax rates, and grants and redistributed tax
revenues from other government levels. In 2007, German local governments received
about one quarter of their revenue from own taxes and French ones received about a
third of their income from this source. An important point is that even though local
authorities in Germany and France can influence the overall tax burdens of firms,
the tax instruments available are different. French local jurisdictions can impose
a professional tax (taxe professionelle, subsequently abbreviated tp) and German
municipalities have at their disposal a local trade tax (Gewerbesteuer, gs). Local
governments in both countries can choose the rate of tax on real estate. Both tax
systems show important differences at sub-national (different tax base) and national
(especially in capital allowances) levels. We translate the formal tax code into a
measure of the tax burden in order to make it comparable across the two countries.
The tax systems of both countries have been subject to several reforms and changes.
In the remaining of this section we describe the major characteristics of the French
and German fiscal system which are important to our context and were valid during
the sample period.
3.2.1 Local characteristics: The French case
French sub-national government is four tiered. The lowest level consists of around
36,000 municipalities, divided into more than 13,000 groups or Etablissements Publics
de Coope´ration Intercommunale. The middle tier consists of 96 departments and the
top tier of the 22 French regions. Our paper focuses on the lowest tier of government,
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i.e. municipalities. Business is taxed at all levels and is subject to a national corporate
income tax (impoˆt sur les socie´te´s, cit) and two sub-national taxes: a local business
tax (taxe professionnelle, tp) and a real estate tax (taxe foncie`re, tf). The statutory
rates ttp and ttf are set annually by the local authorities and vary across regions,
departments, and municipalities. The consolidated tax rate is the sum of the sub-
national level rates. The groups of municipalities can choose to set a single business
tax rate (taxe professionnelle unique), which applies to all municipalities belonging
to the inter-municipal group or to apply an additional tax rate on each of the local
taxes. In the first case, the municipalities do not set individual business tax rates
and the municipal cooperation acts to merge jurisdictions. In the second case, this
new level of local government sets an additional tax rate, which strengthens tax base
sharing.
The professional tax is a local business tax levied on tangible fixed assets, such as
machinery, and on buildings. The tax base is the rental value σ of the tangible fixed
assets used for the business purposes.2 For buildings, tax law defines the rental value
as 8% of the value of the buildings; for machinery, the rental value is 16% of the value.
In both cases a general deduction of 16% applies and the local tax is deductible from
the corporate income tax (tcit). The effective rate is given by
Ttp = (1− tcit)σ(1− 0.16)ttp
The taxe foncie`re, or real estate tax, is levied on the owners of residential prop-
erties in France. The tax base is obtained after applying a 50% allowance to the
rental value compared to the one of business facilities. The effective rate accounts
for deductions from the corporate income tax
Ttf = (1− tcit)σttf
3.2.2 Local characteristics: The German case
Germany has two sub-national government levels: the 16 federal states (Bundesla¨nder)
and the approximately 12,000 municipalities or cities. The German framework of pub-
2See Table 3.7 in the Appendix A3.1 of this chapter for details on the rental value.
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lic finance is a complex system based on revenue-sharing and equalization schemes
between government layers. Corporate profits in Germany are taxed by a central
government tax (Ko¨rperschaftsteuer, cit). The revenues are shared with the federal
states. The trade tax (Gewerbesteuer, gs) is the local business tax which is a tax on
the profits earned by corporations, non-incorporated firms, and self-employed per-
sons. A share of this tax goes to the states and central government. The tax base
consists of the profits of business enterprises determined under income tax law or
corporation tax law. Each local authority has discretion over the so called collection
rate cgs. These collection rates can be transformed into an ordinary statutory tax
rate expressed as a percentage by dividing the collection rate by 100 and applying
a specific multiplier (5% under our assumptions)3 set by law, which implements a
degree of progression into the tax code. The tax liability is also deductible from its
own tax base and the tax base of the corporate income tax (see Scheffler (2005) for
details of the German tax code). The adjusted effective tax rate can be calculated as
Tgs =
5
100
· cgs
100
· (1− Tgs) · (1− tcit)
⇔ Tgs = cgs
2000 + cgs
(1− tcit)
A second local tax is the municipal real estate tax (Grundsteuer, pt). Each muni-
cipality has the right to choose a collection rate for this tax cpt and can distinguish
between agricultural and other areas. We focus on other areas, which are likely to be
used for business purposes. The effective rate accounts for the deductibility of real
estate taxes from corporate income taxation (tcit). It is determined by
Tpt = (1− tcit)σcpt
Other studies on international tax-comparisons, for example ZEW (2008), assume
that the tax base of the real estate tax amounts to 25% of the acquisition costs.4
In order to obtain comparable measures of the tax burdens in the two countries,
3The applied multiplier depends on the amount of the tax base and the legal form of the firm.
In our setting we focus on the highest multiplier, which applies to all incorporated firms. Their
share of the total tax base in 2004 was about 55%. However, the results do not change for any other
value.
4For details, see Table 3.7 in the Appendix A3.1.
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which is based on different tax bases, we compute municipal specific effective av-
erage tax rates. This measure takes into account the elements that vary between
sub-national governments, i.e. the variation of tax rates across municipalities. At
the same time this measure captures the differences across the two countries. The
computation of these tax rates is specified in the Appendix A3.1 and the resulting
tax rates are described in detail in the data section 3.5.
3.3 Literature review
The existence of strategic interactions between fiscal authorities is a common pre-
diction of the tax competition (surveyed by Wilson, 1999) and the yardstick compe-
tition (Besley and Case, 1995) literatures. The reason for a strategic component in
tax rates is an outflow of mobile capital in the case of tax competition. In yardstick
competition, the different incentives and objectives of politicians promote interac-
tions. The empirical literature tests for the existence of strategic interactions among
governments. These models usually are implemented empirically by estimating a fis-
cal reaction function where the optimal tax rate in the equilibrium in a jurisdiction
depends on the tax rates in nearby jurisdictions (see Revelli (2006) for a survey of
the empirical models).
Up to now, empirical studies concentrate either on international tax competition
between countries (Redoano, 2007; Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008; Cas-
sette and Paty, 2008) or tax interactions among local jurisdictions or regions within a
country (see Brueckner (2003) for a survey). The former group of studies shows that
industrialized countries compete over statutory and effective average corporate tax
rates. Most country studies of the second group find empirical evidence of positive
interactions among sub-national governments using various data sets of local prop-
erty, income, or business tax rates. For example, interaction effects have been found
by Brett and Pinkse (2000) for Canada, Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) for Belgium,
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) for the United States, Revelli (2001) for the United
Kingdom, Feld and Reulier (2009) for Switzerland, Sole´-Olle´ (2003) for Spain, Bor-
dignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) for Italy, Edmark and A˚gren (2008) for Sweden,
and Allers and Elhorst (2005) for the Netherlands.
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Tests for strategic interactions have also been performed in the two countries of our
study. The local business tax is the major source of tax revenue for local governments
in France, which explains why most empirical work on France focuses on this tax
instrument at the lowest level of government. All studies on spatial interactions
at the municipal level find evidence of tax interactions. Jayet, Paty, and Pentel
(2002) focus only on horizontal interactions when investigating tax interactions in
France. They check for the existence of tax mimicking between municipalities in Nord-
Pas de Calais (Northern France). Tax interactions between neighbor municipalities
occur in urban but not in rural areas. Charlot and Paty (2007, 2010) study spatial
fiscal interactions among municipalities controlling for vertical fiscal interactions and
accounting for agglomeration forces. They observe significant mimicking behavior
among jurisdictions when choosing local business tax rates and vertical interactions
between municipalities and regions. Empirical studies using French data have also
been performed at the department level (Leprince, Madie`s, and Paty, 2007; Dubois,
Leprince, and Paty, 2007) and the regional level (Feld, Josselin, and Rocaboy, 2003),
finding significant results in favor of tax competition.
In contrast to the fairly large literature on the French setting, studies of strategic
interactions in Germany are scarce. Using panel data for a German state (Baden-
Wuerttemberg), Buettner (2001) finds that tax rates are strategic complements, i.e.
that the best response of a municipality to an increase in adjacent municipalities’ tax
rates is to raise its own tax rate. In a further paper (Buettner, 2003), he confirms
that the tax base is affected not only by the municipality’s own tax rate, but also
by the tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions, although the effect is rather small. The
regional sample for these two studies is located close to the border-region and a set
of dummies is used to capture effects in regions particularly exposed to international
competition. The results suggest that within a bandwidth of 30 kilometers distance
from the border, significant effects are at work. However, this is not worked out in
detail since the data set ends at the German frontier. Hence, internal country com-
petition may be different in the border region, but whether this is due to interactions
with the foreign municipalities is not answered yet. A recent study by Geys and
Osterloh (2011) evaluates the responses of German mayors to questionnaires about
whom they consider to be their main competitors. This paper shows that it is mostly
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other jurisdictions within Germany that are seen as competitors. Only mayors from
municipalities located very close to the border with France responded differently.
Again, whether fiscal policy in border regions depends on - and reacts strategically
to the fiscal policy enacted abroad, or whether domestic effects dominate, remains
an open question.
To our knowledge, no empirical studies test the existence of local tax interactions
across national borders. From a theoretical perspective, as long as capital is perfectly
mobile and in the absence of other frictions, there are no reasons why politicians and
voters should consider only the behavior of adjacent municipalities within the same
country. The aim of this chapter is to fill this gap in the literature with combining
local fiscal data from two countries.
3.4 From theory to empirics
This section shows how we reach from theory to empirical models able to test our
main hypotheses. While theoretical arguments are in line with the standard models
of tax competition, our empirical strategy is context specific and differs from other
studies that examine only domestic local interactions.
3.4.1 Theoretical background
Following Brueckner (2003), the utility of residents in municipality i (ui) depends on
their private consumption (ci) and on the quantity of public goods provided by the
local government (gi), thus
ui = u(ci(ki), gi(ki);Xi) (3.1)
where Xi is a vector of characteristics of the jurisdiction, such as demographic at-
tributes reflecting the preferences and needs of the local population. ki is the resource
used as the tax base in that jurisdiction (capital used by firms for production). The
demand for capital depends on the fiscal environment in the jurisdiction because firms
maximize after-tax profits. As in Zodrow and Mieskowski’s (1986) basic model, a per-
fectly competitive firm produces output by a twice differentiable, constant returns to
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scale production function under the assumption that labor is locally fixed:
fi(ki, li), with l = 1, and fk > 0 > fkk
As discussed above, sub-national governments in France and Germany have dissimilar
local tax bases. The French local tax can be seen as a unit capital tax while the
German local business tax is a tax on profits. Thus, the after local-tax profits of firms
are different in both countries. Maximizing the respective profit function yields the
profit maximizing first order conditions for the demand for capital in either country:5
f ′(ki)(1− Tgs) = r for germany
f ′(ki)− Ttp = r for france
Under the assumption that capital is perfectly mobile, capital market equilibrium
implies that the after-tax rate of return equalizes across jurisdictions, independent
of the tax instrument applied. Furthermore, Lockwood (2004) shows that, although
a jurisdiction may care about which tax instrument its rivals use, the jurisdiction
is indifferent towards these instruments since for any tax rate on profits there is a
revenue equivalent unit rate. Hence we define τ as the effective average tax rate, that
is the tax burden for a one-unit hypothetical investment project. We can transform
the German profit tax into per unit tax by writing Tgs =
τ
f ′(ki)
. Since taxes in France
are already expressed per unit, equilibrium in the capital market for both countries
implies that
f ′(ki) = r + τi (3.2)
is the profit-maximizing condition for jurisdictions in both countries. The tax rate
τ is the measure of the tax burden which we use in our empirical estimations. In
addition to transforming the different tax bases, this measure is able to depict further
elements of the tax code. For example, it accounts for the coexistence of real estate
taxes on the municipal level. We now define ϕ as the inverse of f ′(ki) and the demand
5These equations are simplified since we take account only of the local business taxes. However,
the underlying problem is similar for other taxes.
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for capital is given by
ki = ϕ(r + τi) (3.3)
Market clearing requires that
m∑
i=1
ϕ(r + τ i) +
n∑
i=m+1
ϕ(r + τ i) =
n∑
i=1
ki (3.4)
where m is the share of municipalities in one of the two respective countries. Equa-
tions 3.3 and 3.4 show that capital demand depends on all tax rates and differentiation
of them yields ∂ϕ
∂τi
< 0, i.e. capital flees by an increase in the effective average tax
rate.
Maximization of (3.1) subject to the capital demand equilibrium (3.4) shows that
the optimal tax policy depends on tax rates elsewhere and the municipality’s own
local characteristics. The resulting reaction function is given by
τi = τ(τ−i, Xi) (3.5)
where the notation −i indicates all other municipalities than i.
However, this result holds if and only if capital is perfectly mobile between the
two countries. On the other hand, it could be argued that capital first adjusts at
country level, i.e. the two countries compete for shares, say α and (1 − α). Once
proportions are fixed, each municipality can only try to increase its attractiveness for
firms to locate in its area rather than in a nearby municipality in the same country.
In that case, interactions reduce to the standard within-country case and domestic
tax rates are a function of nearby domestic policy choices.
τi∈[1,m] = τ(τ−i∈[1,m], Xi)
τi∈[m+1,n] = τ(τ−i∈[m+1,n], Xi)
Proposition 1. In the absence of restrictions on the mobility of capital, tax rates
are a function of all other domestic and foreign tax rates, irrespective of the tax base.
As soon as capital is fixed in either country, only domestic interactions occur.
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Hence, a local jurisdiction of any of the two countries could interact with the fiscal
policy enacted in the local jurisdictions of the other country. To test the existence
of tax interactions among local governments, we estimate reduced-form tax reaction
functions which allow us to distinguish the between country effects from the domestic
effects within one country. These estimations can be seen also as an indirect test of
the mobility of capital between the two regions on their respective sides of the frontier.
We present our estimation strategy in the next sub-section.
3.4.2 Identification
Our main question refers to whether there is a correlation between local tax rates
across national borders. Existing empirical work that disentangles the effects between
different sub-groups, in our application between domestic and foreign interactions,
utilize spatial autoregressive fixed effect methods (e.g. Cassette and Paty (2008) using
Generalized Method of Moments - GMM methods, Ge´rard, Jayet, and Paty (2010)
using Maximum Likelihood estimators). To test the existence of tax interactions
among local governments, we need to estimate the reduced-form reaction function,
which can be expressed in a matrix form such as
τ = ρWτ + Xβ + η + υ + ε
where ρ is the parameter associated with the weighted average of competing govern-
ments’ tax rates. The coefficients in β include the parameters associated with the
socio-economic characteristics of municipality i. We allow for different reactions to
the control variables in X in the two countries by interacting them with a country
dummy. Finally, η is a vector of municipal fixed effects, υ is a vector of year fixed
effects and ε is an idiosyncratic error term. Including a community (or municipal)
fixed effect ηi is important in our case. Under this specification, all identifying vari-
ations come from changes over time. This allows us to eliminate possible omitted
variables which do not vary over time.
The weighting scheme W defines which other local governments should be re-
garded as neighbors. Usually a weight matrix is used where W is row normalized,
each row summing to unity.
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In order to distinguish the influence of competing domestic municipalities from
the effect of competing foreign municipalities, we use a decomposition of the weight
matrix, which is a linear combination of partial weights. Starting from any standard
weight matrix W, we define three partial interaction matrices6 such that W = WFF+
WGG + WFG:
- WFF for interactions within France; WGG for interactions within Germany.
All elements in the weighting matrix WFF and WGG are equal to zero if the
municipalities i and j are from different countries;
- WFG for interactions between France and Germany. The elements of the
weighting matrix WFG are equal to zero if municipality i and j belong to
the same country and different from zero otherwise.
As a consequence, W is row-normalized while the sub-matrices are not. The reduced-
form reaction function can be written in matrix form as
τ = ρ1W
GGτ + ρ2W
FF τ + ρ3W
FGτ + Xβ + η + υ + ε (3.6)
where ρ1 is the parameter associated with the weighted average of the tax rates of
other jurisdictions in Germany if municipality i is also German. Analogically, ρ2 is the
parameter associated with the weighted average of other French municipalities’ tax
rates if municipality i is French. The coefficient ρ3 measures the effect associated with
the weighted average of the tax rates of other jurisdictions that do not belong to the
same country as municipality i. Parameters ρ1, ρ2, and ρ3 thus measure the degree
of tax interactions among German municipalities, among French municipalities, and
between French and German municipalities.
Since interactions are supposed to be strategic, tax rates are determined jointly
and are endogenous. Ordinary least squares estimates of the parameters of equation
(3.6) are inconsistent (Anselin, 1988). In order to deal with the endogeneity of com-
peting municipalities’ tax variables on the right hand side, we use an instrumental
variables (IV) approach as proposed by Kelejian and Robinson (1993) and Kelejian
6See Ge´rard, Jayet, and Paty (2010) for a similar exercise that goes beyond standard specification
of the weight matrix for Belgian municipalities.
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and Prucha (1998). Details on the set of instruments used are provided in the fol-
lowing sub-section. We develop two estimations for this static approach, one showing
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) according to
Newey and West (1987) and one with robust standard errors clustered at municipal
level as suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).
It is worth noting that tax rates in such a framework could be persistent over
time, for example because changes in tax rates might be costly for governments to
implement. To capture possible dynamic effects we include a time-lagged dependent
variable to control for persistence in tax rates
τ = γτt−1 + ρ1WGGτ + ρ2WFF τ + ρ3WFGτ + Xβ + η + υ + ε (3.7)
The presence of the lagged dependent variable in equation (3.7) together with fixed
effects requires the use of a GMM estimator as suggested by Kukenova and Monteiro
(2009), namely difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The difference GMM
estimator corrects also for the endogeneity of the spatial lags.
Our main specification allows so far for different spatial interactions in Germany
and France, namely ρ1 and ρ2. However, it assumes that the degree of cross border
interaction is the same from France to Germany and vice versa. As a robustness
check, we estimate a model that allows for asymmetric border effects.
τ = ρ1W
GGτG + ρ2W
FF τF + ρG3 W
FGτF + ρF3 W
FGτG + Xβ + η + υ + ε (3.8)
In this specification τG and τF are respective vectors of the tax rates of all the Ger-
man and all the French municipalities. In this regression the coefficient ρG3 captures
the degree of interaction of German municipalities with respect to their French neigh-
bors. The coefficient ρF3 instead shows how French municipalities interact with their
German counterparts on the other side of the border. These two coefficients provide
evidence of asymmetric cross border competition for both countries.
With similar arguments as for the introduction of two different country specific
spatial lags for the border effect, we also estimate a version of equation (3.7) in which
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we allow for different coefficients for the one period lagged dependent variable.7
The robustness of our regressions and validity of instruments is evaluated with
the usual tests after IV estimations. We show Hansen-J tests for all our estimations.
This test ensures that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals, and that
the excluded instruments do not have to be part of the main estimated equation.
To control for weak identification, we include the Kleibergen-Paap rank F test for
our instrumental variables estimations (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). For the dynamic
estimations, we need to conduct the Arellano and Bond (1991) test, denoted AR(2), to
confirm that the residuals of the first-differenced estimating equation are not second-
order correlated. All statistics are necessary to confirm the validity of the instruments
used.
3.4.3 Instruments and covariates
In our first static specification according to equation (3.6), we use spatial IV as pro-
posed by by Kelejian and Robinson (1993) and Kelejian and Prucha (1998). We are
aware that, although the standard models in spatial econometrics are useful for spec-
ification testing, they assume a parametric structure which can be sensitive to model
misspecification. Spatial autoregressive (SAR) models are useful when a well-specified
theory predicts that the dependent variable is directly affected by neighboring values
(McMillen, 2012). This is exactly our case, since our estimation is based on a well un-
derstood structural model which is in line with the traditional local tax competition
literature. Therefore, there are no concerns over the direction of the causal relation-
ships in the model. SAR models, if developed within a well specified theory, are
useful for a variety of reasons (McMillen, 2012, p. 2): “First, they provide convenient
model specification tests that indicate when a base model does not adequately account
for spatial relationships. Second, they provide convenient robustness checks that can
provide some confidence in crucial statistical results. Finally, they are currently the
only feasible way to approach estimation of an important class of models in which
the primary objective is to estimate the causal relationship of neighboring values of
the dependent variable on itself.” An estimation method such as the one proposed
7We estimate the equation τ = γGτGt−1+γ
F τFt−1+ρ1W
GGτ+ρ2W
FF τ+ρ3W
FGτ+Xβ+η+υ+ε.
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by Kelejian and Robinson (1993) adds other benefits to these advantages. IV is very
well understood, it allows discussion of the identifying assumptions, and useful tests
for exogeneity are available.
As instruments, we include the set of instruments Zi,t which fulfill the assumption
of exogeneity:
E(εi,t|Zi,t) = 0
As Kelejian and Robinson (1993) advise, all the spatially lagged covariates WX fulfill
this property and can be considered in the set of instruments.8 Note that the structure
of our theoretical model imposes causal relationships excluding E(εi,t|WXi,t) 6= 0.
The same applies to any lagged value of τi,t, at least if we are considering the static
model where we implicitly impose the assumption E(εi,t|εi,t−1) = 0. On this basis, we
can insert Wτi,t−1 in the set of instruments. Due to the theoretical structure of our
model, this can also be considered a valid instrument and was used before in similar
applications (Buettner (2001), amongst others). We investigate the appropriateness
of time lags of the spatially lagged tax rates as instruments by conducting a difference-
in-Hansen test, which checks the validity of a subset of instruments. It does this
by computing the increase in Hansen-J when the particular subset is added to the
estimation set-up.
For the dynamic GMM specification we are implicitly assuming thatE(εi,t|εi,t−1) 6=
0.9 In this case, in line with GMM applications, the set of instruments Zi,t is com-
posed of the time lagged values of the dependent variable τi,t−2 and τi,t−3 together
with WX, WGGτi,t−1, W
FF τi,t−1 and W
FGτi,t−1. Because of the structure of the
relations imposed by our theoretical model and the fact that E(εi,t|εi,t−(1+k)) = 0, by
assumption, all of our instruments can be considered statistically exogenous.
The spatial interaction parameters are only properly identified by this approach
if there is no omitted variable. We control for this issue in two ways. First, as
already mentioned, we use a fixed effect specification with time and individual fixed
effects. All possible control variables that are persistent over time, or observations,
8We do not use the spatial lags of demographic and unemployment variables as instruments. As
noted in Buettner (2001), they are found to be correlated with the error terms.
9In this case, the reaction function derived by our theory is not equation (5) anymore but
τi;t = τ(τ−i,t, τi,t−1, Xi,t)
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such as political cycles,10 can be excluded from our specification. We control for
socio economic factors that could be considered exogenous and that let τi,t vary over
time. In line with the local tax competition literature the most important sources of
variation for local taxes are unemployment rates, shares of young and old inhabitants,
and density. This is because local variations of these factors induce different levels of
public services at the local level. To capture possible variations given by vertical tax
competition, we include the vertical tax element of the Effective Average Tax Rate
(EATR) among the covariates. In addition, to take account of different local level
endowments, we include regional per capita GDP.
We perform a number of preliminary specification tests using this set of covariates.
We compute Lagrange Multiplier tests surveyed by Anselin, Le Gallo and Jayet (2008)
for spatial error correlation and a spatially lagged dependent variable, which are
robust to the respective alternative form. This ensures that a spatial autoregressive
model (SAR) is the correct specification as opposed to a spatial error model (SEM)
with spatial correlation of the error terms. The null of these tests is that there is no
spatial process. The p-values of these tests indicate that the spatial error model is
not appropriate (LM error test p-value=0.99), whereas, according to our specification,
the spatial lag model is the correct specification (LM lag test p-value=0.00). If there
are any omitted variables which are spatially correlated and also vary over time
(note that the fixed effects solve the case if those omitted variables are invariant over
time), this omission would create a spatial autocorrelation in the error term. Since
the performed robust LM test is not in favor of spatial autocorrelation in the error
term, we take this as a ’bare bone’ test of the validity of the covariates used, and the
model specification.
3.5 Data and geographical issues
The subjects of our study are local governments in the Franco-German border area.
In order to focus on the effects arising from possible interactions across this border,
we included in our sample all municipalities located within 30 km of distance to
10In our setting local elections occur in the same year in each municipality: this means that the
year fixed effects specification does already control for local elections.
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the Rhine. We focus on those local governments belonging to the German federal
state of Baden-Wuerttemberg and those in the French departments of Bas-Rhin and
Haut-Rhin. Figure 3.1 depicts the regions from which our sample is drawn. On the
French side, local governments belonging to a city union that chose the single tax rate
regime are aggregated since fiscal policy decisions are taken jointly. This provides us
a sample of 602 municipalities.
It can be argued that our sample is a spatial selection from two nations - France
and Germany - and that this selection could cause some kind of bias. We argue that
geographically and historically the Rhine Valley can be treated as a common region.
This valley is surrounded by mountains on both sides, and mountains lower spillover
effects from and to other municipalities. Therefore, our geographical choice provides
a reliable quasi-experimental setting for the identification of cross border competition
effects.
Our dataset provides annual information for the period 2000-2007 for two broad
categories: taxation and socio-economic variables. Before describing the dataset,
we demonstrate how geographical features such as neighborhood and proximity are
introduced in our setup via spatial weights.
3.5.1 Spatial weights
In the literature on tax competition governments are assumed to take account of
flights of capital to neighboring jurisdictions resulting from an increase in the origi-
nal jurisdiction’s tax rate. Thus, a scheme that assigns weights based on geographic
distance or contiguity is frequently applied in the empirical literature. First, based
on the Euclidian distance, we treat different numbers of nearby jurisdictions as neigh-
bors. The weighting scheme WNN6 for instance establishes a connection to the six
closest municipalities and assigns a weight of wNN6ij = 1/6 to each. In the context
of international interactions only jurisdictions from the foreign country are regarded
as potential candidates for neighbors. In other words, each domestic municipality is
connected only to those on the other side of the border.11
Another possibility is to express ’neighborship’ in terms of distance. This scheme
11wij = 0 if i and j are from the same country, but if not different from zero.
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Figure 3.1: Sample: The Franco-German border area
108
is given by the weight matrix WDIST and imposes a smooth distance decay, with
weights given by wDISTij where dij is the Euclidian distance between the centroids of
municipality i and municipality j. After standardization, we get
wDISTij =
1/dij∑
j
1/dij
for the elements in WDIST . We use cut-off criteria to exclude municipalities from
being neighbors if they are more than 15 km or 30 km distant.
A feature of our dataset is that the border between Germany and France coincides
with the Rhine River. This allows us to reformulate the weighting scheme based on
distance in order to take account of the local infrastructure. Crossing the border is
only possible at points where bridges or ferries establish a connection between the
two countries. Our weights wDIST INFRAij are calculated as the nearest river crossing
point from municipality i to reach municipality j in the other country. A comparison
of the ρ3 parameter with distance and this measure reveals whether it is the border
or the infrastructure enabling mobility that is important for tax rate interactions.
3.5.2 Taxation data
Taxation data are the core elements of our dataset. In order to depict the overall
burden borne by firms and to provide a comparable measure of the tax burden, we
compute the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) using the framework developed
by Devereux and Griffith (2003). These measures are often applied in studies of
international tax comparisons and the tax competition literature at the national
level. The EATR is a measure of the effect of tax on a non marginal investment,
which covers its economic costs and provides an economic profit. This is a measure
of the proportion of pre-tax economic profit that the investor gets to keep after
paying taxes. The rates calculated by this method are based on a specific form of
investment, using specific sources of financing. The methodology used to compute
the EATR is provided in the Appendix A3.1. Since we are interested in the part that
local governments can have an impact on, we calculate the local EATR by setting
all elements of the tax code not under local discretion equal to zero. This means
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that our measure will be highly correlated with local statutory tax rates. We expect
a positive impact of neighbors’ tax rates on the domestic tax rate, as shown in the
literature. However, we are mainly interested in the impact of foreign fiscal policy
choices on the decisions taken in the home country which can only be compared by
using effective tax rates.
In addition, we introduce a measure of the tax burden imposed by higher levels of
government including national corporate income taxes. In contrast to the calculation
of the local tax rate, we set everything at the discretion of the bottom level equal to
zero. This procedure allows a comparable measure of the tax burden for the local and
the higher levels to be derived. This is of particular importance for France, because
the tax base differs between a central tax on firms (corporate income tax based on
profits) and sub-national taxes. Moreover, effective tax rates allow us to account for
differences between the two countries in the composition of the corporate income tax
base (especially in capital allowances).
The literature shows that the sign of the slope of the vertical tax reaction func-
tion is theoretically ambiguous (Besley and Rosen, 1999; Keen and Kotsogiannis,
2002; Goodspeed and Leprince, 2005). On the one hand, the lower level government
may reduce tax rates in response to a tax hike at the upper levels in order to avoid
too strong pressure on the tax base. On the other hand, tax rates at one level will
rise following a tax hike at another level in order to keep revenues stable given the
resulting loss to the tax base. Whether strategic substitutability or strategic com-
plementarity between tax rates imposed by different levels of government is the more
likely outcome needs to be settled empirically. Some empirical studies find a positive
effect (Besley and Rosen, 1999; Esteller-More and Sole´-Olle´, 2001; Rizzo, 2010), and
some find an inverse relationship between upper and lower level tax rates (Hayashi
and Boadway, 2001; Brett and Pinkse, 2000). For French municipalities, Charlot and
Paty (2010) establish that regional tax rates and municipal tax rates are strategic
complements, but they find no vertical business tax interaction between municipal-
ities and departments. According to this we would expect a positive coefficient for
French municipalities. However, existing work on the French case does not test the
reaction of municipal tax rates to the central corporate income tax rate and the anal-
ysis is restricted to the business tax. Since our measure of the tax burden combines
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all the taxes borne by firms, we do not have a prior expectation over the sign of this
variable.
Notes: Decomposition of the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR). Dots represent the overall tax
burden, lines represent the tax burden due to higher than local level governments.
Figure 3.2: Decomposition of Effective Average Tax Rates (EATR)
Figure 3.2 favors the argument that local governments in the two countries have
the possibility to interact over their fiscal policy instruments. Each dot represents
the overall effective average tax rate, either in France (gray) or in Germany (black).
The distance from zero to the respective line is an average measure of the vertical
tax burden in our estimations. The difference between the line and each dot is the
additional local tax burden, which we use in logs as our dependent variable. Since
they are spread at the same intervals after 2000, municipalities potentially have the
power to interact with their foreign neighbors. Nevertheless, French municipalities
have a lower share of the overall tax burden (difference between the line and each
dot) than their German counterparts.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for the effective tax rates and the additional
vertical tax burden in both countries. We take the logs of all tax variables in our
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
Germany
local eatr τ overall 0.136 0.006 0.121 0.159 N = 1320
between 0.005 0.123 0.158 n = 165
within 0.002 0.119 0.150 T = 8
vertical eatr overall 0.241 0.017 0.231 0.285
between 0.000 0.241 0.241
within 0.017 0.231 0.285
France
local eatr τ overall 0.030 0.009 0.007 0.060 N = 3496
between 0.009 0.011 0.058 n = 437
within 0.002 0.013 0.051 T = 8
vertical eatr overall 0.316 0.007 0.308 0.333
between 0.001 0.315 0.317
within 0.007 0.309 0.332
Table 3.1: Summary statistics: Tax variables
empirical estimation.
3.5.3 Socio-economic control variables
Socio-economic variables are introduced to control for different spending needs or
preferences for public goods in the local jurisdictions and their size. The municipal-
ities in our sample are different in terms of inhabitants. In both countries the share
of small jurisdictions is quite substantial, while only a handful of large cities (Stras-
bourg, Freiburg, Baden-Baden) is included. Table 3.2 presents summary statistics
for control variables we include in our estimations.
The set of control variables includes economic variables, such as the unemployment
rate and regional GDP per capita. We include the unemployment rate since local
authorities have certain obligations to unemployed people, such as housing costs in
Germany. In addition, the number of unemployed people could be a proxy for the
cyclical stance and other economic conditions. Furthermore, the log of regional GDP,
one period lagged, is included. This controls further for economic conditions and the
fact that tax rates usually react one period later to changes in the GDP.
We also include socio-demographic variables, such as population density, propor-
tion of the population aged less than 15 years, and proportion of population aged
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Germany
young overall 16.894 2.004 6.154 23.958 N = 1320
between 1.751 9.617 20.839 n = 165
within 0.984 10.650 20.046 T = 8
old overall 16.996 3.088 7.612 28.429
between 2.833 8.547 26.987
within 1.244 13.057 20.843
unemployment overall 3.381 1.148 0.000 9.187
between 1.003 0.000 7.443
within 0.563 1.439 5.810
density overall 294.219 254.017 16.931 1698.551
between 254.611 18.034 1671.332
within 6.490 243.381 336.992
log regional gdp (t-1) overall 10.063 0.178 9.732 10.632
between 0.162 9.856 10.505
within 0.075 9.914 10.224
France
young overall 19.450 2.231 10.369 29.167 N = 3496
between 2.045 14.192 25.799 n = 437
within 0.896 14.617 24.356 T = 8
old overall 13.819 2.963 4.974 26.007
between 2.849 5.661 23.503
within 0.826 9.726 17.962
unemployment overall 5.854 2.161 0.000 15.791
between 1.962 0.985 13.955
within 0.909 0.566 10.083
density overall 177.042 219.673 19.415 2238.687
between 219.775 21.750 2184.338
within 7.212 122.774 231.391
log regional gdp (t-1) overall 10.055 0.102 9.862 10.241
between 0.048 10.003 10.100
within 0.090 9.906 10.205
Notes: young: share of inhabitants under the age of 15, old: share of inhabitants over the age of 65,
unemployment: number of unemployed as a share of total population, density: population density,
log regional gdp (t-1): log-transformed lagged value of gdp, measured at the regional level.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics: Control variables
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over 65 years. These variables can be interpreted as expenditure needs indicators and
may have a positive sign. Since the age structure of the population might reflect pref-
erences for public expenditure, these two characteristics of the population are likely
to have an impact on the level of taxation. For example, the working population is
more likely to favor a tax policy oriented to creating a good business environment
compared to the older population, whose demand for public goods might be higher.
A priority for the younger generation is the provision of kindergartens for their chil-
dren. These kinds of expenditures are imposed at the local level in both countries.
In the case of economies of scale in the supply of public goods, population density
may have a negative sign.
3.6 Results
This section discusses the results of our empirical analysis. First, we provide the
results for our basic specifications. For this first set of results, we always focus on
weights constructed using a criterion that regards the six nearest municipalities as
neighbors. Following this, we provide different robustness checks, also with other
numbers of neighbors. Later in this chapter, we compare the results of our basic
specification with an air-line distance weighting scheme and with a distance weighting
scheme reformulated to take into account the presence of infrastructure. Our main
result is that in none of our specifications is the cross border competition coefficient
ρ3 statistically different from zero. Our conclusion is that no cross border interactions
are at work and only the fiscal policy of other domestic jurisdictions is taken into
account when local governments decide over own tax rates.
3.6.1 Baseline estimates
The first two columns in Table 3.3 show the results of the main IV estimations, which
are either estimations showing robust (a) or municipal clustered (b) standard errors,
respectively. Internal spatial lags are significant in both the regressions, indepen-
dent of how standard errors are computed. Tax rates within the two countries are
correlated with the tax rates chosen by their neighboring jurisdictions. The signif-
icant coefficients ρ1 and ρ2 confirm that local jurisdictions within a given country
Spatial IV Difference GMM
Dependent Variable Model Eq. 3.6 Model Eq. 3.8 Model Eq. 3.7
ln(τ) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
equilibrium interaction coefficients
WFF ln(τ) 0.893*** 0.893*** 0.902*** 1.154*** 1.190***
(0.103) (0.124) (0.126) (0.133) (0.141)
WGG ln(τ) 0.502*** 0.502*** 0.491*** 0.636* 0.521**
(0.110) (0.180) (0.180) (0.349) (0.260)
WFG ln(τ) 0.062 0.062 -0.113 -0.032
(0.114) (0.128) (0.154) (0.083)
WFG ln(τG) if F 1.572
(2.872)
WFG ln(τF ) if G 0.024
(0.121)
lagged dependent variable
ln(τ(t−1)) -0.045
(0.033)
ln(τF(t−1)) if F -0.037
(0.034)
ln(τG(t−1)) if G 0.004
(0.045)
controls Germany
young -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.018 -0.010
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.011)
old 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.007 -0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.010)
unemployment -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
density -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log reg. GDP -0.018 -0.018 -0.016 0.014 -0.018
(0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.054) (0.061)
vertical EATR -0.025 -0.025 -0.030 -0.101** -0.107**
(0.049) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.049)
continues on next page...
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...continued from previous page
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
controls France
young -0.003** -0.003* -0.003* 0.024 0.035
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.035) (0.033)
old -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.042 0.033
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.036) (0.033)
unemployment -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
density 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
log reg. GDP 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.066 -0.063
(0.059) (0.057) (0.058) (0.062) (0.064)
vertical EATR -0.041 -0.041 -0.017 0.469* 0.483**
(0.273) (0.292) (0.297) (0.243) (0.204)
individual/year FE yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes
Std.Err. robust clustered clustered clustered clustered
Observations (n) 4214 4214 4214 3612 3612
Number of municipalities (N) 602 602 602 602 602
Hansen J 1.633 0.909 0.739 79.63 92.20
Hansen J (p-value) 0.652 0.823 0.864 0.278 0.504
K-P Underid. 119.8 73.06 45.74 . .
K-P Underid. (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 . .
K-P Weak Id. F 13.99 10.97 8.276 . .
Diff. Hansen Lags 1.633 0.909 0.140 . .
Diff. Hansen Lags (p-value) 0.652 0.823 0.932 . .
AR(1) test . . . -3.277 -3.202
AR(1) (p-value) . . . 0.001 0.001
AR(2) test . . . 1.441 1.540
AR(2) (p-value) . . . 0.150 0.124
#of instruments (excluded) 24 (6) 24 (6) 25 (7) 95 (6) 116 (6)
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipal level,
model (a) with robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Spatial weights are calculated regarding the six nearest municipalities as neighbors (WNN6).
Standard errors are computed as indicated in the table and shown in parenthesis. Model (c) includes
a linear and quadratic time trend and model (g) includes a constant (not reported here).
Table 3.3: Regression results
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interact over their tax instruments. This result is in line with the empirical litera-
ture that establishes a positive relationship between local municipalities’ tax rates in
France (Jayet, Paty, and Pentel, 2002; Charlot and Paty, 2007, 2010) and Germany
(Buettner, 2001). Our results provide empirical support for the study of Geys and
Osterloh (2011) which uses questionnaires and shows that German mayors do not
consider foreign municipalities to be their main competitors. Note that the matrix
decomposition does not allow for normalization; hence we cannot directly discuss the
magnitude of this coefficient. Since we obtain positive coefficients, we can conclude
that there is a competition effect within the country, but not across the border. In
column (c) we allow for asymmetric cross border effects and include separate coeffi-
cients for French and German cross-border interactions according to equation (3.8).
However, this does not change the results as foreign effects are still insignificant and
domestic effects remain largely as before.
Unemployment, density, and young population explain the rest of the variance
showing negative coefficients. A greater share of young people significantly decreases
the tax rate in France. This might be due to the fact that, although communities
have to provide services to this group, their parents favor business friendly policies
since they are most likely still to be of working age. Both countries try to counteract
unemployment by lowering tax rates in order to establish an attractive environment
for business activities, but this effect is only significant for German municipalities.
The instrumentation strategy for these models was explained in Section 3.4.3.
Its relevance is verified by a set of tests: the Hansen-J test indicates that the or-
thogonality of the set of instruments with respect to the residuals cannot be rejected.
Furthermore, the Difference-in-Hansen test on the time lags as additional instruments
does not reject their validity. We can conclude that our instruments are exogenous,
and cannot be considered as weak according to the Kleibergen-Paap rank F statistic.
In the dynamic GMM specification (equation 3.7, column (d) in Table 3.3), all the
variance from the covariates is attracted by the time lag, which fails to be significant
but has a negative sign. The result for cross border interactions remain unchanged,
and tax competition is confined to within the countries. In this estimation the vertical
element of the tax system also has an impact on the own tax rate. These coefficients
are now significant in both of the countries, but most interestingly, signs differ across
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them. German municipalities show up with a negative sign, which implies that they
react to a decrease on the higher level with an increase of own tax rates. On the
French side things go hand in hand: the lower level follows an increase of taxes at
the higher levels of government with the same action.
The Hansen-J test again confirms the validity of instruments. The Arellano-Bond
tests for AR(1) and AR(2) reveal that autocorrelation is treated in the right way.
We use 95 instruments, a number that is acceptable in light of the number of cross-
sections in this estimation (602). This ensures that the Hansen test is not weakened
by the proliferation of instruments (Roodman, 2009).
The time lag captures the tax rate trend over time, but trends might be different
in the two countries. Model (e) takes this into account by allowing for different
responses of municipalities in the two countries. Now signs go in different directions,
indicating a rising trend in Germany and a falling trend in France. However, the
coefficients are still not significant. An explanation behind this result is that we use
effective tax rates instead of statutory ones. Since these tax rates gather information
from different underlying taxes, as property and business taxes, we do not find a
significant effect even though individual taxes might be serially correlated.
3.6.2 Robustness to spatial truncation and the sample size
So far we restricted our sample to municipalities inside a 30-kilometer-wide Rhine
border area. It could be argued that local governments in each country are presum-
ably interacting with governments outside this area. Since the tax rates of those
governments are not considered, the model could appear to be not well specified. A
first answer to this concern has been given in the data section: the Rhine Valley can
be treated as a valley surrounded by mountains, and mountains lower spillover effects
from and to other municipalities. As a consequence, the spatial truncation should
not bias the results as interactions with municipalities outside this area are unlikely.
Another way to think about this problem is to consider samples of different geo-
graphical size. Should any selection bias to be induced via geographical truncation,
this would lead to overestimation of the cross border coefficient and underestimation
of the domestic lags if we restrict our sample to municipalities which are close to the
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Dependent Variable 20km 30km all
ln(τ) (a) (b) (c)
equilibrium interaction coefficients
W FF ln(τ) 0.880*** 0.893*** 0.879***
s.e. (0.175) (0.124) (0.286)
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.002
95% CI [0.538 - 1.222] [0.649 - 1.136] [0.319 - 1.438]
WGG ln(τ) 0.523** 0.502*** 0.361
s.e. (0.254) (0.180) (0.362)
p-value 0.040 0.005 0.318
95% CI [0.025 - 1.020] [0.149 - 0.856] [-0.347 - 1.070]
W FG ln(τ) 0.053 0.062 0.046
s.e. (0.131) (0.128) (0.193)
p-value 0.687 0.630 0.812
95% CI [-0.204 - 0.310] [-0.189 - 0.312] [-0.332 - 0.424]
Observations (n) 2429 4214 5530
Number of municipalities (N) 347 602 790
individual/year FE yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes
Hansen J (p-value) 0.822 0.823 0.849
K-P Weak Id. F 3.054 10.97 15.54
Diff. Hansen Lags (p-value) 0.822 0.823 0.849
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipal level.
95% CI in square brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Only main coefficients reported. List of covariates as before. See Table 3.9 in Appendix A3.2
for details. Model (a) includes only municipalities not more distant than 20km from the respective
border. Model (b) repeats the main estimations shown in Table 3.3 for comparison. Model (c)
includes all municipalities in adjacent counties and regions.
Table 3.4: Regressions for different distances to the border
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border. Table 3.4 shows the results for the full sample in column (b) and for a re-
stricted sample, excluding 255 municipalities which are located between 20 and 30 km
distance to the border in column (a). Column (c) instead includes all municipalities
in the two French regions which are adjacent to the border and in all German counties
which either touch the border or are located inside a border touching county. This
sample could be considered as a full sample drawn from a closed region according
to political criteria. Results from this excercise mitigate concerns of a selction bias.
Model (a) does not show different results compared to (b), but should be interpreted
with caution, since instruments are rather weak in this sample. However, the sample
including all municipalities (c) shows similar results for the French domestic effect
and no significant effects anymore in Germany. The results of no competition with
respect to foreign municipalities remains unchanged in all models. Note that the
95% confidence interval around the point estimate is larger in the full sample. This
strengthens the result of no international interaction effects, because any bias intro-
duced through a too small sample selection would work against our main conclusion
of no international interactions. Therefore, the small sample used so far provides
reliable evidence for this result, and this finding is stable when increasing the sample
size. However, domestic competition in Germany might be specific to the sample and
more prevalent very close to the border.
3.6.3 Robustness to the construction of weights and infras-
tructural means
So far all estimations were computed by using a weighting matrix that regards the
six municipalities close by as neighbors to calculate the spatial weights. Since the
applied weighting scheme is exogenously chosen, we want to confirm that results are
indeed unchanged if we apply another set of weights.
Several robustness checks, shown in Table 3.5, confirm our previous findings. The
four estimations (a) to (d) regard the four, six, eight, and ten nearest municipalities as
neighbors. Results are, however, similar to those obtained in the baseline estimations.
The domestic spatial lags indicate significant interactions, while the coefficient on the
foreign spatial lag remains insignificant.
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Dependent Variable WNN4 WNN6 WNN8 WNN10
ln(τ) (a) (b) (c) (d)
equilibrium interaction coefficients
W FF ln(τ) 0.815*** 0.893*** 0.928*** 0.912***
s.e. (0.113) (0.124) (0.126) (0.129)
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
95% CI [0.594 - 1.036] [0.649 - 1.136] [0.682 - 1.174] [0.660 - 1.164]
WGG ln(τ) 0.393*** 0.502*** 0.572*** 0.641***
s.e. (0.115) (0.180) (0.189) (0.218)
p-value 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.003
95% CI [0.168 - 0.618] [0.149 - 0.856] [0.202 - 0.941] [0.213 - 1.068]
W FG ln(τ) -0.035 0.062 0.048 0.065
s.e. (0.058) (0.128) (0.095) (0.101)
p-value 0.541 0.630 0.615 0.524
95% CI [-0.148 - 0.078] [-0.189 - 0.312] [-0.138 - 0.234] [-0.134 - 0.263]
individual/year FE yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes
Hansen J (p-value) 0.619 0.823 0.733 0.872
K-P Weak Id. F 10.77 10.97 19.06 30.16
Diff. Hansen Lags (p-value) 0.619 0.823 0.733 0.872
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipal level. N=602, n=4214
95% CI in square brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Only main coefficients reported. List of covariates as before. See Table 3.10 in Appendix A3.2 for details. Spatial weights are calculated by using (a)
4, (b) 6 as before, (c) 8, (d) 10, nearest municipalities as neighbors.
Table 3.5: Results for different spatial weights
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We are also interested to know whether the border or a gap in infrastructure
is responsible for this absence of cross border competition. The use of adjacent
municipalities as neighbors, independent of the means of reaching them, suggests that
direct information spill-overs could be excluded as the underlying reason, as long as
the results are non-significant. When taxes are set to attract, or at least not to lose
capital, the municipalities that are easier to reach will be the most likely competitors.
We compute weights based on distance to analyze this question. We distinguish
between weights based on air-line distance (WDIST ) and another set of weights where
the Rhine, and hence the border, can only be crossed where infrastructure allows it
(WDIST INFRA). In other words, the measure of the distance takes account of the
presence of a bridge or a ferry to cross the Rhine and to commute between France
and Germany.
Columns (a) and (c) in Table 3.6 show the results for air-line distance according
to equation 3.6; infrastructure is accounted for in columns (b) and (d). The first two
estimations are for a cut-off distance of 15 kilometers, the last two for 30 kilometers.
Since the results do not indicate differences between alternatives in terms of signifi-
cance, we can exclude any explanation for possible interactions. The results for the
cross-border term are also insignificant in the infrastructure specification, and domes-
tic tax rates do not respond to those of potential neighboring competitors for capital
abroad. Nevertheless, the internal coefficients of the two countries are significant if
neighborship is defined in terms of distance. Finally, although we allow for different
means of interaction, cross-border spillovers are absent from all the specifications.
3.7 Conclusion
A gap in the empirical literature on fiscal interactions is the question of whether
local governments interact with other local jurisdictions across national borders. It
has been well documented that taxation decisions at the national level depend on the
decisions in other countries. This applies also to sub-national governments within
a specific country, which interact with other domestic governments. Whether local
governments tend to mimic their foreign counterparts, however, is an open question.
We conducted an empirical investigation of this question. The European Union and
122
Dependent Variable WDIST with dij < 15km W
DIST with dij < 30km
ln(τ) (a) dist (b) infra (c) dist (d) infra
equilibrium interaction coefficients
WFF ln(τ) 1.206*** 1.223*** 1.384*** 1.406***
s.e. (0.170) (0.172) (0.237) (0.240)
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
95% CI [0.872 - 1.539] [0.886 - 1.560] [0.920 - 1.848] [0.936 - 1.875]
WGG ln(τ) 0.679*** 0.591*** 0.840** 0.741*
s.e. (0.221) (0.196) (0.429) (0.378)
p-value 0.002 0.003 0.050 0.050
95% CI [0.247 - 1.111] [0.206 - 0.976] [0.000 - 1.681] [-0.001 - 1.482]
WFG ln(τ) 0.045 0.003 0.008 -0.015
s.e. (0.096) (0.078) (0.166) (0.147)
p-value 0.642 0.965 0.959 0.917
95% CI [-0.143 - 0.233] [-0.149 - 0.156] [-0.316 - 0.333] [-0.303 - 0.272]
individual/year FE yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes
Hansen J (p-value) 0.741 0.600 0.337 0.281
K-P Weak Id. F 50.03 44.37 50.91 90.88
Diff. Hansen Lags (p-value) 0.741 0.600 0.337 0.281
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipal level. N=602, n=4214
95% CI in square brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Only main coefficients reported. List of covariates as before. See Table A3.2 in Appendix A3.2 for details. Spatial weights are calculated according
to the distance between the jurisdictions centroids. Models (a) and (b) cut-off after 15km, (c) to (d) after 30km. Models indicated by ’dist’ show the air-line
distance, while those indicated by ’infra’ take into account infrastructure between the two countries.
Table 3.6: Results for distance weights
123
its common internal market is a convenient environment for this examination because
there are no legal barriers to the free movement of capital. The Franco-German
context is of particular interest since revenues from business taxation are an important
element of local governments’ budgets and have an intense impact on firms’ after-tax
profits. Local jurisdictions in the border area, from which we construct our sample,
might try to increase their tax bases. We investigate if they do so relative to other
domestic tax regimes, relative to other foreign regimes, or relative to both types of
jurisdictions.
Our results do not confirm that domestic municipalities interact with foreign
ones. Although we apply a variety of definitions for neighborship, the interaction
terms are not significant. We find no evidence of local-international interactions.
This finding is consistent with the view that local jurisdictions pay attention only
to their domestic counterparts, taking an earlier choice over the country as given.
An intuitive explanation for our result is that the costs connected to cross-border
competition are comparatively high. Other national characteristics, besides pure tax
elements, might be more important for the decision about where to settle a business.
In particular, the institutional and cultural framework, and the use of a different
language, might create strong frictions on mobility. These points might be more
important than small differentials in tax rates. Once the decision in which country
to do business is taken, only the question of in which specific region the investment
should take place remains open. Thus, local governments strive to remain attractive
only relative to their domestic neighbors. Our results can also be interpreted as a
indirect test for regional mobility of capital, which in our case seems not to be very
mobile across the River Rhine. Most important, taxes are set by politicians. The costs
to them of comparing domestic and foreign tax codes are higher than making simple
within-country comparisons. The different tax bases can create a particular problem
for local politicians trying to evaluate their position relative to foreign municipalities.
Although our empirical results exclude local interactions across national borders,
further theoretical work could determine under which conditions interactions would
be likely to occur. In addition, the variety of sub-national taxation systems, lan-
guages, and other characteristics in Europe would suggest the need for more empirical
research in different directions. Future work could concentrate on regions where some
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barriers are absent (e.g. language in the case of Germany and Austria) or the mobil-
ity of capital is affected (accession to the European Union). A better understanding
of the border effect in a borderless Europe seems to be interesting and important.
A3 Appendix
A3.1 Local Effective Average Tax Rates
We compute Effective Average Tax Rates (EATR) according to the method proposed
by Devereux and Griffith (2003). Using this method, the impact of tax is measured
by the extent to which the pre-tax economic rent R∗ is reduced by taxation. The
EATR is a measure of the proportion of pre-tax economic profit that the investor
gets to keep after paying taxes. It is based on the difference between the Net Present
Value of the perturbation in the capital stock in the absence and presence of tax,
R∗ − R, which is a measure of the total impact of taxation on the investor. This
difference is scaled using the Net Present Value of the pre-tax total income stream,
net of depreciation,
EATR =
R∗ −R
p
(1+r)
where p is the pre-tax financial return of the investment and r the real interest rate.
Assumptions are made about the values of these two parameters (see Table 3.7). We
define R∗ as the economic rent of the project in the absence of tax:
R∗ =
p− r
1 + r
We also define R as the economic rent of the project in the presence of tax (where
tax is the sum of all taxes which have an impact on the investment project):
R =
(p− r)(1− tax)
1 + r
Table 3.7 sums the value of the economic parameters we use in all the calculations.
We use the same economic parameters for the calculation in all periods and both
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countries to figure out the evolution of taxation parameters and the differences in the
tax systems rather than the development of economic conditions. Five different types
of investment are considered - buildings, financial assets, machinery, intangibles and
inventories. These hypothetical investments can be financed through three different
sources - retained earnings, debt, and new equity.
Variable Symbol Value in %
True economic depreciation rates
intangibles δINT 15.35
industrial buildings δBUI 3.1
machinery δMAC 17.5
finacial assets δFIN 0
inventories δINV 0
Economic parameters
Real interest rate r 5
Inflation rate pi 2
Pre-tax rate of return for EATR p 20
Nominal interest rate (%) i = (1 + r)(1 + pi)− 1 7.1
Table 3.7: Parametrization
Investments in industrial buildings trigger liability for real estate tax in both
countries. The tax base is determined by the notional annual rent were the property
to be lent in the open market. However this notional rent is often substantially lower
than the market rental value, even if every year the notional rent is multiplied by a
factor to reflect the national variation in prices.12 In Germany these values relate to
the location’s market values in the past and are not linked to recent market values. In
these cases, ZEW (2008) makes assumptions concerning the country-specific relation
between the acquisition cost used in the model and the tax value determined by the
tax offices. In Table 3.8, we give the rental value rate σ for each type of capital.
σ machinery buildings
France 16% (tp) 8% (tp) 4% (tf)
Germany 25% (pt)
Table 3.8: Rental value rate
12In France, individual property values have not been reviewed by the tax authorities since 1974.
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Applying this parameterization, the tax laws related to the local taxes and the
above described equations, we are able to compute country-specific effective aver-
age tax rates for a set of five investment goods (buildings, machinery, inventory,
finacial and intangible assets) and three financing opportunities (retained earnings,
new equity and debt). Instead of calculating effective tax rates for each of these
15 combinations and then weighting them by a country-specific EATR, we compute
financed-weighted effective tax rates for each asset. According to OECD (1991) we
can use the following weights: 55% retained earnings, 10% new equity, and 35% debt.
Next, we follow the European Commission (2001) and use equal weights for each asset
to calculate municipal-specific averages of the EATR for both countries. We obtain
the tax rates of the different government levels by setting the taxes on other levels
equal to zero.
A3.2 Detailed regression results
This appendix provides the complete regression tables for all control variables which
were ommited from the tables in the text.
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Dependent Variable 20km 30km all
ln(τ) (a) (b) (c)
equilibrium interaction coefficients
WFF ln(τ) 0.880*** 0.893*** 0.879***
(0.175) (0.124) (0.286)
WGG ln(τ) 0.523** 0.502*** 0.361
(0.254) (0.180) (0.362)
WFG ln(τ) 0.053 0.062 0.046
(0.131) (0.128) (0.193)
controls Germany
young -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
old -0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
unemployment -0.003 -0.002* -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.009)
density -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log reg. GDP -0.014 -0.018 -0.094
(0.037) (0.039) (0.170)
vertical EATR -0.003 -0.025 -0.018
(0.050) (0.043) (0.099)
controls France
young -0.004 -0.003* 0.010
(0.003) (0.002) (0.015)
old -0.006** -0.003 -0.021
(0.003) (0.002) (0.015)
unemployment -0.001 -0.000 0.005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.011)
density 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
log reg. GDP 0.050 0.003 0.138
(0.069) (0.057) (0.283)
vertical EATR -0.060 -0.041 0.185
(0.328) (0.292) (1.398)
individual/year FE yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes
Std.Err. clustered clustered clustered
Observations (n) 2429 4214 5530
Number of municipalities (N) 347 602 790
Hansen J 0.915 0.909 0.801
Hansen J (p-value) 0.822 0.823 0.849
K-P Underid. 9.676 73.060 42.090
K-P (p-value) 0.046 0.000 0.000
K-P Weak Id. F 3.054 10.97 15.54
Diff. Hansen Lags 0.915 0.909 0.801
Diff. Hansen Lags (p-value) 0.822 0.823 0.849
#of instruments (excluded) 24 (6) 24 (6) 24 (6)
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipal level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Complete table for the results presented in Table 3.4. Model (a) includes only municipalities
not more distant than 20km from the respective border. Model (b) repeats the main estimations
shown in Table 3.3 for comparison. Model (c) includes all municipalities in adjacent counties and
regions.
Table 3.9: Regressions for different distances to the border
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Dependent Variable WNN4 WNN6 WNN8 WNN10
ln(τ) (a) (b) (c) (d)
equilibrium interaction coefficients
WFF ln(τ) 0.815*** 0.893*** 0.928*** 0.912***
(0.113) (0.124) (0.126) (0.129)
WGG ln(τ) 0.393*** 0.502*** 0.572*** 0.641***
(0.115) (0.180) (0.189) (0.218)
WFG ln(τ) -0.035 0.062 0.048 0.065
(0.058) (0.128) (0.095) (0.101)
controls Germany
young -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
old 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
unemployment -0.003** -0.002* -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
density -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log reg. GDP -0.013 -0.018 -0.020 -0.028
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
vertical EATR -0.029 -0.025 -0.017 -0.004
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
controls France
young -0.004* -0.003* -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
old -0.004* -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unemployment -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
density -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log reg. GDP 0.034 0.003 -0.007 -0.016
(0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.059)
vertical EATR -0.039 -0.041 -0.017 -0.098
(0.282) (0.292) (0.289) (0.285)
Hansen J 1.782 0.909 1.285 0.704
Hansen J (p-value) 0.619 0.823 0.733 0.872
K-P Underid. 76.75 73.06 90.71 102.9
K-P (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
K-P Weak Id. F 10.77 10.97 19.06 30.16
Diff. Hansen Lags 1.782 0.909 1.285 0.704
Diff. Hansen Lags (p-value) 0.619 0.823 0.733 0.872
#of instruments (excluded) 24 (6) 24 (6) 24 (6) 24 (6)
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipal level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Complete table for the results presented in Table 3.5. Spatial weights are calculated by using
(a) 4, (b) 6 as before, (c) 8, (d) 10, nearest municipalities as neighbors.
Table 3.10: Results for different spatial weights
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Dependent Variable WDIST with dij < 15km W
DIST with dij < 30km
ln(τ) (a) dist (b) infra (c) dist (d) infra
equilibrium interaction coefficients
WFF ln(τ) 1.206*** 1.223*** 1.384*** 1.406***
(0.170) (0.172) (0.237) (0.240)
WGG ln(τ) 0.679*** 0.591*** 0.840** 0.741*
(0.221) (0.196) (0.429) (0.378)
WFG ln(τ) 0.045 0.003 0.008 -0.015
(0.096) (0.078) (0.166) (0.147)
controls Germany
young -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
old 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
unemployment 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
density -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log reg. GDP -0.040 -0.046 -0.048 -0.057
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
vertical EATR -0.043 -0.056 -0.057 -0.071
(0.047) (0.046) (0.062) (0.059)
controls France
young -0.003 -0.003 -0.004* -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
old -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unemployment 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
density -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log reg. GDP -0.080 -0.090 -0.109 -0.121*
(0.060) (0.060) (0.067) (0.064)
vertical EATR 0.240 0.292 0.414 0.481
(0.323) (0.323) (0.422) (0.417)
Hansen J 1.250 1.870 3.379 3.827
Hansen J (p-value) 0.741 0.600 0.337 0.281
K-P Underid. 148.3 150.9 68.91 162.5
K-P (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
K-P Weak Id. F 50.03 44.37 50.91 90.88
Diff. Hansen Lags 1.250 1.870 3.379 3.827
Diff. Hansen Lags (p-value) 0.741 0.600 0.337 0.281
#of instruments (excluded) 24 (6) 24 (6) 24 (6) 24 (6)
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipal level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Complete table for the results presented in Table 3.6. Spatial weights are calculated according
to the distance between the jurisdictions centroids. Models (a) and (b) cut-off after 15km, (c) to (d)
after 30km. Models indicated by ’dist’ show the air-line distance, while those indicated by ’infra’
take into account infrastructure between the two countries.
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